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ABSTRACT

Over the course of several centuries during the Middle Ages the people of Holland
developed a vast water-management infrastructure to protect themselves against flooding. They
found that the best way to maintain these defenses was through cooperation and consensus
forming at the local and regional level. Those who would be affected by an inundation were
given the chance to participate in the decision-making process over flood prevention. These
environmental influences led those in Holland to develop the poldermodel, a culture based on
discussion, debate, compromise, and consensus forming.
In the late sixteenth century a series of natural and human-made floods would test the
limits of the poldermodel in Holland. In November 1570 the All Saints Day Flood struck the
province (arguably the worst flood ever) devastating its flood defenses. Before they had time to
repair all the damages, war erupted in 1572 as those in Holland revolted against their Spanish
Habsburg sovereign. Outmatched by the Habsburg forces, the Holland rebels frequently used
floods for strategic ends. They carried out these military inundations almost indiscriminately and
with little regard for the long-term consequences. That the rebels adopted the motto “better
broken lands than lost lands” demonstrates how far they were willing to go with the use of the
military inundations.
These floods broke the poldermodel in Holland, as many of the different cities
represented in the provincial assembly, the States of Holland placed civic priorities above all
else. The city of Gouda simply refused to send delegates to the meetings until a nearby dike was
repaired which had been during a siege. This civic particularism prevented discussion, debate,
and the ability to form consensus. It was the individuals with water-management experience
which ultimately repaired the poldermodel. They developed a number of ways to satisfy the
viii

civic interests and rebuild the discussion culture in the province. When the war resumed
following a short truce from 1576 to 1579 known as the Pacification of Ghent, the States of
Holland maintained the poldermodel by shifting the burden of the inundations onto neighboring
provinces, and constructing fortifications to keep the enemy out of Holland.

ix

INTRODUCTION

Did the Hollanders flood their lands through foolishness or in an act of madness
questioned the Maas river. To which the Ocean responded, “Not through foolishness, nor
madness, but from great need,” as the Spanish Habsburg government wanted them dead. The
chronicler Pieter Bor included this imagined dialogue in his compendious account of the Dutch
Revolt (1572-1648). The point of this conversation was to make sense of the epic relief of the
siege of Leiden in 1574, in which the Dutch military purposefully flooded roughly half of the
province of southern Holland to save the city.1 The two bodies of water were right to question
the practice; intentional floods were anathema to Dutch historical experience of tirelessly
working to protect the land from inundations.
For centuries, those in Holland and the other low-lying provinces of the Low Countries
had protected the landscape from floods only through great effort and determination. In the
Middle Ages local communities built polders, stretches of land enclosed by a dike or
embankment in which the water level could be artificially controlled through sluices, and later in
the fifteenth century with water-lifting mills. In the process of building these flood defenses the
Dutch developed a unique form of social organization and cooperation known as the
poldermodel. The underlying premise of this theory is that the construction and maintenance of
dikes and other water-management technologies required individuals in a community to work
together and collaborate. Any single breach in an individual’s section of the dike meant disaster
for the whole community. In short, as the Dutch navigated the challenges of living in low-lying
lands they developed a social and political culture based on consensus-forming and compromise.
1

Pieter Bor, Oorsprongk,Begin, en Vervolgh der Historie der Nederlandsche Oorlogen
(Amsterdam, Abraham Wolfgangh, Hendrick Boom, and Dirck Boom, 1679), 549.
1

This dissertation asks the question: What happened to the poldermodel when polders
were intentionally destroyed by military inundations during the Dutch Revolt? Although tactical
floods occurred in many provinces, the research here is largely restricted to the province of
Holland. There is good justification for this focus. The first round of fighting associated with
the Revolt began in 1568, but it was largely suppressed and confined to the southern provinces of
Flanders and Brabant. The Revolt kicked off anew in 1572, and from this point forward the
province of Holland would take a leading role. Thus Holland became not only the most
important province in the Revolt against the Spanish Habsburg state, but it was also the site of
the most military inundations during the course of the war. In addition to this study’s geographic
confines, there are temporal ones as well. The Dutch Revolt dragged out over the course of
roughly eighty years, but since the majority of tactical floods occurred within the first two
decades, the focus here is on the period from 1570 to 1590. The answer to the research question
is as follows: the inundations, both natural and man-made, broke the poldermodel, which was
then repaired by individuals with water-management experience, after which, the poldermodel
was maintained by pushing military inundations onto adjacent provinces and systematizing the
floods closer to home. In short, the age old struggle against the water in Holland brought the
Dutch together; using the water as a weapon during the Revolt nearly tore them apart.
Chapter one discusses the poldermodel theory in greater detail. It focuses on the
geological development of the province of Holland and how the watery conditions there
impacted social development. The chapter discusses the salient components of the poldermodel,
specifically the ability of interested parties to debate and a venue where they can hold the debate.
In short, these sections examine how environmental influences helped the Dutch developed a
consensus-forming culture. The final section of the chapter examines the militarization of the
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landscape, looking at the historiography concerning the relationship between environmental
history and military history.
The second chapter examines the All Saints Day Flood in 1570 and its political
consequences. The flood is arguably the worst in the history of the Netherlands. All the
provinces along the North Sea coast suffered incredible devastation. In response to this natural
disaster the States of Holland engaged in a prolonged debate with the Habsburg monarch Philip
II and his advisors in the Low Countries about possible tax exemptions in Holland. The States
wished to secure tax reductions so that money could be used for dike repairs across the province.
The Habsburg response, however, was uncompromising as the central government desperately
needed Holland’s revenue. This issue was one of many that drove a wedge between the
Habsburg government and the States of Holland. The States ended these talks with the eerily
prophetic warning that the Habsburg policies left them with no legal recourse.
Attention then turns towards the military inundations during the first years of the Dutch
Revolt, from the capture of Brill in Holland in 1572 to the temporary truce secured in the
Pacification of Ghent in 1576. The rebel forces under the command of Prince William of Orange
were outmatched by the numerically superior and more experienced Spanish forces. In light of
this reality, the Prince and the States of Holland continually employed military inundations as a
means of achieving their strategic objectives. The relief of Leiden in 1574 was by the far the
largest tactical flood, yet it was only one of numerous inundations across the province. Before
each of these inundations the States made a promise to repair the damages which resulted from
these maneuvers.
Chapter four examines what happened when the States of Holland failed to honor these
promises. It appears there was an honest desire on the part of the States to repair the damages,
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but a lack of money and shifting priorities meant that many of the repairs went unfinished. The
temporary peace during the Pacification of Ghent, from 1576 to 1579, seemed to offer the States
of Holland the opportunity to finally carry through with their promises. Nevertheless, the
opportunity went begging, as different cities in Holland began looking after their own interests at
the expense of the provincial priorities and comprehensive repairs. The city of Gouda in
particular, simply stopped sending representatives to the States of Holland until the breach in the
Leidschendam was repaired. The military inundations had broken the poldermodel.
The next chapter examines three individuals and their role in repairing the poldermodel.
Abraham van Almonde, Johan van Oldenbernevelt, and Paulus Buys all had experience in water
management before the outbreak of the Revolt. The tactical floods during the first years of the
fighting created a distinct need for individuals such as them with expertise in dike repair and
other water-management matters. In different ways each of these three men found solutions to
the lingering problems from the floods, and in the process advanced their political careers.
Chapter six discusses the States of Holland’s attempts to maintain the poldermodel after
the war resumed in 1579. They pursued to strategies simultaneously to achieve this end. First,
they ensured that the most destructive military practices, inundations and scorched-earth
campaigns, occurred on the “foreign soils” of Brabant and Flanders. This strategy is evident
during the siege of Antwerp in which the States Army decimated the northern coast of Flanders
with repeated floods in an effort to relieve the city. The States Army was equally destructive in
the Meierij district around the town of ‘s-Hertogenbosch in Brabant, where it systematically
burnt and plundered the area. The second strategy involved efforts to integrate fortifications
within existing water-management systems. This tactic helped improve a town’s fortification by
harmonizing flood defenses with military defenses. This integration also led to the development
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of waterlines, a string of fortifications which could systematically inundate entire regions in
order to prevent the passage of enemy troops.

5

CHAPTER ONE - THE POLDERMODEL AND THE MILITARIZATION OF THE
LANDSCAPE

Introduction

This chapter discusses the geological development of the province of Holland before the
Revolt, and how the water conditions there affected the development of local communities. In
order to prevent floods the Dutch developed polders, small areas surrounded by dikes in which
the water level could be artificially maintained. At the same time they created a number of
organizations tasked with overseeing these water-management infrastructures. These unique
developments helped to create a society which valued discussion, debate, and consensusforming, known as the poldermodel. The influence of the poldermodel was not confined to
environmental practices, but was pervasive throughout society as is evident in the political events
in the Low Countries throughout the Middle Ages and up to the break out of the Dutch Revolt in
1572.
The last section of this chapter discusses the militarization of the landscape, and the
historiography regarding the relationship between environmental history and military history.
The focus is on issues relating to tactical and resource management consideration relating to
warfare. It discusses the complex ways in which environmental matters can influence war and
also wars effect on the natural world. The case of Holland offers a unique situation in which the
water that was used as a weapon was also an important resource to be managed.

6

Forming the Polder

The most important aspect of Holland’s environment was the predominance of peat
swamps. During prehistoric times the land of Holland was periodically underwater for extended
periods. The abundance of water resting on the surface slowed and prevented the complete
decay of organic material, creating peat. This created fen peats, or wetland areas, which
stretched across large portions of Holland. This base of fen peat and generally water-logged
conditions created an environment which favored plant life that required fewer nutrients, such as
peat moss. The proliferation and subsequent partial decay of this plant led to the formation of
peat bogs across Holland, which had important ramifications on the landscape. As the peat moss
decayed, a capillary action took place, which actually artificially raised the elevation of the peat
bog. Some of these peat bogs stretched as far as ten to fifteen kilometers in diameter, and could
have been artificially elevated as much as four to ten meters.1 This inhospitable environment
limited settlements to the higher elevated areas along river banks and the dunes.
During the eleventh and twelfth centuries an intense wave of land reclamation occurred
in Holland. The impetus for this escalation in reclamation, from avoiding the wet peat areas
towards one of colonizing them, is consonant with similar trends throughout Europe. The High
Middle Ages in Europe witnessed a surge in population, increasing sixfold between the midseventh and mid-fourteenth centuries. 2 Areas throughout Europe that had once been considered
frontier or wilderness, such as central Holland, became colonized during this period. The

1

William TeBrake, “Taming the Waterwolf: Hydraulic Engineering and Water Management in
the Netherlands during the Middle Ages,” Technology and Culture 43 (2002): 480.
2

William TeBrake, Medieval Frontier: Culture and Ecology in Rijnland (College Station, TX:
Texas A & M University Press, 1985), 21-52.
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technology and methods required were simple. The colonists simply dug a drainage canal to
collect the excess water and connect it to another waterway. As the peat bogs were artificially
elevated, gravity provided the energy needed for drainage. The colonists also built a dike along
the water ways to protect against flooding and developed sluices to regulate water flow.
During this period the Count of Holland acquired rights to the wastelands portions in the
interior of the province. Up to this point, settlements had been confined to the higher-lying areas
along the dunes or dikes and adjoining lands. In order to turn the wastelands into productive
areas the Count entered into agreements with individuals or groups willing to reclaim the land. In
addition to laying down terms for the reclamation area, these contracts helped to normalize the
agreement between the count and the settlers. These functioned as a sort of “constitution” for the
community, where “everything that needed to be regulated between authorities and subjects was
laid down in it.” The reclaimers had full control over their lands. Furthermore, they could
administer low justice and oversee the local government in conjunction with the sheriff, who was
appointed by the Count. In exchange the Count received taxation and soldiers in times of war.3
The agreement allowed the self-governing villages to oversee the construction,
maintenance, and repair of dikes, dams, canals, and sluices within their localities. The
maintenance regulations developed in an ad-hoc fashion with little uniformity, but there were
some common practices. In general, individuals were assigned a maintenance pledge, a section
of the dike which was their responsibility to look after. In order to ensure the individual took
adequate care of their dike section, and to prevent flooding, the villages formed a special
administrative organization. The village members elected representatives known as heemraden

3

G.P. van de Ven, Man-Made Lowlands: History of Water management and reclamation in the
Netherlands. 4th ed. (Utrecht: Stichting Matrijs, 2004), 71.
8

who were tasked with carrying out inspections on the different water works.4 The connection
with local works is evidenced with the name, as heem in this regard means living place, while
raad means councilor, so the term literally translates as a counselor for local affairs.5
For issues which transcended local boundaries, organizations known as water boards
developed. Similar to the heemraden at the local level, these were administrative bodies tasked
with overseeing specific dikes, sluices, or other hydraulic implements. In some cases the Count
of Holland distributed the privilege of caring for these structures to local villages or water
boards, depending on their significance. In other cases local communities took it upon
themselves to arrange for the care of regionally important structures. In these first centuries of
sustained water-management activities the jurisdictional boundaries were rather porous. A single
area might contain several water boards depending on a number of geographic factors and its
relations with neighboring communities. Over time the numerous waterboards coalesced into a
single regional water board, known as hoogheemraadenschappen, or literally association of
superior heemraden.
The history of the regional water board of Rijnland provides a good example of how this
process could occur. In the eleventh century fifteen self-governing villages took the initiative to
improve the water conditions in the area north of Leiden, by closing off several rivers, digging
several drainage canals, and constructing seven sluices. The villages agreed to the formation of
the Rijnland water board. The permanent members of the board were tasked with coordinating
sluice management with villages in the province of Utrecht which were affected by the drainage.

4

Van de Ven, Man-Made Lowlands, 68-82; Carla de Wilt, Landlieden en Hoogheemraden: De
bestuurlijke ontwikkeling van het waterbeheer en de participatiecultuur in Delfland in de
zestiende eeuw (Hilversum: Verloren, 2015), 96.
5

De Wilt, Landlieden, 103.
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In the thirteenth century the Rijnland water board expanded to the north, adding a number of
villages to its jurisdiction along with the oversight of dikes along the IJ river and the Spaarndam
dike and its sluices. In 1255 the heemraden of the village of Spaarndam received a formal
written privilege from the Count of Holland William II to oversee the Spaarndam dike. This
agreement is known as the Magna Carta of the Rijnland water board.6 This example showcases
the importance of local initiatives for coordinating and overseeing water-management concerns,
while also highlighting the authoritative role of the Count of Holland.
In the thirteenth century and later, regional water boards like that of Rijnland developed
throughout Holland. The cause of this growth lies in widespread land subsidence and the strain
it put on the water-management systems across the province. As the countless villages which
sprung up earlier began draining the land, the peat upon which they were situated began
compacting. This meant that the villages fell in elevation relative to the water level. In response,
the villages began working together to organize the region’s flood protections, securing their
safety first and asking for a charter from the Count later. At the same time, the Count also
provided charters for specific water works. In other words, the impetus for regional water boards
came from below, at the village level, and from above, from the Count.
The land subsidence also led to the creation of polders. These were essentially small
independent water territories, each with its own ring dike, sluices, and discharge canals. The
individuals living in a polder could thus artificially maintain the water level inside the ring dike.
In order to oversee these new water management structures, the residents inside the polder
formed an organization known as a polder board. These polders did not follow village
boundaries, but were dependent on the local water situation.
6

Van de Ven, Man-Made Lowlands, 80-81; Milja Tielhof and Petra J.E.M. van Dam. Waterstaat
in Stedenland: Het Hoogheemraadschap van Rjinland voor 1857 (Utrecht: Matrijs, 2006), 7.
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The proliferation of regional water boards and polder boards across Holland did not take
away rights and powers from local communities. The charters which established the regional
water boards were akin to those for towns, laying down specific rights and responsibilities for the
organization. Everything outside of those responsibilities remained in the purview of the village.
There was also considerable overlap between the regional water boards and local governments in
terms of how specific tasks were carried out. Similarly, the polder boards were only responsible
for maintaining the water-management structures within the polder. In other words, the
organization of water management was decentralized, with a significant amount of power
retained at the local level.7
The history of the Delfland water board in the southwest corner of Holland offers a good
example of these developments. The Delfland water board formed in the thirteenth century,
tasked with the responsibility of overseeing the “common land water works.” These were dikes
and other embankments which transcended local importance and required coordination with
neighboring villages. It is not clear whether the initiative came from below, with the seven
shires represented in the water board, or from above with the count. In the fourteenth and
fifteenth centuries the practices and rules of the water board were formalized and codified like
many of the other regional water boards. Similarly, Delfland occupied an intermediate position
in the political structure of Holland, just like the other water boards. It operated on the same
level as the sheriff, between the Count of Holland and the local governments.
Several times per year the members of the Delfland water board would carry out a
schouw or inspection of the “common land water works” in conjunction with the Dike Count,
which served as the Count’s representative. The villages also selected their own officials to

7

Van de Ven, Man-made Lowlands, 114-116.
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accompany the heemraden and Dike Count as they carried out their assessments. The
heemraden could assess fines or penalties for faulty maintenance work or other transgressions,
but it was up to the local sheriff to carry out the punishments. The water board officials also set
a cost for the maintenance of a given dike or sluice and it was up to the village governments to
decide how best to raise those funds.8
The preceding discussion provides a clear indication of the social and political impact of living
in polders and other low lying areas. Local communities found solutions to prevent the risks of
flooding. Sometimes this required working together with neighboring villages, other times it
necessitated negotiations with the Count. What is most important for this study, is that the
individuals affected by the water-management system were involved in the decision making
process in one form or another.

Forming the poldermodel theory

The term “poldermodel” originated in the field of economics during the 1990s to describe
situations in which different parties become invested in a particular organization. Specifically,
the theory focused on generating synergy among the government, companies, and employees
through open discussions and consensus forming.9 As the name implies, the model originated in
the unique ecological circumstances of polder life. The dikes, embankments, and sluices which
surrounded a polder and protected it from flooding required a form of communal cooperation.
8

De Wilt, Landlieden, 10-16, 103-112.
Maarten Prak and J.L. van Zanden. Nederland en het Poldermodel: Social-Economische
Geschiedenis van Nederland, 1000-2000 (Amsterdam: Bakker, 2013), 11; Tim Soens, “Polders
zonder Poldermodel? Een onderzoek naar de rol van inspraak en overleg in de Waterstaat van de
laatmiddeleeuwse Vlaamse Kustvlakte,” Tijdschrift voor Sociale en Economische Geschiedenis 3
(2006): 3-36.
9

12

The underlying premise of the poldermodel is that in the process of forming a polder and
maintaining the water management infrastructure to prevent flooding, all the inhabitants of the
polder had a vested interest to work together.10
While the term poldermodel originated in economics in the 1990s, this line of thinking
had antecedents. The early twentieth-century Dutch historian Johan Huizinga used the term
“polder thinking.”11 An important part of the early debate centered on the democratic character
of polder politics. The premise of this school of thought was that Holland and other coastal areas
formed an early democratic and participatory society as a result of the unique ecological
influences. In the process of selecting heemraden, village representatives took part in a form of
self-government. Local residents of all statuses assumed responsibility for dike inspections and
other water-management initiatives. Living in the polders led to “small scale, autonomous, and
democratic forms of government,” or stated differently, an “experiment in democracy.”12
This ambitious argument has not withstood historical scrutiny, but in the process of
critiquing the democratic character of the poldermodel a general consensus has emerged which
focuses on the idea of participation culture. This approach discards the underlying assumption of
equality and examines which parties had a voice in the decision-making process. Tim Soens’
research on several polders in the province of Flanders during the Middle Ages provides an
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For an excellent description of the current debates surrounding the poldermodel see the 2011
KNAW grant application by M.R. Prak, Petra J.E.M. van Dam, and P. Sigmond titled: “In
search of the poldermodel. Participation and representation in Dutch Water-boards in the predemocratic era” available at: www.huygens.knaw.nl/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/projectPoldermodel.pdf .
11

Soens, “Polders zonder Poldermodel,” 4
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Tim Soens, “Het Waterschap en de Mythe van Democratie in het Ancien Regime. Het
voorbeeld van de Vlaamse Kustvlakte in de later Middeleeuwen,” Jaarboek voor Ecologische
Geschiedenis (2001): 39-56; Soens, “Polder zonder poldermodel,” 4.
13

excellent example of this corrective in the historiography. His research confirmed the existence
of the poldermodel in the area, with active participation from below and consensus-forming
tendencies, but with some caveats. In the polders which Soens examined, he found that local
communities set the tax levels, kept yearly account logs, and appointed two to five “sluice
masters” to oversee daily tasks such as the opening and closing of the sluice doors. Nonetheless,
he also found that the decision-making process was skewed towards important individuals and
institutions in the area. In other words, the local nobility and church representatives had more of
a say in the decision-making process than other local individuals. Consensus-based decision
making remained, but like other medieval organizations, there was a hierarchy.13
At the local level and polder level decision-making policies, the participation culture
could vary greatly. Carla de Wilt’s work on Delfland demonstrated the presence of great
variation between individual ambachten, or shires, in the water board. She developed a
qualitative means of assessing participation rates based on burenraadpleging (local decision
making committees), accessibility of local offices, and land ownership patterns. In the three
shires she examined, the level of participation ran the gamut, from the elitist Berkel shire, which
often selected great land owners to the more open Maasland shire. De Wilt found that the more
elitist shires brought fewer cases before the Delfland tribunal, the judiciary branch of the water
board which adjudicated water management cases.14
What do these local differences in participation culture mean for politics at the provincial
level? In other words, did the very ethos or belief in the importance participatory forms of
government influence politics in Holland or was there something more concrete? De Wilt’s
focus on the tribunal is suggestive, as it corresponds with Maarten Prak and J.L. van Zanden’s
13

Soens, “Polder zonder poldermodel,” 11-34.
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De Wilt, Landlieden. 396-401.
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work which examines the poldermodel at higher levels of government. They argue that the two
constituent parts of the poldermodel are distinguishable parties that are able to negotiate, along
with a place where negotiation can occur. At the local level, village governments and polder
boards provided these requirements, the tribunal operated at the regional level, and the States of
Holland worked at the provincial level. Prak and van Zanden’s understanding is not some
allusion to “national character” but rather a society that is based on “compromise and consensus”
which can change over time. Conflict is a common part of the process, but the focus is on
people’s ability to meet and discuss issues.
Prak and van Zanden selected the Great Assembly of 1651 as the best examples of the
poldermodel in action. This event was a spontaneous meeting of the States General (the
governing body of the Dutch Republic) to discuss the condition of the Republic following the
unexpected death of the stadholder and leader of the military William II of Orange. These
historians noted how this gathering was informal and typical of a community focused on debate
and conversation.15 Other scholars not specifically involved in the poldermodel debate also point
to the importance of this gathering in terms of participation and debate. Willem Frijhoff and
Marijke Spies demonstrated this meeting exemplified the “discussion culture” of the Republic.
They note, “The Great Assembly of 1651 was in fact the first great fraternizing ritual of the
independent Republic, in which the intention of unity was rediscovered and harmony
celebrated.”16
The unity noted by Frijhoff and Spies was a result of the lived experiences in Holland
going back centuries. In the process of building polders and establishing flood defenses the
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people of Holland developed a social and political culture based on consensus forming. Any
individual who did not properly care for his/her section of the dike could spell disaster for the
whole community. In order to avoid catastrophe, local communities ensured that those who
maintained the dike were invested in the decision making process. What was required to make
the poldermodel function? The affected parties had to be willing and able to talk, and there had
to be a venue for discussion to take place.

Poldermodel politics before the Revolt

Traditionally scholars have viewed the decentralized political machinery of Dutch
politics as largely inefficient compared to other European states. They argued that the economic
and social achievements of the Dutch Republic during its Golden Age in the seventeenth century
occurred in spite of the extremely decentralized state. More recent scholarship, however, has
turned this interpretation on its head and demonstrated that these achievements probably
occurred because of the bottom-up style of government.17 This sort of pragmatic, consensusforming approach to rule is evident throughout the Middle Ages in the Low Countries. The
material that follows traces the practice of consensus, polder-style politics during the Middle
Ages and its subsequent breakdown during the sixteenth century.
Throughout the Middle Ages the area known as the Netherlands or Low Countries was
little more than a geographic expression. Over the course of several centuries the Burgundians,
and later Habsburg rulers, attempted to form the area into a coherent polity. The goal of the
former was to enhance their power within France, the latter to help pay for costly wars.
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Nevertheless, there was considerable diversity among the various provinces. The western
provinces of Flanders, Brabant, and Holland were more urbanized and oriented towards maritime
commerce, while the eastern provinces tended to be more rural and agrarian. This polyglot
provincial system proved difficult to unify and centralize, and the Habsburg process of statemaking in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries was never completely successful. In fact, political
power in some of the provinces, such as Holland, actually underwent considerable devolution.18
In the Middle Ages power was negotiated in a seemingly endless process of revolution
and repression between local powers (such as civic magistrates and nobility) and ruling dukes,
duchesses, and monarchs. A number of factors influenced the process, such as the degree of
urbanization. In general the ruling power would grant privileges and exemptions in return for
revenue, remove those same privileges in case of opposition or revolt, and then later re-grant
them when they need money, essentially creating a convoluted panoply of legal rights and
charters.19 These privileges formed the basis of later particularistic politics, as each city became
bitterly defensive over the protection of its customary rights. As J.J. Woltjer succinctly stated,
“In most cases these privileges were real, but here too the literal text was less important than the
vague feeling that positive privileges and ancient rights were the crystallization of a more
comprehensive equity, a more profound justice, as flexible as the heart’s desires.”20 More than
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anything, however, these cities were fighting for the right and ability to participate in the
decision-making process.
The year 1477 serves as one of the most important turns in this regard, marking a
foundational event in the evolution of particularism in the politics of Low Countries. This date
marks the unexpected death of the Burgundian ruler Charles the Bold. Before his untimely
passing he had begun a program of military expansion with the aim of uniting his possessions in
the Low Countries and France, which served to stiffen resentment to his rule. As Charles lay
dead in the snow outside of the besieged city of Nancy in France, his daughter Mary of
Burgundy accepted the role of Regent of the Low Countries, but only after she acquiesced to a
number of limitations on her power. The official proclamation of this agreement, known as the
Great Privilege or the Joyous Entrée, came to be seen as a pivotal event in civic and provincial
relations with their Burgundian, and later, Habsburg rulers.21
The Dutch political historian Martin van Gelderen noted that this event created a
“normative, implicit constitution” in addition to the number of privileges which consisted of “a
diversity of charters acquired or extorted by cities, guilds, crafts, clergy and nobility from
imperial princes, vassals, dukes and counts, who had ruled the Netherlands during the late
medieval period.”22 The importance of these privileges lies in the fact that they gave local
powers the legal ability to debate issues which they believed affected them.
The Burgundian rulers attempted to get around these privileges and subvert them through
the creation of the States General and the provincial assemblies, such as the States of Holland.
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During the fifteenth century the Burgundian rulers created the States General as a means to forge
the multiple provinces into a unified whole. This representative body included members from
the polyglot collection of provinces under Burgundian control in the Low Countries. According
to Jonathan Israel, the Burgundian ruler Philip the Good only created the institution to streamline
communications with the individual provincial assemblies and stabilize provincial currencies.
While the States General did provide a location for debate, the different provincial assemblies
had been coordinating and meeting on their own volition for decades prior. For instance, the
States of Holland and Zeeland often held joint meetings. Furthermore, in special circumstances,
such as when trading relations with England for wool and cloth became strained, the affected
provinces called a meeting on their own volition to discuss the matter.23
The Habsburgs would eventually acquire the Low Countries through a complex set of
marriage alliances and wars, but there was still no king of the Low Countries. Instead, while the
Habsburgs served as the King of Spain, they only held titles of nobility in the various provinces
such as the Count of Holland and Flanders or the Duke of Brabant. In truth, the Low Countries
fell under the umbrella of the composite monarchy of the Habsburgs, which proved difficult for
them to implement universal and consistent policies across their territories. It was a Dominium
Politicum et Regale, in which the Habsburg monarchies had to work with representatives
assemblies like the States General and the States of Holland. In this organization, problems
could only be overcome through negotiation and discussion, not through strong arm tactics. 24
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The major breakdown of this consensus-style government came in the form of financial
pressure and religious conflict. The Habsburg ruler Charles V (1500-1558) engaged in a number
of costly dynastic wars against the French Valois kings which stretched across Europe.
Additionally, the Habsburg rulers were defenders of the faith for the Catholic Church, which also
involved them in a number of religious conflicts. At different points in Charles’ reign he fought
against the Ottomans, the French, Protestants in Germany, passing along a daunting debt to his
son and successor Philip II (1527-1598). All of these activities put a tremendous strain on the
Habsburg treasury.
Initially the Habsburg rulers and their subjects in the Netherlands found amicable ways to
solve the financial issues. In Holland, Charles V granted the States of Holland assembly
considerable authority over its taxation policy in return for more revenue. After much debate
and discussion the provincial assembly then granted the cities considerable latitude and
autonomy in tax collection. In short, the power over taxation underwent a process of devolution
from the Habsburg monarch down to the cities of Holland.25 In this way, those who were being
taxed could participate in the discussion over taxation policy. Essentially this is the poldermodel
in action.
It was the Habsburg ruler’s staunch pro-Catholic policy which disrupted the political
consensus. In their attempt to root out what they perceived as heresy they issued strict placards
prohibiting Protestant worship and practices. These only served to push Protestant sympathizers
and churches underground. Nevertheless, given the geographic location of the Low Countries
and its strong commercial activities, trading hubs such as Antwerp and other cities were able to
maintain active contacts with international Protestant movement. In this way, the Calvinist
25

See Tracy, Holland under Habsburg rule.
20

church in particular developed a significant following in the Low Countries, even if in terms of
sheer numbers it remained in the minority.26
The religious differences drove a wedge between the ruler and those he ruled. Charles V,
and later Philip II, had to take a broader view and support the Catholic Church while the
magistrates were focused on local matters and had to pursue social harmony. 27 At first, the
opposition chiefly flowed along the lines of the non-implementation of the divisive heresy
placards. Local magistrates argued it was their customary right not to enforce the placards on the
grounds that it created local unrest and it violated their privileges. In a relatively short period of
time, however, segments of the nobility and religious groups became much more vocal in their
opposition, culminating in the Iconoclastic Fury in 1566 in which Protestant groups engaged in
open-air sermons, so-called hedge preaching, and the destruction of religious imagery within
Catholic churches. Philip II’s response was both quick and severe, sending the authoritarian
Fernando Toledo, the Duke of Alva. Alva set up a secret tribunal to track down and punish those
who took part in the iconoclasm, earning it the ominous title of the “Council of Blood.”
The best representation of Alva’s heavy-handed rule came in the form of the citadels
which he built in cities in order to awe and pressure the inhabitants into submission. The citadel
in Antwerp serves as the most striking example. Here Alva named four of the five bastions of
the citadel after himself, Duke, Fernando, Toledo, Alva, and the fifth after the engineer who
designed the fortification. In front of the defensive structure he commissioned a statue to be
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built, constructed from melted-down cannons captured from rebellious forces. The statue
depicted him literally stomping out the heresy, with his foot resting on a figure representing the
personification of unorthodox religious views.28
Alva’s employed this uncompromising approach beyond religious issues. He captured
and executed Lamoraal, the Count of Egmont and Philip de Montmorency, the Count of Hoorn.
These two deaths sent shockwaves throughout the Low Countries since they had been ardent
supporters of the Catholic Church and seemingly had nothing to fear from Alva’s arrival. These
were high-profile executions, but were part of a wide-spread program by Alva. Over a quarter of
the nobility of Holland were charged with heresy by the Council of Blood.29 This repressive
style of rule engendered wide spread resistance, creating a major wedge, essentially providing
the final breakdown of consensus-style government between the Spanish Habsburg monarch and
his subjects in Holland and the other provinces.
The hammer fell on that wedge on 1 April 1572, when the Sea Beggars captured the town
of Brill, sparking the Holland phase of the Dutch Revolt. In the two decades that followed the
rebels in Holland had to develop new ways to reach consensus without the influence of a central
power in the form of the Habsburgs. The States of Holland resolved this matter by being more
inclusive. Before the Revolt only the nobility and the six “big cities” of Dordrecht, Haarlem,
Leiden, Amsterdam, Delft and Gouda were represented. The first meeting of the States of
Holland in 1572, which met illegally without a summons from Philip II, included no less than
eight more “small cities.” Within a short time the final number would be set on sixteen cities
with representation along with the nobility. This expansion of voting rights is a great example of
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the poldermodel in practice; it brought in other cities to the discussion and involved them in the
decision-making process.
Many of the pre-Revolt political offices and bodies were simply modified to meet the
pressing needs of the time. This is clearly evident in the development of the role of the
stadholder. This term literally translates as “city holder” and originally functioned as a
representative of the monarch, liaising between the sovereign ruler and his/her local subjects. At
the outset of the Revolt, the current stadholder of Holland Prince William of Orange, was the
central figure of opposition to the Spanish monarch Philp II. As the fighting wore on this office
came to be a sort of de facto executive position in charge of military operations. The fact that the
provincial body of the States of Holland “acknowledged and accepted” him as stadholder, rather
than being selected, meant that power was shared between the two bodies, but the legal
underpinning of this arrangement was never made clear.30 The later extensive “stadholderless”
periods during the Republic point towards this conclusion as well.
As the well-known Dutch scholar Henk van Nierop noted, “Many historians regard the
modern state as a device somehow imposed from above upon a hapless community….This
approach, however, neglects the part played by the ordinary subjects of the state. The Dutch
Republic presents an interesting case for studying the various patterns in which local
communities and common citizens contributed to state formation.”31 Widespread opposition to
Habsburg religious and financial policies were the motivations for the Revolt. At the outset the
rebels never established concretely their long term goals and priorities. As such the course of the
war often lacked clear direction and took unexpected turns. At certain times, it appeared as
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though the Revolt was on the verge of collapse, such as during the siege of Leiden in 1574, and
at other times it looked like the entire Low Countries would unite, following the Pacification of
Ghent in 1576.
What is important to note during the various twists and turns of the wars is that the
poldermodel continued to function. An explicit part of Prak and van Zanden’s analysis is that
the poldermodel or consensus-style of organization remained intact during the Revolt. As
evidence they cited specifically the case of the city of Vlissingen when the regents asked for
advice and assistance from the civic guilds and militia. They argue that poldermodel politics
were dominant in the conflict between the absolutist policies of Philip II and Alva on the one
hand, and the old style of local power formation based on privileges on the other.32

The Militarization of the Landscape

How did the numerous military inundations during the Revolt that damaged and
destroyed countless polders affect the poldermodel? That is the research question for this
dissertation, but unfortunately there is a lacuna in the historiography where military inundations
are concerned. Fortunately there is a growing literature in environmental history which focuses
on warfare that can provide a framework. The two principal ways in which humans interact with
the environment in terms of warfare are tactics and resource management. Both of these
categories fall under the umbrella term “the militarization of the landscape,” meaning human
attempts to mobilize the environment for military purposes. The tactical issues involve the
manipulation of geographical features to secure specific ends, such digging trenches or the
32
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building forts on higher elevations. The resource-management component centers on a society’s
ability to mobilize resources to pursue war. The fighting in Holland during the Dutch Revolt
offers a unique opportunity to treat these two topics in unison by focusing on water-management
practices. As noted, the inhabitants of Holland had an established tradition of managing water to
prevent flooding with the widespread construction of dikes and waterways since the Middle
Ages.33 In response to the ecological conditions of Holland and the continual threat of flooding,
the Dutch developed an “amphibious culture” which helped them cope with their watery
landscape.34
It is only rather recently that environmental historians have begun examining the
militarization of the landscape, meaning attempts to utilize the environment to secure military
objectives. This includes the manipulation of given geographies for strategic purposes, the
impact of warfare on the natural world, and the natural world’s impact on the course of war. For
the most part these examinations have centered on modern warfare, no doubt growing out of the
fear of the degree to which modern weaponry and tactics can alter the landscape and destroy
entire ecosystems. Military historians have yet to latch onto this new trend, but fortunately
environmental historians have offered a number of insightful avenues for investigation.35 The
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few examples discussed here are suggestive of the myriad of approaches to the militarization of
the landscape and its usefulness as an analytical approach. They demonstrate that human
attempts to militarize the environment can have unforeseen consequences, and environmental
factors can greatly affect the outcome of a given conflict.
Rachel Woodward took a broad approach examining how the ethos and organizing
principles of militarism exert an influence on the configuration of location and space. She argues
that, “military geographies are everywhere” and are formed through a process in which
“militarism and military activities create spaces, places, environments and landscapes with
reference to a distinct moral order.”36 Everything from weapon factories to battlefields and
testing grounds fall within the scope of her work. Although she focuses on modern examples,
the same understanding can be applied to historical examples. Sieges, battles, defenses and
outfitting the military all left their own impression on the landscape in the same way tanks,
bombs, and military bases do today.
The influence of these military activities and ideals on the landscape, however, is often
ambiguous and never complete or final. In spite of advanced technologies, well developed
institutions and bureaucracies, and scrupulous planning humans have never been total masters of
their environment. While human abilities to transform the environment are considerable,
environmental agency in the form of weather and other natural processes still influence and
affect the outcome. Chris Pearson provides insight into this process in his study of modern
France noting:
This process of engagement with, and mobilization of, nature has not been a
smooth process. Nature’s unpredictability, dynamism, and indifference to human
suffering have raised repeated problems for the military. From mud, rats, and lice
in the trenches to the Allies difficulties in overcoming Normandy’s bocage
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landscape after the D-Day landings, environmental conditions have raised a series
of problems and obstacles to be tolerated, overcome, or bypassed. Outcomes
therefore arose as products of the emerging relationship between human design
and the unintentional vibrancy of nature.37
In other words, the landscape is anything but a blank canvas awaiting human agency but rather a
dynamic interaction between human actions and natural forces.38
This approach offers a useful lens because civilian and military activities often interact
with environmental trends in a myriad of complex and sometimes contradictory ways, as
evidenced by Timothy Mitchell’s Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-politics, Modernity. This work
focuses on a series of disasters which struck Egypt between 1942 and 1944. He provides an
excellent example of how military matters, state-making initiatives, and the development of
“natural” forces intertwined. In this period Egypt began the construction of the Aswan Dam,
intending to showcase the power of the state. The associated irrigation and flood control
measures created habitats for mosquitos, which brought malaria. The disease struck a population
suffering from malnutrition, since farmers focused on sugar cane production and exported
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fertilizer needed elsewhere during World War II, leaving behind a soil bereft of nutrients. At the
same time, the war provided the opportunity for relief. The US entry into the war in the
Mediterranean brought with it philanthropic organizations with experience combating misquotes
during the construction of the Panama Canal. Mitchell remarks that the mosquito could not
speak but its emergence led to huge debates over public health, the war, and state-making in
Egypt.39 His work highlights the complex and complicated manner in which warfare and
environmental developments interacted.
Many scholars have blurred the lines between military domination and environmental
domination. Military historians have long understood the importance of geographic factors in
determining the course of a battle, but their analysis has perhaps been too superficial.40 Works
such as J.R McNeil’s Mosquito Empires: Ecology and War in the Greater Caribbean
demonstrate the relationship is more than just capturing and holding the high ground. Here he
demonstrates how disease played a partisan role in warfare, decimating European armies and
settler populations. Malaria and other diseases effectively served as a better defense than any
military fortification. Meanwhile the local residents escaped largely unharmed as a by-product
of inhabiting the area for generations and building up resistances.41
Lisa Brady offers another approach by examining the intentional actions of military in
terms of ecological militarism. She observed that one of the strategies employed by the Union
forces during the United States Civil War was an ecological war as much as a military one. They
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employed scorched-earth tactics to turn the “civilized” southern landscape into wilderness, in
order to cut off the Confederate’s ability to wage war. This attack on their agricultural base also
served to instill fear among the southerners. She explains, “Faced with a return to chaos, and
paired with physical destruction of once productive landscapes, southern support for the
Confederacy weakened and Union victory was attained.” In short, the environmental component
of the fighting struck a deep-seated fear of wilderness in the American psyche.42
In terms of resource management, scholars focusing on the early modern period have
produced a number of works highlighting the relationship between warfare and the environment.
The majority of these studies focus on trees and timber reserves, as the preindustrial era was “the
age of wood.”43 Some of them focus on the impact of deforestation. Thorkild Kjærgaard’s work
provides an excellent example, demonstrating how Danish attempts to maintain “Europe’s best
navy” led to severe timber shortages and sand storms. The situation was so dire that Danish
foresters actually attempted to grow trees in the shape of ship hulls to eliminate wasted
material!44
Other works highlight the role of the control of resources in state formation. For
instance, Karl Appuhn’s A Forest on the Sea critiques the idea that strong centralized states
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supporting market economies were the hallmark of European advancement in the seventeenth
and eighteenth century. He shows how a more traditional policy of “managerial organicism”
undergirded the Venetian forest management policies as opposed to more profit-driven
initiatives. Venice still developed an impressive bureaucracy for overseeing its timber resources,
but it was the only European state to implement large-scale forest conservation programs.45
Thus control of the forests was an important component of the Venetian state even if they did not
approach its management from a strictly profit-seeking perspective.
Paul Warde’s Ecology, Economy, and State Formation in Early Modern Germany
examines how local duchies in Germany maintained a stable and viable forest policy in spite of
the dynamic shifts in society, most notably in the form of the Thirty Years War. He remarked,
“State formation and any mode of production have for their fundamental condition the integrity
or disturbance of the ecologies which deliver their most basic resources.”46 The state and other
institutions’ abilities to manage forest reserves were vital.
In the Low Countries water is the resource which has received the most scholarly
attention in terms of its impact on society and the state.47 Over the past few decades the field has
received much more scholarly interest and undergone considerable change. Early works tended
to be myopic, focusing on the origin and institutional arrangements of water boards. These
bodies largely developed in the Middle Ages and were responsible for drainage and dike or
sluice repair issues in a given locality. Over time many of these water boards changed
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dramatically in terms of power, territory, duties, and amalgamation. The early works traced the
first charters of these water boards and internal changes, but largely treated them as selfcontained units of analysis rather than placing them in their historical milieu.48 In the second
half of the twentieth century historians began incorporating the importance of ecological factors
such as subsidence into their analysis, but the scope of the field has changed the most in the last
twenty years.
The Dutch scholar Petra J.E.M. van Dam has been at the forefront of these developments,
helping guide the historiography. In a 2004 article she noted that new hydraulic histories of
Holland begun to have a “green edge,” incorporating new methodologies and source materials,
while also focusing explicitly on ecological, economic, social and political developments.
Emphasizing water-management issues, historians would highlight the multiple ways in which
environmental factors affected, and were affected by, other historical developments. As one
scholar noted, “The new hydraulic history sees water boards, both great and small, as products
not only of their own internal rules and actions but also shaped to a large degree by the larger
world of economy, society, and politics.”49
This approach is evident in her collaborative work Waterstaat in Stedenland: Het
hoogheemraadschap van Rijnland voor 1857 (“Water administration in an urban land: The
regional water board of Rijnland before 1857”), which offers an authoritative analysis of the
Rijnland regional water board. As the title implies, the economic and social influence of the
major cities in Rijnland, such as Haarlem and Leiden, are key to understanding environmental
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trends. Along with an insightful overview of the history of Rijnland Water Board urban
rivalries, van Dam and Tielhof give significant attention to civic demand for peat, and land
reclamation financed by urban investors.50
A number of works have helped fill in the gaps between hydraulic history and other
historical disciplines, making important connections between the two. English works such as
G.P. van de Ven’s Man Made Lowlands and Audrey Lambert’s earlier monograph The Making
of the Dutch Landscape both offer detailed surveys of the long-term economic and social
developments throughout Holland and the rest of the Netherlands.51
Perhaps the strongest ties have been between water management and economic history,
such as Jan de Vries’ early pioneering work The Dutch Rural Economy in the Golden Age, 15001700, which demonstrates how the watery landscape affected agricultural development in the
rural sectors of the Holland economy.52 More recently, Diederik Aten’s Als het gewelt comt
details how lake reclamation affected water transportation and led to considerable economic
competition and political conflict in northern Holland.53 Similarly, Han van Zwet’s
Lofwaerdighe dijkagies en miserable polders offers great insights into the practice and financing
of lake reclamation in seventeenth-century Holland.54
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One area which still remains largely unexplored, however, is the impact and influence of
military inundations on the economic, social, and political developments in Holland. Many of
the works on water management generally focus on longer-term processes, such as the ecological
crises created by turf extraction. As such it is not surprising that they do not treat the short-term
issues which military inundations might have caused. Furthermore, the many books which cover
the Revolt usually only treat the intentional flooding as a temporary setback to the longer social
and economic trends they are examining. Numerous works mention military inundations in
passing and hint at their importance, but in general the topic has not yet received any substantial
scholarly consideration.
To date, there are only a few articles and book chapters that treat military inundations
specifically. D.J.B. Trim’s chapter in Amphibious Warfare offers some insightful approaches to
treating “inshore, estuarine, riverine, and lacustrine” military strategy in general in the early
modern period, but military inundations are rarely mentioned.55 Other works tend to be more
descriptive than analytical. They either cover very long periods of time or discuss them in
relationship to the waterline, a series of defensive fortifications built to intentionally flood tracts
of land for defensive purposes.56 Not surprisingly the siege of Leiden in 1574 has received the
deepest analysis, as it was one of the pivotal moments of rebel opposition to Habsburg rule.57
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James Tracy has written about the lack of compensation for farmers and rural dwellers in
Holland whose land was flooded in order to save the city from defeat.58 Marjolein ‘t Hart’s
recent work Dutch Wars of Independence: Warfare and Commerce in the Netherlands 15701580 devotes three pages to the “lasting burdens of inundations” and probably provides the best
overview of their impact. But the lack of an established historiography on the subject is
noticeable in her references.59
The areas of Zeeland-Flanders have received the most attention in terms of military
flooding and its connection with the so-called verdronken landen (drowned lands). One scholar
estimates that nearly 90 percent of the coastal area lay under water after fighting in the area in
the mid-1580s and was not repaired until three years after the war ended in 1648.60 Adriaan de
Kraker has probably written the most expansively on this topic. In his article on Axel in North
Flanders he demonstrates how the sea dikes around the town were already in disrepair at the
outset of the Dutch Revolt, a situation which became exacerbated by depopulation caused by
looting and plundering. As the sea dikes were already in a poor condition the rebel factions
began cutting them in order to open up an all-water passage to towns which lay further inland in
Flanders. In the process Axel became a veritable island. He notes that resurgence which
historians argue occurred in Axel after the inundations only appear as growth and prosperity
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because the military flooding had been such a nadir.61 De Kraker contextualized the military
inundations, showing how they fit within the broader politics before and during the Revolt, but
the same issues have not been studied for water management in Holland.
David Blackbourn probably provides the most salient description of the relationship
between humans and their environment in terms of water management and the military in the
making of modern Germany. He notes how the conquest of nature of also implied the conquest
of people. He traced the various ways in which military developments and ideology affected the
landscape and served to justify the domination of different populations. He examined how the
draining of the Oder Marshes, the straightening of the Rhine, and the creation of a harbor at Jade
Bay in German lands generated a dramatic loss of biodiversity and a great deal of human
suffering and death.62 In other words, Blackbourn’s examples detail how Germans negotiated
with their environment at the same time that they negotiated amongst themselves. The
environmental winners were the most adaptable flora and fauna. The human winners were those
in power, as the poorest people or at the margins of society lost out in the form of forced
removals, forced labor on environmental projects, or having to live in flood-prone areas.
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Conclusion

The struggle against water in the Low Countries undoubtedly had a lingering effect, as
Petra J.E.M. van Dam alluded to in her description of the “amphibious culture” in Dutch society.
The motto on the Zeeland coats of arms probably states it most forcefully: Luctor et emergo, “I
fight to emerge.” The underlying premise is that the struggle serves as a unifying agent against
the common enemy of water and flooding. This understanding is the fundamental principle of
the poldermodel. In spite of appropriate criticisms over the egalitarian or democratic character
of its representation, the poldermodel serves a useful paradigm for explaining the consensus and
discussion style organization which emerged in the Low Countries in general and Holland in
particular.
As earlier discussion makes clear, the process of the mobilizing nature for military
purposes is a complex one. Tactical and resource management considerations could greatly
impact the course and outcome of conflicts while also influencing power relations within a given
state. The historiography of water management in Holland is well established, but there still
exists a lacuna regarding the impact of military inundations.
In many cases the strategic floods in Holland did secure some tactical victories, but they
also created considerable collateral damage. Land, houses, possessions, and lives were all lost in
the process of military conquest. How did the States of Holland handle these issues? How did
they manage the most important resource in the area after the dike breaches and intentional
floods? How much damage did the flooding cause, and how successful were the water
management infrastructure repairs? James Tracy has demonstrated that the local residents did
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not receive any form of financial reimbursement for their losses, so how did they exercise their
agency?63 That is the focus of the following chapters.
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CHAPTER TWO - HOLLAND’S LANDSCAPE PRIOR TO THE REVOLT

Introduction

The sixteenth century was a difficult period for the water boards of Holland. The watermanagement infrastructure across the province had to handle increasing quantities of water as a
result of turf mining. The resulting need for repair and replacement led to widespread disputes in
the regional water boards and between cities over finances and the best courses of action. In the
meantime the maintenance of upkeep of the many dikes and sluices fell into disrepair. Many
people in Holland feared the possibility of a major storm and the long-term damage it might
cause.
That major storm did strike Holland, with important environmental and political
ramifications. The All Saints Day Flood occurred on 1 November 1570 and is arguably the worst
flooding disaster to ever hit the Netherlands. It ravaged Holland and the other provinces along
the North Sea coast, leaving devastation in its wake. The States of Holland struggled to come to
terms with the disaster and coordinate relief and repair and repeatedly asked Philip II and Alva
for a remission or deferment on some of their taxes. Their pleas fell on deaf ears, as the
Habsburg state needed all the money it could get. The fallout from the All Saints Day Flood
highlights the differing priorities of Holland and the Habsburg and was an important, yet
understudied, cause of the Revolt.

38

Pre-Revolt Issues

Throughout the sixteenth century Hollanders conducted serious negotiations with their
environment to halt the deteriorating condition of their water management infrastructure. The
Dutch historian S.J. Fockema Andreae termed this period the “century of conflict” in Rijnland,
as there were numerous disputes over taxation, representation, jurisdiction, and repair costs.1
The flood defenses in Holland had been deteriorating for some time because of extensive peat
(turf) mining. The partially decayed vegetation served as an important fuel after it had been cut
and dried. Throughout the Middle Ages this industry supported a sizeable population in the Low
Countries. Many households in Holland relied on the fuel, while exporting the material to
nearby provinces also offered steady profits.
In southern Holland the water board of Schieland demonstrates the serious ecological
damage from turf mining. The turf-mining industry largely provided the economic foundation
for the town of Gouda. This city commanded roughly one-third of the entire turf-shipping traffic
in Holland, with around 218,000 tons passing through the city annually. The Dike Counts and
other water-management officials saw the destruction which this practice caused, but were
largely unable to slow down the deterioration. According to one survey completed in 1514,
roughly two-thirds of the available land around the town of Zevenhuizen in the center of the
water board was mined out and thus agriculturally unproductive.2
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As peat harvesters dug up the earth and collected the abundant fuel source, lakes began to
enlarge as their banks were washed away. Throughout the sixteenth century officials in
Schieland worried about the creation of a “great inner lake.”3 In nearby Rijnland, this fear
proved justified as several smaller lakes combined to form the great Haarlemmermeer, a small
sea in the center of Holland. It was only with slight hyperbole that Hollanders termed it the
“waterwolf,” because its waters were always clawing away and swallowing up entire sections of
land along the shore.4
The turf mining and the Haarlemmermeer put a tremendous strain on the water board of
Rijnland to maintain the dikes and sluices and find an agreeable solution to discharging
increasing quantities of water. Repairing and improving the Spaarndam dike was always one of
the top priorities for Rijnland, as this was the main drainage point for the waters from the
Haarlemmeermeer into the IJ river, and eventually the Zuiderzee. In fact, the foundation of the
Rijnland water board, and its so-called ‘Magna Carta,” can be traced back to a 1255 privilege
granted by William II for the care of the dike.5 Maintaining the Spaarndam was a communal
responsibility for the cities and residents of Rijnland and as such there was ample discussion
over the best policies for its care and maintenance.
In the sixteenth century there were some very public disputes over the Spaarndam in
terms of dike repair and sluice replacement. Around 1510 there were serious worries that

power structures in Holland were horizontal, between the water boards and other governing
bodies, and as such they lacked the necessary power to enforce the laws. Tielhof and van Dam,
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flooding north of the IJ would spread south, which were justified when the dike broke only a few
years later. After this disaster struck representatives from the Rijnland water board, Amsterdam,
Haarlem, and Leiden proceeded to fight over how to pay for the repair work. The situation
became so critical that Charles V intervened and appointed a negotiator to settle the matter.
When no internal solution was forthcoming, Charles V dismissed the entire water board and
replaced them, while the negotiator brought in an expert from northern Holland to improve the
dike.6
Two decades later the situation had not improved, as the water board noted that “the
common land stood in great peril” which began a heated debate over the construction of new
sluices in the Spaarndam.7 In general wooden sluices only lasted about twenty-five years and
needed regular replacement.8 This recurring expense, coupled with the costly dike repair, meant
that the Rijnland water board ran up a debt. This situation further deteriorated when several
villages along the Spaarndam stuck the spade in the dike, a symbolic act in which a community
abandons its dike pledge duties because it can no longer fulfill upkeep responsibilities. This
created a unique situation in which those villages protected by the Spaarndam actually paid little
if any taxes on its upkeep and in particular the construction of the new sluices. That the water
board was forced to accept this spade sticking showed a nadir for the power of Rijnland.9
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Over the course of the sixteenth century there were eight different sluices built in the
Spaarndam, all of which the cities in Rijnland contentiously debated. Leiden and Haarlem in
particular engaged in protracted arguments over drainage and finance. The installation of a few
stone sluices alleviated some of the concerns as they were more durable. At the same time
neither city wanted to pay the bulk of construction costs, which complicated matters. At the
same time Haarlem wanted to increase its ship traffic by improving the navigability of the river
Spaarn, a branch of the IJ, while also looking to open up access to the nearby river Leid. The
end goal was to divert ships towards the city to increase its toll revenue. Haarlem would return
to this issue during and after the Revolt as well.10
There were problems in the southern portions of Rijnland as well. The important
landscheiding dike was in disrepair and in need of attention. As the name implies, this dike
served as a boundary separating Rijnland from the other water boards of Schieland and Delfland.
In the early sixteenth century the water boards conducted a number of inspections and attempted
to broaden and improve the dike. However, these improvements proved illusory.11 In 1561 there
were serious concerns that if a powerful storm occurred widespread flooding would ensue.
Apparently, over the course of the previous twenty years several individuals had dug turf too
close to the dike, or made small cuts to improve their water access.12 Other parts of the
landscheiding dike, such as the Leidschendam, suffered from overuse. This dam controlled
passage along the Vliet river between Leiden and Delft. In 1562 the water board of Rijnland
complained that the adjoining overtoom where goods from ships were loaded and unloaded had
10
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compacted because of excess use and was becoming a flood threat. There were apparently talks
between the Rijnland and Delfland water boards over making special keys to the lock, which
each would possess, and would only use when both parties were in agreement.13 Clearly the
Hollanders’ negotiations with their landscape were yielding mixed results.

The All Saints Day Flood

The major storm that many feared would lead to widespread flooding and devastation
occurred on 1 November 1570. In the preceding decades the members of the water board of
Rijnland had continually stressed that if a major storm should occur then there would be serious
repercussions. This particular flood, however, was monumental, arguably the worst North Sea
flood of all time. Research places the flood levels at 4m above the sea level in most places, but
as high as 4.7m in east Friesland, higher even than the great flood which hit the Netherlands in
1953.14 The destruction spread from Denmark as far south as Flanders with incalculable
destruction. Contemporary chronicles pegged the death toll at 20,000, although more recent
research places the number of deaths within the range of 3,000-4,000.
Along the northern coast of Flanders there were apparently dike breaches large enough
that ships could sail through them. The local water boards estimated the damage at 91,511
guilders to repair the area.15 Situated along the coast, the land of Saeftinghe had been constantly
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threatened by flooding, but following the All Saints Flood the majority of the area was flooded
for good. The last dikes which remained intact were flooded for strategic reasons in 1584 as part
of rebel attempts to capture the town of Axel.16 The damage was so absolute that the land is still
currently un-reclaimed, serving as an important wetland environment for bird and fish life.
Holland likewise suffered considerable losses and damage from the All Saint’s
inundations. The town of Dordrecht was completely flooded as barrels of wine and beer floated
down the street. Two-thirds of the polders to the southwest of the city were inundated, as the
water rose so high that it overflowed over the dikes rather than breaching them. There was
enough flooding in Rijnland to take a boat directly from Leiden to Amsterdam. Fortunately the
dike along the Rijn held strong, which prevented even further devastation. In Delfland it took a
concerted effort to reinforce the dikes, as the church bells rang all day to call people to action.
The town of Scheveningen on the coast could not be spared, losing no fewer than ninety houses,
which were washed away. Those houses which remained were largely unusable. Schieland
required similar vigilance to prevent complete ruin, as residents worked for ten days to repair and
strengthen the threatened dikes.17 As one contemporary chronicler stated, “the suffering and the
damages are so immense that words cannot describe them.”18
The political fallout of the All Saints Flood was felt throughout the Low Countries.
Historians often overlook its importance because it occurred just a little over a year before the
Revolt began in Holland. As such, it is usually ignored, with focus on other aspects of Dutch
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discontent with Habsburg policy, or was eclipsed by the major events of the Revolt which
followed. Nevertheless, the All Saints Flood opened up a divisive debate between the States of
Holland and their regent, the Duke of Alva, and their king, Philip II.
The critical issue was financial, which was an ongoing source of friction. For decades
Holland had been paying an ever-increasing amount of taxation to the Spanish monarchy. This
money mainly came in two forms: beden and “penny” taxes. The beden were essentially
subsidies which the States of Holland supplied to their sovereign. Ever since the fourteenth
century the province supplied a yearly ordinary beden and periodically would supply an
extraordinary beden because of special circumstances, such as crusades or wars. During the
Habsburg-Valois Wars (1494-1559), Holland was able to leverage Charles V’s need for money
into a degree of provincial autonomy. In exchange for raising a number of extraordinary beden,
the States of Holland gained the right to raise the revenue as they saw fit.19 While the beden
raised a tremendous amount of money for the Habsburg state, they were collected in a way that
was less onerous to population of Holland and raised less opposition.
The “penny” taxes were widely criticized because they were directed at commerce but
Philip II refused to do away with them. The penny taxes never raised anything near the sums of
the beden. For the years 1543-1555 the penny taxes in Holland only amounted to 1.8 percent of
those of the beden.20 Yet the Habsburg financial needs were pressing, especially after 1568
when a Spanish ship containing 80,000-pounds destined for Brussels had to take refuge in an
English port and was subsequently confiscated by Elizabeth I. As Alva needed money to pay for
defense and administration following the Iconoclastic Fury, in 1569 he asked the States General
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for their permission to collect three new taxes: the 10th, 20th, and 100th Pennies. The first two
were essentially a permanent sales tax on moveable and landed property amounting to ten and
five percent respectively, while the last tax was a one-time tax on capital of one percent.
The 100th penny tax was carried out immediately and raised a significant amount of
revenue for Alva, while the 10th and 20th penny taxes remained an open question. In place of the
last two taxes the individual provinces offered a one-time payment of four million florins over
the next two years. Alva accepted the offer, but continued to push for the collection of the 10th
and 20th penny taxes. The provincial states saw the offer as a way out of the penny taxes, Alva
saw it as a financial alleviative, something to keep the government functioning smoothly until
the States consented to the other taxes. When it became clear the States of Holland would not
consent, Alva began collecting the taxes against the wishes of the States General and the
individual provinces.21
The split between provincial priorities and the broader Habsburg concerns could not have
been starker. The fact that the penny taxes would be permanent meant, in theory, they could be
used support a standing army to force the unpopular policies (such as the religious placards) onto
the inhabitants of the Low Countries. More importantly these taxes subverted the power of the
purse strings from the States of Holland. For decades the representatives of Holland had bartered
and negotiated with their Habsburg rulers over the right to collect taxes using their own
procedures. On 31 July 1571 when Alva called for the collection of the 10th and 20th pennies he
attempted to browbeat the city magistrates of Holland into submission. He ordered officials
from the Court of Holland to make sure his plans were implemented and decreed an enormous
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1,000 guilder fine on city burgomasters if they did not carry out the collection.22 The States of
Holland and the city magistrates were attempting to keep their place at the negotiation table
while Alva was doing his best to limit their voice. It is against this larger fiscal background that
the debates occurred regarding funding the repairs from the All Saints Day Flood.
When the States of Holland requested money for the necessary dike repair work, the
Habsburg response was for them unsatisfactory. In spite of the fact that Alva himself believed
that as much as five-sixths of Holland might be flooded, he and Philip II refused to grant any
exemptions regarding the collection of the contentious penny taxes. The States of Holland
complained that paying the taxes and the repairs put the province in a “poor, miserable, and
calamitous state,” which would leave the land desolate.23 Even before the All Saints Day Flood
hit, the States complained to Alva that collecting the 100th penny affected their ability to
maintain dikes. Alva’s intentions were quite clear, however, the States would have to find a way
to collect both. The States complained that they did not know whether they would be a kingdom
or a pauper once everything was paid.24
Immediately following the All Saints Day Flood, the States of Holland pleaded directly
with Philip II, requesting clemency because of the “desolation caused by God Almighty.” In
their letter, they not only noted the widespread damage, but also hinted at their dissatisfaction
with Habsburg rule, specifically Philip’s inability to protect Dutch ships from piracy. They went
on to discuss the difficulty of raising taxes, arguing that the cities were already paying too much,
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while the rural areas were decimated from the flooding. They concluded that the whole process
of tax collection needed to be postponed in order to funnel money towards the costly repairs.
While they awaited Philip’s response, the States also began discussing postponement of one of
their beden, noting how all these issues made payment impossible.25 In the end, they believed
that their “great hope” lay in a possible tax exemption from Philip or Alva.
The States of Holland had to wait several months for a reply as decision making and
correspondence could take some time in the Spanish capital.26 In the meantime Alva wrote back
to the States of Holland by February 1571, stating that they could exempt part of the flooded
lands from the third installment of the 100th penny and defer taxes on land until the end of the
year. However, since Philip had already spent the majority of the taxes in advance, the States
would still need to raise 100,000 guilders, which amounted to the bulk of the taxes promised
before the flood. Alva’s leniency on taxation was hardly lenient at all.
The States thanked Alva formally for his clemency but took the opportunity to remind
him of the great damage still being repaired across Holland. They argued that the All Saints Day
Flood had created an entirely new situation in the province. As such they would be unable to
raise the 100,000 guilders, as the defense of the land against flooding was still in a perilous state.
Furthermore, Alva’s letter left unanswered the question of whether or not to collect rent on
flooded lands, which was an important part of the State’s initial complaint, since they expected
little benefit from flooded lands. 27
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After Alva’s letter, the States decided that they wanted to hear the decisions directly from
the king. They also began gathering detailed information regarding the condition of the lands in
Holland, which they believed would help them secure some tax exemptions. Each city was to
provide a report, while the water boards and dike counts would address the damage in the
countryside. The issue of rents on flooded lands remained unsettled. After a prolonged debate
among themselves, the States decided that they could raise the 100,000 guilders minus the
revenue which they calculated has been lost because of the flood. They worried, however, that if
they instructed the tax collectors to be rigorous with the collection of rent dues then it could lead
to widespread arrests because of delinquent payments.
The States of Holland decided they should look after their own needs. Roughly a month
later the States decided to withdraw the second payment of their 271,000-pound beden agreed to
the previous year. Alva responded by reaffirming that the monarchy needed the revenue. The
limits of his leniency amounted to a reduction or exemption on some taxes until August, but the
full amount would still be due by the end of 1571.28 Clearly both parties were at an impasse.
The States decided the best approach was to address the issue head on, so they sent a
delegation to Brussels to negotiate with Alva directly. The meeting amounted to a full-blown
examination of the benefits of Habsburg rule. In addition to the lingering grievances over the All
Saints Day Flood, the representatives brought up a number of taxes, specifically the 10th and 20th
penny, which they believed hurt Dutch trade and hindered Holland’s economy. Alva
recommended that the States put in writing their exact demands and what they wanted from
Philip. Only a short time later he summoned the delegates and informed them that Philip had
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plans for the tax money from the 10th and 20th pennies. He told them that they should be good
subjects like they had always been, and raise the money which they promised!29
The States of Holland responded by noting that they were confused by their negotiations
with Alva, arguing they had never attempted to get rid of the 10th and 20th pennies despite the
fact that they were becoming increasingly burdensome. Rather, they had asked Philip to
reconsider whether these taxes were damaging trade and fishing, which hurt their ability to raise
taxes. They estimated that they had already raised 80,000 guilders from rents during the present
year, but were unclear about how much of this money went to the Spanish government since
some of the funds also went to dike repair. They argued that the “land must be won from the
water with great cost” and the water management infrastructure was still in a poor condition
following the All Saints Day Flood.30
For his part, Alva appeared to be equally and genuinely confused over the State’s
policies, stating that he expected to be thanked for his moderation regarding the 10th and 20th
pennies. He asserted that the establishment and collection of these funds had always been done
with the State’s consent, so he seemingly could not understand their current resistance. He
believed that Philip would offer some moderation, but would generally carry out the tax in full.
Exasperated, the States decided to issue a placard protesting the 10th and 20th penny taxes
which would be published across Holland, arguing that they were being pressured into defending
their ancient liberties. They noted that they had tried to appease the King with another beden,
and had asked him for leniency on the taxes, which they argued were leading to the ruin of the
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province. By November 1571, a full year after the flood had occurred; Alva was left wondering
why the States still had not raised the 10th and 20th pennies given Philip’s moderation.31
These negotiations highlight the disparate priorities of the States of Holland and their
Habsburg rulers. The States repeatedly attempted to keep the lines of communication open and
discuss how best to deal with the aftermath of the All Saints Day Flood. They wrote to directly
Alva and Philip II, and when this failed they sent a delegation to Brussels to negotiate in person.
From Holland’s perspective, these attempts provided little satisfaction as Philip and Alva needed
the revenue. Discussion and debate matter little when one party is either unwilling or unable to
budge on its position. Stated differently, these debates only served to demonstrate to the States
of Holland the futility of future negotiations. If Philip would not allow for remittances or tax
reductions following one of the worst floods to ever strike Holland, then when would he?

Conclusion

Clearly, the All Saints Day Flood had caused a tremendous amount of damage, not only
to the Holland landscape, but to the relationship between the province and its sovereign as well.
The water-management infrastructure in Holland required attention even before the flood struck.
That the All Saints Day Flood was one of the worst ever to strike the Netherlands just increased
the level of devastation across the province. The debates between the States of Holland on one
side and Philip and Alva on the other only delayed and complicated the repairs. These
interruptions meant that the military inundations which hit Holland even harder.
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In terms of the relationship between the province and their sovereign the All Saints Day
Flood was another example of the contrasting priorities of the two parties. Philip’s territories
stretched across Europe and into the Americas which pushed his finances to the limit. When the
flood struck his coffers were nearly empty with his finances on life support. In such a position,
Philip ordered Alva to cover the expenses for his soldiers and administration. Alva’s attempts at
fiscal self-sufficiency came about in the form of heavy-handed tax collection which created no
small degree of discontent in the provinces. The States of Holland attempted to keep an open
dialogue and negotiate an amicable solution but to no avail. The fact that both parties expressed
their confusion with the other over the collection of the 10th and 20th pennies speaks volumes
about the breakdown in communication.
The States of Holland ended their negotiations with Alva over the All Saints Day flood
with the ominous conclusion that they had found no solution to their burdens, and had no legal
way to give the king contentment.32 For them, every avenue appeared to be closed. The illegal
remedy which the States of Holland found came in the form of open rebellion against the
Spanish. The natural disaster further alienated the province from central regime. For decades
the two parties had differing priorities, the debates surrounding the repairs laid bare this truth.
The period following the disaster was Holland’s hour of need, and in many ways their Habsburg
rulers abandoned the Hollanders as they were distracted by other priorities. These events did not
create the Revolt, but they made opposition and rebellion a more attractive choice for many.
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CHAPTER THREE - “BETTER BROKEN LAND THAN LOST LAND”: MILITARY
INUNDATIONS DURING THE DUTCH REVOLT

Introduction

“Better broken land than lost land” became the unofficial motto of the rebel forces during
the 1570s Holland campaigns of the Dutch Revolt. Contemporary and later chronicles of the war
repeatedly noted that the Prince of Orange and his supporters took this approach when it came to
the fighting in Holland.1 The mantra suggest that he, the States of Holland, and the rebel forces
were completely aware of the environmental damage they could cause in the form of seriously
weakened water-management defenses. In their attempt to militarize the landscape they
acknowledged that they could “break it” irreparably. The strength of the Spanish military
reduced the likelihood of a victory through traditional modes of warfare. This fact made the
destructive floods an appealing tactic for the rebels.
This chapter details the floods which hit Holland throughout the 1570s, both natural and
military. The strategic floods for military goals were the most widespread, but natural floods
also occurred, adding to the destruction and misery in the province. The Dutch landscape was
not a pristine environment that was destroyed by the toils of war; that is not the narrative of this
chapter. Rather there were already significant problems with water management systems in
Holland throughout the sixteenth century that the Dutch were having difficulty addressing. For
instance, the water board of Rijnland in the center of Holland endured a “century of conflict”
1
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over various legal, jurisdictional and water management issues. To add to the misery, Holland
and territories all along the North Sea were hit with arguably the worst flood in their history, the
All Saints Day Flood on 1 November 1570. Alva and Philip’s response to this natural disaster
was hardly accommodating, refusing to grant any significant tax relief for those affected. This
grievance became one of the many local complaints against Spanish rule that lead to the outbreak
of the Revolt.
Once the fighting began, the rebel military forces routinely used flooding in order to
secure their military objectives. The rebels often made attempts to control the flood waters, but
with varying degrees of success. Environmental factors and local resistance often complicated
the military plans. By the Pacification of Ghent in 1576 the rebels had flooded large sections of
the land in Holland and secured their objectives, causing enormous amount of collateral damage.
In some ways the Spanish were forced out of Holland on the back of a wave, beginning with the
floods in Northern Holland at Alkmaar, then moving south to central Holland with the sieges of
Haarlem and Leiden, before flowing east, towards Gouda, Oudewater, and the Alblasserwaard
and then south towards Brill, Voorne, and Putten. Flooding, both natural and man-made, was an
ever present feature of life in Holland in this period.

The Use of Military Inundations during the Revolt

In the early stages of fighting the rebel Dutch forces were seriously outnumbered and
outmatched. Part of the reason that Alva took such a hard line on taxation is that he had had to
support a standing army of 13,000 men ever since 1569. This swelled to an imposing 67,000
man army in response to the outbreak of hostilities in 1572, remaining around these levels for the
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remainder of the war.2 The rebels, for their part, struggled to organize the men and money
necessary to resist the Spanish forces. William of Orange incurred tremendous debt paying for
soldiers’ wages before the States of Holland finally found a way to provide regular troop
payments. Essentially outmatched, the Prince and the rebel forces consistently utilized guerillastyle tactics, most commonly with military inundations.
Siege warfare was the most common type of military engagement in the Dutch Revolt
specifically and early modern warfare more generally. This type of fighting required a great deal
of manpower, logistical support, and patience. The first step involved isolating the particular
city one wanted to capture. This could be accomplished in a variety of ways, but generally the
besieging army would construct two lines for attack and defense. The line of attack faced inward
toward the city while the line of defense faced outward and was intended to protect from a
rearguard attack. This step often involved the construction of temporary sconces, small
defensive works which guarded bridges, roads, or other passes.
Once the besieging army surrounded and isolated the city they could either starve it into
submission or attempt to create a breach in the defenses in order to gain entry. The two options
were not mutually exclusive, so a city’s defenders often had to fight hunger at the same time as
they fought the besiegers. The attackers also had two options for opening a breach in a city’s
defenses. First, they could use their artillery to try to blast open a hole. The newly developed
bastion style defenses and difficulties relating the artillery made this approach challenging.
Second, they could dig trenches up to the walls and place explosives. This approach was slow
and dangerous, yet it offered better chance of success if the attackers could reach the walls.
2
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Sieges could last months, in some cases years, which made them a logistical headache
and a financial heartache for rulers across Europe. Making arrangements for the necessary food,
clothing, tents, shovels, artillery, gunpowder, wagons, horses, and all other supplies required for
an army was difficult and costly work. In many cases army commanders contracted out these
duties to private entrepreneurs, and the army never received everything it was promised, either in
terms of supply or pay.3 Nevertheless, raising an army large enough to besiege a city and
keeping it fed and paid well enough to continue with a siege required tremendous effort and
application.
Military inundations, on the other hand, required much less coordination and preparation.
For centuries the Dutch had been protecting the land from flooding with the construction of dikes
and sluices.

In order to carry out a military inundation an army simply needed to create a

breach in the dike, or keep the sluice doors open, and let nature take its course. In place of a
large army and wagon train full of supplies and weaponry a simple shovel could suffice.

The

sources consulted for this dissertation provide little description of the technical side of the
operation, but it does not appear to have been overly complicated. The bigger issue was ensuring
that somebody with experience in water-management practices was present to oversee the
flooding and that he had enough pioneers (diggers) to carry out the necessary work. Henk den
Heijer’s work Holland under water: the logistics behind the relief of Leiden notes that the
inundations were largely the responsibility of members of the water boards and that these
individuals required “een legertje dijkgravers” (a small army of dike diggers).4
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The use of intentional flooding was an ever-present feature of the early stages of the
Revolt in Holland, from its outbreak in 1572 until the Pacification of Ghent in 1576. Both sides,
the rebel and Habsburg forces, attempted to militarize the landscape in order secure their
objectives, but there were important differences in their approaches. For the rebels, floods
became an important tactic to prevent troop movement and expel the Habsburg army from the
province. The rebels also used inundations much more frequently. The Habsburg forces used
the tactic more sporadically, for instance when they were upset following the relief of Leiden in
1574. For the most part, it appears as though Alva and subsequent Habsburg commanders
preferred more traditional forms of war.
That is not to say that they did not see the appeal of military inundations. At one point it
appears as though Alva seriously considered the possibility of flooding all of Holland.
Logistically and technically flooding the entire province could have been accomplished without
too much difficulty. In the end, Philip decided against it because it was still technically his
property, and it would lead to considerable damage to the surrounding provinces. He noted, “For
all things considered, one may say that Holland at present is a dike that protects all the other
provinces, and that if Holland were flooded, the other provinces would be exposed to manifest
danger and forced to build their own dikes; and before they are built their territory will
undoubtedly be lost.” Ironically, Philip believed that the tactic would be too cruel, and that
might damage Spanish reputations.5
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To complicate matters, the water boards and usual institutions which were responsible for
the water-management infrastructure were hard hit by the fighting as well. The war essentially
paralyzed the water boards and prevented them from limiting the damage from the floods and
carrying out repairs. Still struggling to cope with the damage from the All Saints Day Flood, the
Rijnland water board suspended all of its activities in June 1572 because of the “turbulent
times.”6 Furthermore, many of the water board representatives were split in their loyalties.
Some of them supported Philip II and the Habsburg government, while others sided with rebels.
The rent master of the Schieland water board sided with the loyalists and fled when the fighting
began, taking the privilege book (which recorded the organization’s decisions and policies) with
him.7 The Delfland water board encountered similar split loyalties. The majority of those who
sided with the king vacated their posts and fled to Utrecht.8 In other words, the lingering
damage from the All Saints Day Flood, the prevalent use of military inundations, and the
disorder among the water boards tasked with overseeing the water-management infrastructure
would only increase the damage, delay the repairs, and prolong the suffering for those affected
by the flood waters. All of this would put the poldermodel under considerable strain.
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The Capture of Brill and Spread of the Revolt

Not surprisingly the capture of Brill on the island of Voorne, the first engagement of the
Dutch Revolt, also witnessed the first recorded military inundation in Dutch history. The Sea
Beggars, a band of Dutch privateers ostensibly under the command of the Prince of Orange, had
been preying on Spanish shipping in the North Sea for several years, finding refuge in English
ports. Eventually Queen Elizabeth I was faced with the possibility of hostilities with Spain if she
continued to tacitly support the Dutch forces, and so decided to cut her ties and expel them from
England. On 1 April 1572 they landed at Brill and captured the city with relative ease, as Alva
was temporarily distracted by military events along the French border. He did leave behind
some limited garrisons, specifically in the nearby town of Maassluis. Once the commander heard
about events at Brill he marched all night. As the Spanish forces approached, the town carpenter
Rochus Meeuwisse hurled himself into one of the town’s canals and proceeded to chop at one of
the sluices with a hatchet. The destruction of the sluice released the stored water and flooded the
surrounding area, preventing a Spanish attack before it even began.9 This act and saved the city
from possible recapture. It is also telling that on 2 April, the day after Brill fell, the Spanish
Stadholder of Holland, Count Bossu, ordered a visual inspection of the Maas dike and had troops
stationed there for he feared the beggars might attempt to put part of Delfland under water and
carry their attacks to the Holland mainland.10
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The Sea Beggar capture of Brill signals a landmark event in Dutch history, although at
the time its significance was far from clear. Over the next several months cities across the
provinces of Holland and Zeeland would side with the Prince and the Revolt, but for a variety of
reasons. In August 1572, there was still a lot of confusion, as expressed by one diarist who
wrote that there were numerous “fables” about which cities had rebelled and which ones
remained loyal.11 Overall there had been general dissatisfaction with Habsburg policies, as
evidenced with the discussion around the repair of the All Saints Flood damage. Like many
revolts, however, the rebels had no clear plan program for what they wanted to achieve.
In these early days, support for the Revolt often came more in the form of a “protest
vote” against Alva and Philip II, rather than a proactive vote for the policies of Orange.12 In
short, it was reactionary rather than visionary. Town governments faced pressure from a variety
of sources, from outside forces like those of the Beggars, and the threat of internal civil unrest if
they supported Alva and the collection of the 10th penny too vigorously. In this regard the civic
militias proved vital as they often chose not to resist the Beggars.13 Once the town went over to
the Revolt, many of the loyalists to the central government chose to leave rather than wait to see
what might come next. Orange also helped secure support by replacing members of the town
council, or vroedschap, with people he could trust. By the end of 1572 nearly all the towns in
Holland and Zeeland had sworn allegiance to the Prince and the Revolt. The two notable cities
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which remained loyal were Middelburg in Zeeland, which withstood a nearly two-year siege
before surrendering in and reconciling with the rebels in 1574, and Amsterdam which eventually
made peace in 1578. This period represented the early and chaotic civil-war phase of the Revolt
in Holland.
In these years the rebel leadership struggled to develop and articulate a coherent plan for
the rebellion. The core areas of the Revolt, the provinces of Holland and Zeeland, were still
divided amongst themselves. Most cities had sided with the rebels, while the countryside largely
remained under Spanish control. At the higher levels of government and politics the core issues
of the Revolt revolved around the issues of liberty and religion. These two terms, however,
suggested different meanings to different people and the rebels were split among themselves
which issue should take precedence. For many, however, the Revolt forced more basic
questions. Henk van Nierop stated it most eloquently, “For most contemporaries the most urgent
question was not how to win it [the war], but how to survive it.”14
On 19 July 1572 the States of Holland took the revolutionary step of meeting in
Dordrecht on their own authority in an attempt to give the Revolt some direction. They met
without being summoned by the monarch, actually ignoring a simultaneous summons by Bossu
to meet at The Hague. At this meeting they formally invited Orange to act as Stadholder and
captain general of Holland in order to oversee the military and the war.15 The task before Orange
and the States was monumental: not only did they need to find a way to unite the various factions
of opposition, but they also had to do so under extreme military duress. As Tracy noted,
“Orange and the rebel states had to find a strategy for defending towns that were at times mere
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islands of rebellion in a Spanish sea.”16 It was with little exaggeration that Orange himself stated
that he would probably find his death in Holland and the Revolt.17
In truth, it was probably the Spanish themselves who did the most to unite the opposition.
Alva gave a clear reminder of why his nickname, “the iron duke,” was an appropriate moniker.
When he returned from the French border in the fall of 1572, he set about trying to re-establish
Habsburg authority in the northern Netherlands, mercilessly in many cases. In November the
town of Zutphen in the eastern province of Gelderland surrendered to Alva’s son Don Frederick
following a short siege, after which the inhabitants were brutally murdered. Alva made a similar
example of the town of Naarden in central Holland only a month later. Alva intended for these
sackings to send a clear message to the rebels: end this rebellion or else. Apparently the message
got lost in translation. Instead of cowing into submission the rebel forces fought with renewed
vigor. For the rebels, the meaning of these sackings was clear: surrender at your own peril.
It was in this phase of the war in Holland and Zeeland that the rebels used military
inundations most frequently. Struggling for funds and largely united only in their opposition to
Alva, while fearing the worst if they got caught, the rebels attempted to turn the landscape into a
weapon for military use. Compared with raising an army large enough to face the Spanish
forces in battle, flooding was a seemingly low cost alternative that offered immediate results. At
the same time, however, the rebels clearly understood the possible long term consequences of
this tactic.
The town of Flushing in Zeeland serves as a prime example. It had been one of the first
towns to go over to the Revolt following the Sea Beggar capture of Brill, and for the next two
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years the rebel forces waged a bitter struggle against the loyalists of nearby Middelburg. In this
pitched battle the rebel forces repeatedly flooded the land in between the two towns. When
Flushing was on the defensive awaiting reinforcements it “let the water course in.”18 Several
months later, the town was on the offensive, flooding the landscape even further and bringing in
ships in order to take Middelburg with a naval assault. The attack proved unsuccessful as
Middelburg held out for over a year longer. As a result of these tactics Zeeland became “wasted
and full of water” as one chronicler later attested.19 The devastation wrought by the use of
flooding would not have been lost on the rebel forces. Nevertheless, given the choice between a
defeat at the hands of the Spanish army and a trial by water, they chose the latter. For the rebels,
it was better to break the land then to lose it.

The Sieges of Haarlem (1572-3), Alkmaar (1573) and Amsterdam (1572-8)

The next great siege of the Revolt occurred at Haarlem, just west of Amsterdam,
beginning in December 1573, shortly after the massacres at nearby Naarden. Alva wanted to end
the Revolt as quickly as possible, and the capture of Haarlem would serve to divide Holland in
two along the IJ river (See figure 1). This strategy would separate southern Holland from the
northern Quarter and sever rebel communications and troop movements between the two areas.
The city was ill prepared to withstand the Alva’s forces, as it had only built impromptu defenses
inside the existing medieval walls. This siege demonstrated just how much Alva’s goal of
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intimidating the Dutch into submission had backfired. Over the next six months the town’s
militia put up a determined resistance to the siege, but would ultimately succumb to the Spanish
forces.
Nearby Amsterdam, on the other hand, remained loyal to the Spanish and bore the brunt
of Beggar attacks. The city served as an important link in the Spanish supply lines, allowing
them to bring in troops from the province of Utrecht for use in the siege of Haarlem (See Figure
1). This route allowed Alva to bypass the rebel controlled cities of southern Holland. The main
passage entailed troop movements along the tops of dikes which ran along the Zuiderzee and the
IJ river. One of these was the Spaarndam dike which separated these waters from the interior of
lakes and rivers Holland, specifically the Haarlemmermeer. The strategic importance of
controlling these dikes and water ways was clear to both sides, as evident from the fact that the
Beggars began sinking ships around Amsterdam as early as October 1572 to prevent passage to
the city.20 In an effort to control access to the two cities, both armies cut dikes and flooded the
land. Here the goal of the inundations was not to force out the opposing army, but rather to
facilitate troop and ship movement. Nevertheless, the end results were no less destructive.
Alva and his commanders envisioned a quick capture of Haarlem as they enjoyed
numerical superiority, with a fighting force of 17,000-18,000 soldiers versus only about 4,000
troops defending the town. The military historian Christopher Duffy noted that from a Spanish
point of view, “the reduction of the town seemed more of an administrative than a military
problem.”21 On 20 December Alva ordered outright an assault of the city without taking the
usual preparations. He had not counted on the resilience of the defenders, however, and his
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Figure 1: Spanish Lines of Attack and Resupply. Wim Klinkert, “Water in oorlog,” 456. The
Spanish reinforcements from Utrecht followed a northern and southern approach. The northern
one, via Amsterdam, could easily be disrupted with dike breaches. Note also the watery
conditions in the Northern Quarter which
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forces were roundly defeated. At this point the war settled into a more traditional siege, with
Alva attempting to mine up to the walls and place explosives while simultaneously isolating the
city. He was much more successful with the former than the latter, because Haarlem could keep
open communication and resupply lines with the towns to the south via the nearby
Haarlemmermeer allowed Sonoy to develop a waterline. Also note how Alva’s capture of
Haarlem served to separate southern Holland from the Northern Quarter along the IJ river.
In the early months of the siege when the Haarlemmermeer was frozen the rebels simply
used skates and sleds to reach the town, followed by the more traditional use of ships once the
water thawed.22 One of the few areas in which the rebels enjoyed an advantage was in the navy.
At one point they may have had as many as thirty ships and three galleys stationed in the huge
interior lake. The rebel forces were so effective in resupplying Haarlem that at one point the
defenders actually had enough bread that they could taunt the Spanish forces by throwing out
loaves to them.23
The Spanish forces, for their part, did their best to limit rebel access to the
Haarlemmermeer and eliminate this advantage. They were apparently successful enough that the
rebels felt compelled to start cutting dikes as early as February 1573. An eyewitness in
Amsterdam recorded that the Beggars had attempted to cut a dike near Amsterdam which
separated the Zuiderzee and Haarlemmermeer.24 The Beggars then breached the important
Spaarndam dike in March to allow ships passage into the Haarlemmermeeer. Afterwards they
proceeded to protect the opening with a makeshift defensive fortification in order to prevent the
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Spanish from doing any repairs.25 The situation reversed itself in May when Alva secured an
unexpected naval victory over the rebel ships on the Haarlemmermeer. He followed this up with
the capture of the fortification around Huis ter Hart, a stone house near the sluices which guarded
the entrance to the lake from the IJ river. It is possible, but not entirely clear, that the Spanish
may have created their own breach to circumvent Huis ter Hart to bring in their own ships to help
secure their victory.26 In any case, the Spanish ability to cut off Haarlem proved to be the key to
success, for the town finally surrendered to them on 13 July 1573.
The Spanish victory was a qualified success, as their army was hard hit by the cold
weather, disease, and low morale. Some of the Spanish commanders had even considered
raising the siege.27 It was a hard fought victory. In addition to the loss of human life the
landscape bore the brunt of the hostilities. Nevertheless, Alva had reached his goal of dividing
Holland in two. At this point he set about conquering the Northern Quarter, the portion of
Holland north of the river IJ.

In some ways his foray north was ill fated from the outset, as the

geography there was even more water logged and perilous, which benefited the rebels. In other
ways his hand was forced, for this area served as a base for attacks against Amsterdam and vital
Spanish supply lines. This venture would ultimately end in failure and Alva’s retirement as
governor. He most likely welcomed his recall as he found administering the Netherlands an
arduous and thankless task, which was exacerbated by his struggles with rheumatism.
In the same month that Alva captured Haarlem he began moving his forces north towards
the city of Alkmaar. The city lay in the center of the Northern Quarter of Holland and offered
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the Spanish the most convenient entrance point and best possibilities for further attacks.
Alkmaar represented the best chance at subjugating the area, but it was still a perilous
undertaking. At the outset Alva understood that transportation and logistics would be key. Even
before the Revolt began he had considered the prospect of fighting in this area and concluded
that the best approach would be along the sea dikes. This option was the best, but not without its
own challenges as the sea dikes were so narrow that carts and wagons could only move along
them in a single file line. Not surprisingly, he had struggled to bring all of his force to bear in
the assault.28
The rebels did their best to make his task even harder. Under direct commands from the
Prince, the Beggar leader Diederick Sonoy began immediately flooding the fields around the city
to prevent further Spanish movement. Sonoy opened the North Sea sluices at Krabbendam three
times, but on the first two occasions farmers closed the sluices to protect their fields. In the end,
Sonoy finally placed guards to ensure that the flooding would continue as planned. The rural
inhabitants were ‘very unwilling’ to see their lands flooded, but Orange directed Sonoy to
destroy as many dikes as necessary to secure the military objective.29
The goal of these inundations was to create an impassible water barrier, or waterline, and
prevent a Spanish attack. This particular waterline (arguably the first) was massive. Van Nierop
argued that it stretched from Zijpe polder north of the city, along the nearby Rekere river,
through the Schermer lake, extending through the Zaan river, before connecting with the
Wormer and Purmer lakes, ending at the Zuiderzee near the town of Monnickendam. This
inundation gave the Spanish a foothold south of the waterline, but never enough mount a
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sustained or serious challenge to the Northern Quarter.30 On 8 October 1573 the Spanish forces
withdrew to deal with a more pressing military issue in the south.31
With the withdrawal of Spanish forces from the Northern Quarter Amsterdam became
even more isolated as the rebels employed economic warfare against the city. The rebel forces
had already targeted Amsterdam during the siege of Haarlem in an effort to divert Spanish forces
and attention. As early as December 1572 the Sea Beggars had begun sinking ships to disrupt in
the city’s shipping routes. As the siege of Haarlem reached its climax in the summer of 1573 the
rebel forces increasingly targeted the dikes around Amsterdam to interrupt Spanish supplies and
communications. On 3 June 1573 Sonoy threatened the city by taking the St. Anthony’s dike to
the south of the city and building a sconce atop it. In response, the Spanish stadholder
Maximilian de Henin, the Count of Bossu, cut part of the dike to bring his own ships through to
confront the rebels. After a round of fierce combat the rebels withdrew. Three weeks later the
Beggars cut the sea dike, forcing the rural residents to retreat into the city, bringing all their cows
and food with them. In early July a small storm struck which pushed water through the breaches,
causing one observer to remark that the area southwest of the city resembled a lake.32
The fall of Haarlem in 1573 did little to relieve the pressure on Amsterdam. The Beggars
controlled the Diemermeer southeast of the city, which left its inhabitants in continual fear. In
August the Beggars put a sizeable breach in the Diemer dike, which separated the lake from the
larger Zuiderzee. This inundation made the lake look like a “great wild sea,” killing numerous
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livestock and leading to “great misery everywhere” inside Amsterdam.33 The Beggars completed
their encirclement of the city in October when they destroyed the Amsterdam fleet at the Battle
on the Zuiderzee. After this point the rebels could keep the city isolated with a small fleet, while
periodically cutting the surrounding dikes to ensure the city remained an island unto itself.34
Over the course of the next several years, Amsterdam could do little to repair any of the
damaged dikes. The regents’ main priority was to keep the citizens fed. As early as 1573 they
would only allow in refugees who could supply a mud, or hectoliter, of grain.35 According to the
monk Brother Wouter Jacobsz, who endured the siege of Amsterdam, on 9 February 1574 the St.
Anthony’s dike was still in disrepair and further damaged by storms that night. Several months
later in July, rebel forces decided to create more cuts in the Diemer dike to prevent Spanish
movements associated with the siege of Leiden further to the south. In October once Leiden was
dramatically saved with the use of military inundations (see below), the rebels again returned to
breach the Diemer dike, presumably to taunt the loyalists in Amsterdam. As the Beggars had
already cut this dike several times, it appeared to be their default tactic for intimidating the city.
This time, however, the defenders were able to prevent further damage.36
In 1576 several naturally occurring floods continued to pile the misery onto the people of
Amsterdam. Throughout the year several heavy storms caused dike breaches along the
Zuiderzee coast and the IJ river. The Court of Holland authorized the construction of new
temporary embankments because many of the old ones could not be repaired, but this did not
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begin until sometime into the next year.37 One storm in particular, on 10 June brought bitter
winds and a rise in water levels which set many areas around Amsterdam further under water.
Apparently any northern wind threatened Amsterdam with another flood.38
Amsterdam enjoyed a temporary respite towards the end of the year. The States of
Holland decided to begin repair work on the Spaarndam sluice, stopping the damage caused by
Spanish forces as they retreated from the siege of Leiden.39 Amsterdam itself sent out some
workers to begin work on the Diemer dike, which many interpreted as signs of forthcoming
permanent peace, associated with the Pacification of Ghent. The reprieve was short lived,
however, as Haarlem quickly reconciled with Prince, singling out Amsterdam as the lone site of
loyalist support in Holland. Wouter Jacobsz noted that those in Amsterdam continued “to live in
misery” now that all the other cities were united against them. On 9 January 1577 he found that
the Beggars had again flooded the surrounding area and controlled all the water passages into
and out of the city.40
Amsterdam would finally make its own satifactie (treaty) with Orange on 8 February
1578, but not before the rebels inflicted more suffering. On 25 January they had made inroads
into capturing the city by force. The residents responded with their own military inundation,
cutting the dike by the Haarlemspoort on the west side of the city and forcing the rebels to
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retreat.41 The fact that one of the final acts in this area of hostilities involved yet another dike
breach is telling, yet one more dike breach in an area already decimated by military activities.
The sieges of Haarlem, Alkmaar, and Amsterdam generated a great deal of environmental
damage and suffering for all those involved. Both armies had directed several dike breaches to
give passage for their ships, disrupt troop movements, and to pile on the misery in the case of
Amsterdam. Several of the important dikes, such as the Spaarndam and the Diemer, had been
broken in the name of military necessity. Throughout the sixteenth century the different water
boards had done everything in their power to protect these vital flood defenses. In the span of a
few years these initiatives were undone, and the ongoing war prevented repairs and restoration.
The use of the waterline during the siege of Alkmaar pointed towards further possibilities for
flooding, but these required a degree of planning, the right conditions, and they still entailed a
great deal of destruction. At the same time, however, the successes of some of these inundations
validated their continued use. In many ways the destruction during these sieges were just the
opening salvos in the militarization of the landscape: a portent for further misery.

The Siege and Relief of Leiden (1573-4)

Leiden was the key strategic location in southern Holland, opening doors for attack
towards the other major cities in the surrounding area, and as such it was probably the pivotal
event of the civil war phase of the Revolt in Holland. According to Jonathan Israel, “The siege
of Leiden, if not quite the longest – that of Middelburg was longer – was the costliest, hardest
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fought, and most decisive, as well as the most epic of the great sieges of the Revolt.”42 The siege
and relief of the city is the best known case of military inundation during the Revolt. James
Tracy estimates that between 1572 and 1576 roughly half of the farm and pasture land in Holland
was under water, largely as a result of the relief of Leiden.43 It is no coincidence that the most
important siege of the Revolt also witnessed the largest example of military inundation, as well
as the most well-known.
The Spanish forces began their siege of Leiden in late 1573 after the fall of Haarlem.
Even in these early stages of the struggle Orange had considered using military inundations, but
ultimately chose more traditional tactics. By March 1574, however, Spanish forces had gained
the upper hand and controlled the surrounding countryside. The rebel attempts to break up the
siege by force of arms ended disastrously with the battle of Mook in Gelderland, in which the
Prince’s younger brother Louis of Nassau died. This battle offered a temporary reprieve for
Leiden, as those in the city stored up supplies and prepared for the resumption of the siege. The
Spanish duly obliged, and resumed their attempt to capture the city in May.
The States of Holland were well aware of the precariousness of the military situation.44
With only 7,000-8,000 men the Spanish commander was able to secure all the surrounding
villages and erect as many as sixty sconces, effectively isolating the city. By July the only way
Orange could communicate with the people of Leiden was via carrier pigeon.45 Predictably the
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food supplies began to dwindle and the defenders began to feel the pangs of hunger. By August
Orange was pleading with the city to hold out a bit longer.
It was around this time that the rebels developed the motto, “Better broken land than lost
land.” The eye-witness of the siege Jan Fruytiers clearly articulated the rebel’s intentions, noting
that they were willing to let the land become a sea, rather than surrender it to the Spanish. So
dire was their situation, that they felt these were their only two options.46 The Prince and the
States made their choice, deciding to “break the land,’ using the same tactic that had already
served them so well: military inundations. Although the rebels had made the difficult decision to
flood a large portion of Holland, there was still considerable work to be done if Leiden was to be
saved. Directing the floods waters toward the city was a massive undertaking, full of technical
and logistical challenges.
The States were crystal clear about their intentions and possible repercussions in the
formal act for relief of Leiden which they published on 30 July. It was their plan to inundate the
lands in the water boards of Rijnland, Schieland, and Delfland and all adjacent areas by cutting
dikes and opening sluices. In theory, this maneuver would drive out the Spanish, and the
Beggars could reach the city with a flotilla of boats. They further noted that they would try to
limit the damage to farm animals and crops. How they planned to do this is unclear, beyond just
having the residents move to the higher elevated cities with whatever goods they could carry.47
The plan entailed bringing in waters from the Maas and Ijssel rivers which stood roughly twenty
kilometers from the city. It was an ambitious plan, but the Prince and the States of Holland had
few alternatives.
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The rebel task was complicated by a number of problems. The water boards of Rijnland,
Delfland, and Schieland were split in their loyalties. Some members retained their allegiance to
Philip II and fled to Utrecht, while others had chosen to follow the Prince and the States.48 This
fact meant that some of the individuals most qualified to help with the flooding were absent.
Furthermore, the Spanish had done well to secure the countryside and block off the important
routes to the city. As early as October 1573 the regents of Leiden were complaining about the
rebel failure to take the important Lammen sconce south of the city.49 This meant that when the
rebels began flooding southern Holland they essentially had to take their second-choice route to
the city, which required several more dike breaches and even more damage to the landscape.50
Contemporary chroniclers portrayed the relief as part of a carefully worked out master
plan by Orange and his supporters, but the actual events were much more complex.51 On 14
August 1574 Orange sent a letter to two unnamed individuals authorizing them to begin opening
up sluices and to break the “great dike” by Capelle, noting that the water could be brought to
Leiden in a few short days.52 Roughly two weeks later, on 26 August, the first cuts were made at
Capelle, about halfway between Rotterdam and Gouda, bringing in water from the Ijssel.
Orange personally attended these first cuts, which were carried out by Pieter van der Goes, the
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Dike Count of Delfland.53 Over the course of the next month the States noted that these cuts
were not brining in the necessary water. As such they began authorizing officials such as the
lawyer and advisor to the Prince, Gerard van Wijngaerden, to cut any dikes and destroy
whichever sluices or mills they found necessary. If the plan was not “masterful” it was at the
very least carried out with conviction.
According to an eyewitness account of the siege when the first cuts were made the people
of Leiden went to the walls of the city to watch the water’s progress. Apparently they believed
that the flood would lead to a quick resolution. After they discovered that the relief would be a
much longer process they retreated from their perch, speaking “many words not worth
writing.”54 Three days after the first breaches were made the States of Holland began recruiting
pioneers (diggers) from all over southern Holland to carry out more.55 On 2 September the
States wrote to Van der Goes to make additional cuts in the dikes near Delft and Nootdorp,
fifteen or sixteen feet wide, and if necessary he was to make further breaches to keep the water
flowing north.56
Once it became clear that these initial cuts would not be sufficient, Orange and the
members of the States of Holland began to get nervous. They sent letters to the Lands Advocate
Paulus Buys and several others to begin inspecting the breaches, presumably to ensure they were
not being interfered with and were continuing to let in the flood water. The same letters also
directed the officials to make sure that the laborers were being diligent and working as they
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promised. The fact that many of the pioneers were recruited locally and paid poorly, ostensibly
to flood their own lands, did not help their motivation. Perhaps more troubling, the States began
receiving reports of enemy movement in the Alblasserwaard to the east. They gave the
inhabitants there three days to make preparations, after which they would open up another area
for military inundations (see below).57
While the vanguard of the rebel forces slowly made its way towards the city, in the rear
of the action Orange and the States were busy monitoring the flooding and arranging a fleet of
barges. The regents of Gouda were ordered to cut an embankment northwest of the city and have
the mills keep pumping in order to better move water towards Leiden.58 Throughout the month
of September the States ordered the military to watch the sluices and make sure they remain open
at the right times (at high tide) and to prevent the enemy from blocking them. They also
consulted several people regarding creating yet another dike breach in the Havens dike by
Rotterdam.59 In the background of all this flooding the States and the Prince were making
arrangements for the actual relief of Leiden. The cities of Gouda, Delft, and Rotterdam came to
serve as staging areas for the laborers, ships, and supplies for the relief. By mid-September there
were 640 pioneers and 320 ships stationed in the three cities awaiting instructions and further
flooding.60
The water appeared to move rather slowly since the outer dikes along the Maas and Ijssel
rivers were only partially broken and flooded at high tide. Initially the rebel forces probably
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only cut the inner dikes between polders selectively, but most likely abandoned this precaution
as the situation became more dire.61 The Spanish defense of the landscheiding dike was one of
the biggest hindrances to the rebel effort. This important embankment separated Schieland,
Delfland and Rijnland and was well defended by the Spanish. By the end of August the
eyewitness Jan Fruytiers observed that all the polders around Rotterdam and Gouda were
flooded, so that once the landscheiding was captured the rebels could easily sail towards
Leiden.62
The rebel attempts to capture the important dike bore little fruit. On 4 September the
States ordered the Delft regents to outfit the city militia and engage the enemy in order to capture
the dike. The effort failed.63 The following night the rebels launched a surprise attack further
west in an attempt to outflank the Spanish. They partially succeeded and opened up a small
breach in the landscheiding, but in spite of the attack’s success, the path to Leiden was still not
clear. Roughly a week later the rebels attempted another surprise attack. Under the cover of
darkness the rebel forces set out from Rotterdam heading north. Apparently this foray was
poorly planned as the forces arrived at the Groenweg dike which ran parallel to the
landscheiding, and ended up cutting that dike instead of the landscheiding.64
While the situation outside the city stalled, the situation inside remained perilous. Those
inside the city were forced to mix vinegar with their beer and add slate to their wheat to make
their provisions last longer. According to Fruytiers the three plagues of war, famine, and death
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were present, “and not having had enough a further [plague] was coming,” specifically in the
form of discord as religious disputes began to add tension to an already nervous situation. At the
end of September Fruytiers wrote dramatically, “Finally the misery here is so great, that I did not
have the power to keep writing.”65 He recommended himself to God for his and the city’s safety.
By late September the rebels had made progress but the Spanish still held key defenses
on the Zeewardsweg dike, in the town of Zoeterwoude south of the city, and with the Lammen
sconce. The Prince got lucky with the first obstacle when the Spanish commander unexpectedly
withdrew his forces from their outer defense. The rebels wasted no time in breaching the
Zeewardsweg dike once they claimed it.66 The second and third obstacles, however, remained in
Spanish hands and were a barrier to saving the city. The Lammen sconce, in particular,
commanded the area south of Leiden and was well-garrisoned, which prevented the rebels from
saving the city through outright assault.
Military inundation remained the only route for saving the city. On the 23 September the
States ordered Pieter vander Goes to inspect the sluices along the Maas river and ensure they
were open and in good order, to make sure the river water was coursing into Holland. Three
days later they authorized him to make any additional dike breaches necessary. Simultaneously
they ordered Gerard van Wijngaerden to make additional cuts along the Ijssel dike to the east and
to open all the sluices in Gouda.67 By the end of September the inundations offered the only
chance for the rebels, and they devoted all their efforts to it.
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Yet on the first day of October the situation still looked critical from the rebel
perspective. In total they had made no less than sixteen different major dike breaches, not
counting the numerous smaller ones in the interior polders. Simultaneously they monitored the
various sluices to ensure they brought in enough flood water to save the city by ship.
Nevertheless, despite their best efforts to militarize the landscape, they had failed. The flood
water had largely come to a halt and they were not able to capture the Lammen sconce or
Zoeterwoude by force. In the course of three days, however, the situation would reverse itself
and the Prince would sail triumphantly into the city.
In the end it was only when military and natural forces combined that the city could be
saved. In the first days of the month of October a heavy rain began to fall. This process was
then followed by sudden shift in wind direction that blew extra water northward towards the city.
Fruytiers believed that the water level may have risen from nine inches up to twenty-eight. He
noted that God “let the winds blow…and wonderfully spread out the water.”68 The rebels
capitalized on the opportunity and sent out their ships from the nearby cities. Along the way
they breached several more dikes to keep water flowing northward and engaged the Spanish
forces at Zoeterwoude and the Lammen sconce. Fruytiers recorded that the Spanish now had the
fear of the Philistines in them.69
Apparently the flood waters around Leiden were still fairly shallow and the attackers had
to portage the barges at some points. Nevertheless they were resolute. At this point the tide of
the battle – and flooding – turned in favor of the rebels. The Spanish commander withdrew his
forces, which allowed Orange to capture and break the Zegwardsweg dike. By 3 October the
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continual rain and wind deposited enough water in the canals leading to Leiden that Orange and
his forces could engage the Lammen sconce and capture it. This feat finally allowed for the
relief of the city. The prince personally sailed into the city, distributing bread to the beleaguered
citizens and thanking them for their bravery. Fruytiers mentioned that Louis Boissot, the admiral
of the Dutch fleet, went to the church in Leiden and gave thanks to God, for wonderfully
bringing in the sea, and keeping it the desired places. 70 The city was saved, but at a tremendous
cost.
There is some scholarly debate over how much damage the relief of Leiden actually
caused to southern Holland. S.J. Fockema Andreae did not believe that the relief had the
characteristics of a great flood. As evidence he notes that in the final charge towards the city the
rebel forces had to portage their barges at some points. Nevertheless, while certain areas around
Leiden might have escaped with less damage, other parts were greatly affected.71 Recent
research has suggested the floods generated a tremendous amount of destruction. One historian
convincingly depicted the damage, noting that all of Schieland and Delfland were flooded, with
the streets of Rotterdam and Delft completely under water. Rijnland was only a little better off,
with the flooding stopping at the Rijn, Gouwe, and Vliet rivers. The damage proved lasting
however, and the repair process was complicated by the ongoing war. According to a 1576
report taken on Alphen-on-the-Rijn, a town just east of Leiden, only seven percent of the land
was available for harvesting with the rest being “desolate and unusable.” A year later some
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Figure 2: Map of the Military Inundations for the relief of Leiden. Klinkert, “Water in oorlog,”
462. The arrows denote dike breaches and cuts, while the shaded region represents the extent of
the flooding. The thick line shows denotes the rebel’s route to the city, notice the “second
choice” route around the town of Zoetermeer.
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reports noted that the majority of land was still under water.72 Many feared the Maas dike would
be irreparably damaged and would waste away, leaving Schieland completely under water. The
water board of Rijnland worried that the flood waters might mix with the Haarlemmermeer,
obstructing ship traffic and possibly leading to further damage to the Spaarndam dike. Cities
such as Delft and Leiden were considered “water cities” (sea-side towns).73 Furthermore, as the
Spanish retreated out of Holland they targeted and damaged numerous dikes and sluices, such as
the Mallegat, Huis ter Hart and the Rijn dike.74
The relief of Leiden entailed a degree of directed flooding that was unprecedented in
Dutch history. Over the course of about two months the military inundations put around half of
the province of Holland under water. In many ways the rebel loss of Leiden would have spelled
the end of the Revolt in general, since the outnumbered and outmatched forces could not
dislodge the Spanish army through traditional maneuvers. The inundations offered the Prince the
best possibility for success so he devoted all of his efforts to them. The majority of the important
military encounters between the rebels and the Spanish in Holland were over control of dikes.
Once the dikes were captured, the rebels wasted no time breaching them and releasing the flood
waters further north toward the city. Nevertheless, in spite of all the man-made flooding, it was
only with the changes in weather that the city was saved. The rains and wind provided the final
drops that filled up the container that was southern Holland. The city was saved through human
and natural agency, but at an extraordinary cost. The bill for the safety of the city was not
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calculated by guilders or the loss of human life as are so many military encounters, but rather
through environmental ruin.

Flooding in the Southeast (Scheiland, the Alblasserwaard, and the Krimpenerwaard)

At the same time that Orange and the rebels were busy flooding the lands around Leiden
they were also worried about a rearguard attack by the Spanish. During the middle of the siege
of Leiden the States of Holland got wind that the Spanish were taking refuge in the
Alblasserwaard. This water board stretched across the southern border of Holland. The region
stood far enough away from Leiden not to pose a direct threat. Yet the rivers which surrounded
every side of this region offered the Spanish forces easy troop movement. The Krimpenerwaard
lay directly across the Lek River from the Ablasserwaard, and offered the Spanish possible
access to Schieland and the interior of southern Holland. At the same time, however, these
locations also afforded the rebels ample opportunity to continue with their military inundations
to keep the Spanish from gaining a foothold along the borders of southern Holland.
Even before the siege of Leiden the area had been hard hit by naturally occurring floods.
According to M. Gottschalk’s compendium of floods in the Netherlands, the Alblasserwaard
made for a “disastrous tale” during late sixteenth century. Like many other places in the
Holland, it had been hard hit by the All Saints Flood in 1570. The damage to the watermanagement infrastructure made it more vulnerable to further disasters in 1571 and 1573, when
ice floes floating down the rivers broke dikes and led to further inundations. Some of these
floods were especially catastrophic, such as the one in 1573 which resulted in as much as twelve
to fourteen feet of water standing on the land. The next year military flooding took the place of
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natural disasters. In total, from 1570 until 1577 the area only enjoyed periodic dry spells, but
was otherwise under water for the majority of the time.75
Although the military flooding in this area was less spectacular compared with that of
Leiden, intentional flooding in this area was more constant. For over a year the rebel forces
consistently flooded this rural area. On 4 September 1574 the States of Holland had intercepted
enemy dispatches which discussed the possibility of Spanish forces wintering in the
Alblasserwaard, and they also suspected that the enemy may have been receiving support from
the area. The States subsequently renounced their protection of the area effective within three
days. The same day their protection ended, the States “thoughtfully advised” the Land’s
Advocate Paulus Buys and another official to begin cutting dikes in the area. A week later they
ordered the regents of Dordrecht and Gorinchem to have their militias begin cutting dikes
immediately. The States directed them to spare no expense with their dike breaches, noting that
they would help pay for the cuts and repair. The next day they wrote again to the Dordrecht
regents, telling them to cut the dikes for the safety of the land and cities, and to damage the
enemy.76
By 26 September, just days before the rebel forces saved Leiden, the States had to cut
more dikes in order to relieve Gorinchem. The initial inundations appear to have slowed the
Spanish but did not force them to relinquish their siege. Additional breaches by the rebels to the
nearby Wolferse dike in October finally forced the enemy to abandon their fortifications by 12
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November 1574. While this saved the city of Gorinchem, Spanish forces nevertheless remained
in the area.77
The military inundations to save Gorinchem were not as intricate or involved as those of
Leiden, but they still inflicted considerable suffering on the local residents. By February of the
next year the town of Dalem, which adjoined Gorinchem, complained about its situation, noting
it was still in “great peril” from the floods. The two large breaches in the Dalem dike, a result of
cuts by both the rebel and Spanish forces, remained unrepaired and were causing great misery,
poverty and affliction in the town.78 Over the next few months Orange and the States attempted
to reduce the suffering in the area, but they could only provide partial respite as the enemy
remained a threat. The States authorized a one stuiver per morgen tax to raise money to repair
the Wolferse dike, and decided to provide full funding for a new sluice in Gorinchem which they
believed would offer some relief.79
By the summer of 1575, however, a Spanish invasion halted repairs and witnessed
several more inundations in southern Holland. The Spanish plan involved a two-pronged attack
through Zeeland from the south-west and through the Ablasserwaard and adjoining
Krimpenerwaard from the southeast. In late May the States wrote to representatives of
Schieland, Delfland, and Rijnland that the Spanish could be launching an assault, and so they
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were ordered to begin storing supplies in their cities within twenty four hours.80 On 16 June
Orange had serious fears about a Spanish incursion coming through the Alblasserwaard. The
next day the magistrates of Dordrecht feared an imminent Spanish attack on Oostendam. The
village lay just north of Dordrecht and was only separated the town from the Alblasserwaard by a
small river. The Spanish capture of Oostendam would drive a wedge between Dordrecht and the
rest of southern Holland. The States responded by authorizing a ten stuiver per morgen tax to
construct a fortification at nearby Zwijndrecht, but the residents had trouble raising the funds and
deciding exactly where to place the defenses. The situation appeared so threatening that the
Prince requested all available people to fight for the fatherland!81
Dordrecht was spared when the Habsburg forces turned their attentions further northeast,
bypassing the defenses of Zwijndrecht (if they were ever built), setting out directly for interior of
southern Holland. They set their sights on Gouda, Oudewater, and Woerden in Schieland and
the Krimpenerwaard. Over the next two months, the Spanish scored a number of victories. On
19 July the Spanish commander, Gilles de Berlaymont, Lord of Hierges, began setting up his
forces around Oudewater. The Prince had seen this attack coming and had already ordered the
magistrates of Oudewater to use all their resources to prevent the Spanish advance. He
specifically noted the need to cut the nearby dikes and open the sluices. The magistrates,
however, refused to use flood their land, possibly because of the damage it would do to the
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harvests.82 Orange had also directed the regents of Woerden to carry out inundations, but it is
unclear whether they followed his orders.83
In any case, Hierges began his siege of Oudewater on 6 August, and within two days had
captured the poorly defended town. Like Alva, Hierges wanted to send a message with the
treatment of captured towns. Several hundred of the roughly 3000 inhabitants, men women, and
children, were brutally murdered. According to some sources the only remaining structures in
the city after the Spanish moved on were the church and eight houses.84
After this victory the Spanish commander turned south towards the town of Schoonhoven
and began setting up their siege works. A victory here would give the Spanish control over both
sides of the Lek river and footholds in the both the Krimpenerwaard and Alblasserwaard. In
order to relieve the city the Prince ordered a breach in the Lek dike, but city regents refused to
obey, because some of them had not wanted to destroy the harvests. Throughout the siege
Orange and the States continued to implore the city to carry out military inundations, but it is
unclear which ones actually occurred, if any.
On 12 and 13 August 1575 the States of Holland gave orders to breach the Wolferse dike
by Gorinchem and to flood the Alblasserwaard. The States wanted to bring the area under water,
and keep it that way. They began organizing laborers in Zwijndrecht to carry out the cuts, and
the dike officials were ordered to arrest, fine, or deport any residents unwilling to help the
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cause.85 The flooding served little tactical use as Schoonhoven surrendered to the Spanish on 24
August after their cannons opened up a three hundred foot gap in the city walls.86 After the siege
the receiver of Dordrecht was ordered to pay 400 pounds for laborers used in dike breaches all
across the Alblasserwaard at Papendrecht, ‘t Elshout (Kinderdike), Oudekerk, Krimpen, and
Lekkerkerk.87 The floods had not saved the Schoonhoven, they had only added to the misery for
the residents of the Alblasserwaard and Krimpenerwaard.
After taking Oudewater and Schoonhoven, Hierges directed his attention towards
Woerden, which could serve as a stepping stone for Gouda. When it appeared that the siege of
Schoonhoven might be lost Orange arranged a commission including the magistrates of Gouda to
have villages in Schieland prepare for upcoming inundations. On 24 August the States ordered
Dirck Jansz Lonck, one of Orange’s most trusted officials in Gouda, to take personal command
of dike breaches around the city.88 This time the Prince wanted to ensure that his orders were
followed.
Following the string of Spanish victories rebel support in Holland appeared to be at a
nadir, but Orange and the States slowly began to turn the tide at the Siege of Woerden.89 On 29
August 1575 the States wrote to the city that they would do all they could to help relieve it.
Hierges began his siege on 8 September, and again the rebels did not have the military strength
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to force out the Spanish through an outright assault. The States said they would continue to do
what they could to help the city, and would reimburse their payments for the militia just like they
did at Leiden, but otherwise they must trust in their ally Orange, as he tried to preserve their
freedom.90 Over the next several months, however, there was little change as both combatants
sought a breakthrough.
In spring 1576 the Prince had finally made some progress towards securing the city’s
safety. The States of Holland provided Orange money for a much stronger army, totaling a
hundred companies of 150 men plus a hundred warships. Furthermore, he made sure that his
dike breaches would be carried out as he intended, unlike some of the previous ones. These
began with breaches along the Ijssel River at the village of Oudekerk which cut off supplies to
the Spanish from their defenses at Krimpen. These inundations proved effective as the Krimpen
garrison surrendered on 26 February 1576.91
The Spanish would keep up their siege to Woerden for another several months,
prompting several more rebel inundations. In late July 1576 representatives from Leiden,
Gouda, and Alkmaar were ordered to begin organizing provisions for the relief and to coordinate
their efforts with the admiralty. In an effort to break up the siege the States ordered cuts to the
Ijssel dike on 8 August. When Gouda dragged its feet and stalled, the States wrote to them
demanding that they help with the cuts and assist the water board officials already working on
the task. Two days later the city responded that the Ijssel dike stood “open” and that east
embankment of Gouda was cut as well. Apparently these breaches were enough to force the
Spanish to begin pulling up their siege. By 25 August the States ordered members of the
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Delfland water board to begin repairing the Ijssel dike and the east embankment, and to conduct
a report on their condition. By the end of the month representatives from Woerden were writing
to the States asking for advice over which of the abandoned Spanish fortifications could be
demolished and used for material.92
The inundations in the Alblasserwaard, Krimpenerwaard, and Schieland stalled and then
reversed the Spanish invasion from the southeast. The States and the Prince came to rely on the
floods as a military expedient, but perhaps became too dependent on the maneuver. The floods
related to the siege of Schoonhoven did nothing to save the city, but only brought in yet more
water to three different water boards which had already experienced widespread inundations. It
is no wonder then that the military inundations during the siege of Woerden, while successful,
encountered significant resistance from local populations. After the massive inundations for the
relief of Leiden the people of Holland were growing tired of further calls for dike breaches and
open sluices.

Brill, Voorne and Putten

At the same time that Hierges was putting pressure on the southeastern flank of Holland
the Spanish attempted an attack from the southwest. Although the major battle in this theater
came to settle on Zierikzee in Zeeland, the city of Brill and the islands of southern Holland
suffered heavy damage as well. The timing was unfortunate for the local residents because the
area had already been suffering from flooding issues and was enduring a severe financial crisis.
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As early as July 1573 the area of Putten on the island of Voorrne complained about the
condition of its dikes and the flooding in the area. Whether this was a result of military
inundations or lingering damage from the All Saints Flood is difficult to tell. The States of
Holland’s resolutions mention a tax exemption for the village of Korendijk, south of Putten,
granted by the Prince in 1573, but it made no mention about the causes of the damage to the
dikes. In any case, the repair and upkeep for the sea dikes there were proving too expensive for
the local residents. They estimated the cost of repair and rebuilding in the area at 16,000-18,000
pounds. The Prince’s exemption was to last six years, but within two years the island was
already asking for an extension. The States apparently added four years to the exemption, on the
condition that they build a less expensive earth dam in the area as a stopgap measure to help
protect the land from further flooding.93 In August 1575 the States exempted the island from the
collection of a ten stuiver tax.
Other areas nearby were experiencing difficulties as well. After Brill and the lands of
Voorne and Putten fell short of their tax dues, the States authorized the tax collectors to increase
their demands on any areas not flooded or in enemy hands. The fact that the States had to add
this caveat suggests widespread flooding and enemy encroachment. If anyone resisted, officials
were allowed to arrest them or confiscate property as necessary.94 The town of Brill attempted to
ensure that the money would be used for a local fortification, which would help secure the safety
of the island of Voorne, but even that proved unsuccessful.95 Apparently there was little money
to go around, even for local needs and projects.
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Over the course of the summer and fall of 1575, this area would be put under further
pressure as Spanish forces drew near. At the same time that Hierges had opened up a
southeastern front, the Spanish Commander Cristóbal de Mondragón began advancing from the
southwest. The two-pronged approach enjoyed some initial successes. By September 1575
Mondragón had captured the islands of Klundert, Rugenhil, and Fijnaart along the coast of
Flanders. These locations offered him a launching point for his famous crossing of the Zijpe
channel in which his army waded between islands at low tide to capture the islands of Schouwen
and Duiveland. These victories essentially drove a wedge between Holland and Zeeland. As
Geoffrey Parker noted, at this point, “The fate of the Dutch Revolt hung in the balance.”96
In response, the Prince again militarized the landscape in an attempt to have the flood
waters make up for the rebel deficiency in manpower. On 1 October 1575 Orange wrote to the
water board of Voorne ordering them to survey the dikes around Brill because he intended to
breach them for the defense of the city.97 Three days later the States wrote the magistrates of
Brill that they intended to flood the island of Overflakkee and Schouwen along with the area
around Zwijndrecht. If the Spanish were going to drive a wedge between Holland and Zeeland,
then the rebels would do likewise and make sure that the Spanish could not combine their forces.
The States wrote that with the help of Almighty God the lands and cities of Holland would be
protected. In the same letter, however, they authorized the regents of Brill to make any dike cuts
collector for the States regarding an exemption from the 3rd penny tax. This tax was the same
one which the States authorized the arrest and/or confiscation of property if not collected. RSH
1575, 462, 2 July 1575. On this date the States declared they could not afford to be lenient with
the collection of a ten stuiver per morgen tax for fortifications in Voorne and Putten, because
they were “highly needed.”
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necessary.98 God helps those who help themselves. Two days later Orange appointed a
commission for the defense of the town charged with organizing the local inhabitants to help
build a sconce and arrange the breaches in the Maas dike. By 3 November Orange had ordered
other officials to Brill to help carry out the dike cuts.99 The next year would bring little relief for
the area, as storms throughout 1576 led to further damage to the islands.100
The military inundations in the islands of southern Holland did just enough to prevent a
Spanish attack on the mainland. The islands were already in disrepair which only added to the
already costly repair. Even before the floods local residents had little money to spare for the
astronomical costs of the necessary dike repairs. In short, these floods struck a population that
could least afford it.

Conclusion

The mantra “better broken land than lost land” was not simply a token catchphrase used
by the rebels to highlight the need to remove the Spanish military from Holland. Contemporaries
genuinely felt these were largely the only two options available to them. They were fully aware
of the possible repercussions of military inundations. During the relief of Leiden some people
feared, perhaps unrealistically, that the floods might bring in salt water and make the land
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unusable for years to come.101 The rebels were quite willing to break their land rather than lose
it.
The great sixteenth-century hydraulic engineer Andries Vierlingh clearly understood the
possible ramifications. He believed that the military inundations carried out on the island of
Walcheren in Zeeland in 1574 would affect currents along the coast of Flanders, resulting in the
silting and closure of rivers. In his view, this would ultimately lead to cities such as Antwerp
and Bergen op Zoom becoming landlocked. During the war he proposed allowing for trade in
dike materials between the rebel and Habsburg territories as a sort of truce or peace-keeping
mission to help limit the damage. The proposal went nowhere as the Habsburg government in
Brussels never approved it. There was little Vierlingh could do to prevent these intentional dike
breaches other than appeal to water board officials’ sense of duty. When this failed in Zeeland,
he labeled the water board officials “heretics!” He argued that they had turned their back on
their responsibility to protect the land from flooding.102 The intentional flooding of the
landscape was antithetical to centuries of experience directed towards preventing inundations. In
many ways military inundations were truly heretical in the Low Countries. They were a sin
against the doctrine of the poldermodel and flood prevention; they were imposed on local
populations without any discussion or debate and flew in the face of the accepted wisdom of the
day that understood floods as something to be avoided.
Vierlingh was not the only person who tried to prevent these inundations from occurring.
Throughout the prolonged siege of Leiden several towns wrote to the States of Holland
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requesting they be allowed to close their sluices and stop flooding the land.103 Orange had to
place guards at some of the sluices and dike breaches to ensure that the flood waters continued to
course into Holland. In Alkmaar as well the rural farmers attempted to prevent the flooding of
their lands. The regents of Gouda and Schoonhoven simply chose to ignore the Prince’s orders
and left their dikes intact in order to protect their harvests. Clearly the militarization of the
landscape was a controversial process. People’s lives and livelihood were at stake.
As the war dragged on it did not seem that there was any end in sight to the military
inundations. During the relief of Leiden, one of the Spanish commanders had intercepted a rebel
letter that outlined which sluices and dikes were vital to protect Holland from total inundation.
He forwarded the letter to the Spanish government at Brussels, which approved the proposal to
flood the entire province. In the end, Philip II rejected the plan on practical grounds rather than
moral ones, noting that the rebels deserved harsh punishment, but it would damage Spain’s
reputation and destroy one of his own possessions.104 Orange himself apparently toyed with the
idea of flooding the entire province in 1576 when he was having trouble finding foreign
assistance for the Revolt. He supposedly wondered whether it might be better to cut all the dikes
in the Netherlands, abandon it to the elements, and have the inhabitants put on ships and resettled
across Europe.105 It was not just leaders who held this bleak view however. When Wouter
Jacobsz spoke with a woman from Gouda, she noted how one of the regents there had more love
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for the Ottoman Turks than for Philip II, and if she had her way, she would cut all the dikes in
Holland and make it impossible to reconquer.106
Another issue, which was not addressed in this chapter, was the damage to the
infrastructure which would be needed for drainage and repair, namely the water lifting mills.
Both sides targeted these important structures. While Philip II had reservations about the use of
flooding as a weapon, he had no qualms about fire.107 Houses, fields, and in particular mills
were readily available targets for the Spanish forces. Conversely, the rebels saw them as a
defensive liability and tore down countless mills around cities. They worried that they would
either obstruct their line of fire or could be used by the Spanish besiegers. The widespread
destruction of these important structures would only complicate the already complex and divisive
repair work.
By 1576 the rebels had gotten their wish, the land was not lost, but it was broken. The
militarization of the landscape had proven effective for the rebels in the short term. The dike
breaches and flooding had driven the Spanish forces from Holland, yet at a tremendous cost.
Half of the province lay under water for at least a small period of time, and the infrastructure
required to drain and to protect the land laid in disrepair. Countless dikes, embankments, and
sluices were damaged and destroyed in order to prevent Spanish victories. As one historian
eloquently stated, the inundations, which should have been liberating, in fact had the opposite
effect.108 Following the strategic floods, the province of Holland appeared less as a crown for
the rebel’s head and more of a cross to be borne. The complicated and unpredictable process of
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how the Prince, the States of Holland, and the other interested parties handled the aftermath of
militarization of the landscape is the focus of the next chapters.
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CHAPTER FOUR - THE DIFFICULT JOURNEY: THE BREAKDOWN OF THE
POLDERMODEL

Introduction

While flood waters still covered large sections of the province of Holland the leaders of
the Revolt faced challenges forming a workable government. From the onset of the fighting in
Holland in 1572 until the Union of Utrecht in 1579 the Prince of Orange and the States of
Holland struggled to establish an effective form of administration and tax collection. As one
historian aptly stated, “the Revolt ran out of money before it had really started.”1 In these trying
times, payments for the military received top priority, and many other pressing needs, such as
dike repair and repayment fell through the administrative cracks.
The States clearly intended to compensate those who were affected by the inundations.
For instance, the resolution for the relief of Leiden clearly specified that the States and cities of
Holland would pay for all the necessary repairs. Yet by 1577 the States reversed this decision
because of “pure lack of funds.” 2 The States experimented with other remedies but again with
mixed success. Repairing the damages from the militarization of the landscape proved a
challenging endeavor.
The tremendous debt from the inundations and financing the war put a considerable strain
on nearly everyone. At various points several rebel leaders such as the Prince and the Land’s
Advocate Paulus Buys threatened resignation because of all the difficulties financing the war.
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The States and Orange finally secured some respite from the war and financial burdens with the
Pacification of Ghent in 1576. The Pacification forged the temporary unification of all the
provinces in the Netherlands and Philip II’s withdrawal of all Habsburg troops from the Low
Countries after the soldiers had mutinied and sacked Antwerp. For a short three-year period
those in Holland were safe from the threat of war.
Ironically, the conflicts surrounding the dike and sluice repairs came to a head around the
same time as the Pacification and threatened the newfound unity within the States of Holland.
Numerous cities simply decided to place their own interests above those of the province. The
Prince himself clearly understood how divisive these issues could be, as evident in his
negotiations with Gouda. He had urged Gouda to remain silent regarding the repair to the
Leidschendam after the relief of Leiden. The city became increasingly intransigent, but the
Prince implored the States of Holland to remain united, worrying that the enemy would interpret
the internal conflicts as a sign of weakness.
This chapter describes the difficulties which the States of Holland encountered
establishing a stable form of government and fulfilling their promise to repair the damage caused
by the militarization of the landscape. It focuses on the difficulties which the inundations caused
in tax collection and how the repairs for the water-management infrastructure fell through the
administrative cracks. With no clear solution coming from the States of Holland, individual
cities took it upon themselves to solve the problems which remained from the many tactical
floods caused by the fighting in Holland in 1572-1576.
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Establishing a fiscal and political order in Holland and coordinating with the other
rebellious provinces

This section addresses some of the general difficulties the States of Holland and the
Prince of Orange encountered as they tried to establish effective forms of rule and administration
in the political and military arenas in the 1570s. As previously mentioned, the Dutch Revolt
began as a protest against Habsburg policy rather than for the establishment of some new state or
government. The resistance included a lot of improvisation in the first few years of fighting as
the rebels tried to build a unified movement. A great deal of ambiguity marked this phase of the
Revolt. The States of Holland may have taken the revolutionary act a meeting without a
summons by Philip II in July 1572, but Orange would not officially condemn his sovereign until
his “Apology” in February 1581, nine years later. Furthermore, the Prince’s proclamation only
came after Philip condemned him as an outlaw. In the interim the Prince, the States of Holland,
and the other rebellious provinces conducted countless debates over how to organize the military,
form of government, finances, and other necessary state-making initiatives. Tracy quite rightly
notes that States of Holland had undergone an “apprenticeship in self-government” under
Habsburg rule in the early sixteenth century, but in the first decade or two of the Revolt they
struggled once they were on their own.3
The States of Holland and the Prince were confronted with two simultaneous challenges,
one internal and one external. They needed to establish a way to maintain order and governance
within the province of Holland, while at the same time finding a way to coordinate their efforts
with other insurgent provinces. The domestic and interprovincial issues were often intertwined,
3
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meaning that changes in in one arena affected the course of the other. In these difficult times, it
is no wonder that the States of Holland struggled to develop an effective form of rule.
The rebels justified their actions with a defense of ancient liberties and privileges and
thus tried to maintain established forms of governance as much as possible. The year 1572,
however, was watershed moment which brought with it new circumstances. Old policies and
procedures needed to be adapted to suit the new political landscape. An example is the
expansion of the number of voting cities in the States of Holland from six to eighteen to make
the States more representative. This development is an excellent case of the poldermodel in
action. The States of Holland gave a voice to those cities affected by the war, inviting them into
the discussion and decision making processes. The inclusion of these other voices did not
necessarily bring harmony and consensus, but it did offer the newly included cities a formal
platform to air their grievances. The poldermodel was functioning, but the war efforts put it
under considerable strain.
Traditionally the power structure between the various government bodies in Holland was
just like the landscape, rather flat.4 This fact meant that there was no clear organizational
hierarchy or chain of command at the outset of the fighting; who was answerable to whom, was a
fairly open ended question. Throughout the first years of fighting both parties attempted to give
the regime a more stable structure and clarify the roles of the different bodies of government, but
not without difficulty. Prior to the Revolt the States had very few written and formalized
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procedures and functioned according to generally accepted previous practices. This sort of
relaxed procedure, however, could not endure the strains of paying for a costly war.5
One of the major issues that the rebels attempted to address straight away was the
relationship between the Prince as the stadholder and the States of Holland.6 Orange considered
the governance of the rebellion to be between “myself and the States,” but this understanding left
considerable room for maneuver. Events in the early days of the Revolt did nothing to clear up
the matter. The Prince was largely responsible for the first meeting of the revolutionary States of
Holland in 1572, as he had suggested the idea of a meeting through one of his trusted advisors
Philip van Marnix, lord of St. Aldegonde. This implies that Orange held authority over the
States, but one of the representative body’s first acts was to “acknowledge” and “accept” Orange
as their stadholder which suggests the power flowed the other way. In truth, the situation was
rather fluid with both parties having relative equality and with each needing the other. It is clear
that “the mutual dependence of States and Prince-Stadholder nonetheless remained virtually
total.”7 The States needed Orange’s leadership to help direct the military and execute policy,
while he needed the funds which only the States could provide.
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One of the fundamental issues was the intermediaries between Prince-stadholder and the
States of Holland. At the start of the war in 1572 the States had created a committee to serve as
“Commissioners in all matters of war” in order to advise the Prince. Later these were expanded
to include a Council of State, Council of Finance, and Council of Admiralty through which
Orange would carry out the daily work of administration and to help coordinate with the States.8
The relief of Leiden seems to have offered them the opportunity to reevaluate their relationship
though, since the ambiguities and disarray which existed between the different offices of
government often strained their mutual good will.9 On 20 October 1574, roughly two weeks
after the siege ended, the Prince and the States began discussing the pressing need to arrange the
political and military matters in Holland. In a letter from Orange he observed that confusion
stemmed from three chief sources, the debts from paying for soldiers and garrisons, divisions
among cities over how to arrange these payments for the war, and the organization of the
“gemene middelen” or common funds. He urged the States to take control of the government
more firmly, while they responded by noting they needed a strong leader to give the Revolt
direction.10 Confusingly, both parties seemed to want the other to take the lead.
The issue concerning the establishment of the Landraad, or Provincial Council, and the
formation of a union between Holland and Zeeland demonstrates the difficulty which the States
and Orange encountered in establishing an effective form of government. The goal of the
Landraad was improve the working relationship between the Prince and the States and do away
with the different councils. In theory the Landraad was supposed to communicate more
8
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effectively with Orange, enforce the various resolutions passed by the States, and (perhaps most
importantly) establish efficient tax collection. This body would comprise twenty nine
individuals, four from the nobility, ten from Southern Holland, and seven each from North
Holland and Zeeland. There were heated debates about it throughout 1575. The nobility were
unhappy that only two nobles were actually chosen when the members were selected, not the
four they were promised. By August the Landraad still had not met resulting in “great confusion
and disorder.” Orange believed the whole idea was too unwieldy and thought a smaller Council
of State would be more effective. The States responded that the land had always essentially had
a Landraad in spirit, as its governance had comprised a lord, cities and the nobility. By October
1575 the Landraad was officially abolished even though many members had already taken their
oaths. The council had accomplished nothing of note. Decision-making in Holland was proving
to be a challenging affair.11

11

The debate concerning the Landraad, Union of Delft, and financing the war demonstrate the
intricate, involved, and messy decision making process during the first years of the Revolt. RSH
1575, 75-77, 18 February 1575, the States continue to discuss paying for the military and
“putting things in order.” RSH 1575, 107, 1 March 1575, Buys is order to address the
conscription and arrangement of the government. RSH 1575, 228-229, 14 April 1575, Buys
estimates that the States need to raise the 100,000 pounds from a Quota system between the
various quarters of Holland. RSH 1575, 245-247, 20 April 1575, Articles are drawn up for the
connection between the land and cities discussing the need to assist each other, prevent
plundering and prevent trade or communication with the enemy. RSH 1575, 268, 10 May 1575,
Buys wants his dismissal because of the difficulties of establishing the government. RSH 1575,
277-279, 13 May 1575, the States discuss the union with Zeeland and refer several points of
confusion to Orange for advice. RSH 1575, 290-291, 16 May 1575, the States decide they need
to resolve the lingering questions of the government within a few days, but are ultimately
unsuccessful. RSH 1575, 295-298, 18 May1575, the States read aloud the points of government
and conclude that Orange will be responsible for the military and defending the liberties and
privileges of the land, and further Orange will work with a council of qualified individuals from
Holland and Zeeland. RSH 1575, 300-303, the States decide the Landraad (the Provincial
Council) will have 29 members. RSH 1575, 356, 4 June 1575, the States agree to unite with
Zeeland under Orange’s authority, with all the cities agreeing except Gouda (see below for
Gouda’s complaints). RSH 1575, 516, 19 July 1575, the Union with Zeeland needs to get its
resources sorted. RSH 1575, 520-524, 20 July 1575, the States have a lengthy debate about the
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Establishing a formal relationship with the province of Zeeland proved to be a
complicated affair as well, although it did bear more fruit in the end. By July 1575 the two
provinces had formed a “Union” at the request of the Prince. This was not a merger, or a true
unification between the two provinces, but rather two independent provinces agreeing to work
together under the same “sovereign and supreme head” in the form of the Prince-Stadholder.
The pressures of war required the two provinces to further clarify their arrangement over the next
several months. By April 1576 they agreed to the “Closer Union,” in which the rights and
responsibilities of each party was further clarified. The actual text of the Closer Union contained
repeated references to a bondgenootschap, an alliance or confederacy, between the two
provinces. In actuality, they were still a “dual government of States-with-stadholder.”12
The relationship between Holland, Zeeland, and their stadholder with the rest of the
provinces of the Netherlands changed dramatically following a Spanish mutiny in the summer of
1576. The war had stretched Philip II’s finances to the brink. The new governor-general, Don
Luis de Requesens, could keep the wheels of war turning because he had a good relationship
with the Antwerp bankers and could borrow from them on his own credit. His death in March

government. RSH 1575, 536, 29 July 1575, the nobility are upset with their lack of
representation in the Landraad. RSH 1575, 548, 5 August 1575, the States write to Buys
regarding why the Land’s Council has not been called and the great confusion and disorder it has
created. RSH 1575, 604, 27 August 1575, the States confirm that the Landraad will be
responsible for communicating with Orange, enforcing the resolutions, and handling the
“gemene middelen” (common funds) (see below). RSH 1575, 648-649, 19 September 1575,
Orange believes the Landraad will only bring disorder and that a Council of State would
function better, the States respond that Holland has always had a de facto Land’s Council, plus
the members have already taken oaths. RSH 1576, 28-31, 23 March 1576, the States hold a
lengthy debate over the debts and funding concerning the Union of Delft. RSH 1576, 41, 15
April, Buys will discuss with North Holland Zeeland about the Union, noting they will trust each
other and assist with repairs, and funds can be transferred between provinces and quarters if
necessary. RSH 1576, 54, 25 April 1576, the Union of Delft is formalized and signed.
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1576 crippled the Spanish war effort. The first cracks appeared after Spanish soldiers captured
Zierikzee in Zeeland on 2 July and abandoned the city within a few hours because of unpaid
arrears. After the mutinous army captured several other towns, the States General, which
represented the Spanish held provinces, opened up talks with the Prince and the provinces of
Holland and Zeeland about working together to expel the Spanish. Before all the provinces could
coordinate their efforts the mutinous Spanish forces captured Antwerp and raped, pillaged, and
plundered the city for several days.13
The “Spanish Fury” as the event became known, had significant ramifications throughout
the Netherlands. Shortly afterwards all the provinces of the Netherlands signed the Pacification
of Ghent. This agreement served to unite the other provinces under the direction of the Prince
and the States of Holland to finally remove the Spanish forces from the Netherlands.
Furthermore, it called for a meeting of the States General in which the various provinces could
settle matters on their own terms. Orange himself believed that the Revolt should encompass all
the Low Countries, so it was no surprise that he became the de facto leader of the provinces.14
Religious differences cracked and then broke the fragile Pacification of Ghent, calling
into question Holland’s relationship with the other provinces. War returned to the Netherlands in
1579, although many of the provinces had begun making preparations even earlier. At this point
the provinces split into two different unions. The provinces which supported the Habsburgs,
primarily the southern ones, joined the Union of Arras.

In the northern provinces Holland took

the lead in establishing the Union of Utrecht. Both of these unions were completed in 1579.15
13
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The Prince and the States of Holland attempted to put the war effort on a better legal and
financial footing by obtaining foreign aid. In 1581, the Prince published his Act of Abjuration,
in which he argued that Philip II lost his authority in Holland and the other rebellious provinces.
This argument paved the way for the States General, representing those provinces in the Union
of Utrecht, to offer sovereignty to the Duke of Anjou, the French king’s younger brother. Anjou
was supposed to bring direction, unity, and financial support. None of these ever materialized
and his sojourn in the Netherlands only lasted for two years, from 1581until 1583. When this
failed the States General looked west towards England and agreed to the Treaty of Nonsuch.
Under this arrangement, Sir Robert Dudley, the Earl of Leicester, became the Governor General
of the provinces in the Union of Utrecht. His rule was similarly short, lasting from 1585 until
1588. After this point the provinces of the newly formed Dutch Republic ruled on their own
authority through the States General.
What impact did these events of high politics have on the course of local and regional
dike repair and compensation for those affected by the military inundations in Holland? For the
most part they served as a distraction, but they also diverted important resources (mostly
financial) away from the repair efforts. For instance, a month before the States of Holland
ratified the Pacification of Ghent on 26 November 1576, they passed a four-stuiver per ton of
beer tax intended for dike repair across the province. Shortly afterwards the Prince sent a
commission to Brussels to act on his behalf which included Paulus Buys and Gerard van
Wijngaerden. These two men had years of water management experience but had also spent
considerable amounts of time outside of the province. The Prince himself spent six years in
Flanders and Brabant, from 1577 until 1583, in an effort to keep the Revolt alive in these
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provinces. At the same time, he was needed in Holland to weigh in on important water
management disputes, such as those in Gouda and Haarlem (see below).

Gemene Middelen and Receivers up to The Pacification of Ghent

The first years of the Revolt provided a formidable test for the financial apparatus of the
States of Holland. For a majority of the sixteenth century Holland had demonstrated its financial
strength through its subsidies, or beden, to the Habsburg monarchy. The States provided the
Habsburg government a number of yearly and extraordinary beden which they raised via longterm, low-interest loans. The money for these loans came from bonds bought up by individuals
across Holland. The money to repay these bonds came from land and excise taxes which
increased over the course of the sixteenth century. The States found a way to make the purchase
of bonds appealing by devolving the financial power to the cities. The idea was that individuals
had more faith in their city repaying their bonds than the States of Holland or the central
government in Brussels.
With the outbreak of hostilities, however, the States of Holland felt compelled to suspend
the repayment of the previous loans, choosing instead to funnel all the available money into war
effort. This decision damaged their credit worthiness. Before the war they were able to borrow
with an interest rate of 12%, which increased to as high as 30-40% by 1575 for smaller amounts.
This alteration meant that the States would initially have difficulty paying for the war with loans,
and at the outset had to primarily rely on the cash which could be raised immediately via taxes.
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These revenues were known as the gemene middelen or common funds, coming mainly from
land and excise taxes.16
Reconstructing the public finances of Holland during the early years of the Revolt is
difficult for a number of reasons. First, there is a dearth of primary sources for many of the
records were either burned or recycled to make room for additional storage during the eighteenth
century.17 Second, the war itself also created a number of difficulties in terms of tax collection
and recording. In these early years the front lines of the fighting changed considerably so
farmers were pressured to provide revenue and supplies to both sides of the fighting. For
farmers, “every soldier was an enemy.”18 Many rural residents did not have the funds to pay
their taxes, and the collection of unpaid rents and taxes could stretch on for years, making the
documentation of payments challenging. Third, the style of fighting also caused problems and
generated considerable confusion. For instance, then Brother Wouter Jacobsz spoke with a rural
pastor, the latter noted that God had smote the land, and the majority of homes in his village
were abandoned, to such a degree that it was not clear who owned which parcels of land.19 In
July 1575 the States requested an official in Schieland to conduct a report on how long the land
was flooded in the area, and how it was affecting the collection of taxes.20 Finally, many church
lands were confiscated by the state and later resold, using the funds for a variety of expenses.
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The exact process and revenue resulting from these sales are still poorly understood. Despite the
“hazardous” character of historical research on Holland’s finances during the period, historians
are in complete agreement that the province was critically short of funding.
The civil-war character of the struggle also meant that a number of loyalist supporters
abandoned their offices, which were filled with junior personnel without the same experience.
For instance, the chief receiver, or tax collector of Holland, Jacob Bol, had served for decades
but sided with king and left his office. His replacement, Franchoys van Valkensteyn, struggled
under the difficult conditions as he was forced to learn on the job. Valkensteyn was not the only
tax collection official that needed replacing however, as there was a considerable turnover in
personnel and procedure. Cornelis van Mierop became the receiver for Leiden and Rijnland in
October 1574, followed two days later by Pieter Hanneman for the towns and cities in Schieland
and Delfland.
At the outset, the role and collection processes for the various receivers were poorly
defined, which only added to the confusion. When Jacob Muys became the new chief receiver
after Valkensteyn in October 1574, the States asked that he clarify his powers and duties.
Specifically the States wanted to know which issues fell under his prerogative, to establish travel
costs and salary for officials, and to complete a full report of the condition of the coffers within
three months.21 In June of the next year the States held a debate over the status and
responsibilities of all the receivers. They noted that they had difficulty collecting funds every
eight days, and there was general confusion about over what to do with confiscated goods and
property. Several months later the Prince and the States authorized a much more rigorous tax
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collection, allowing the receivers to arrest or confiscate goods from individuals who were behind
on their payments.22
At the same time that new officials were having difficulty settling into their new roles,
the States began promising the Prince ever-increasing money for the war. In May 1574 they
promised 30,000 guilders per month from the six major cities. When Orange threatened to
resign in November this increased to 45,000. In March of the next year the States found that the
actual revenues were considerably less than the amount promised to the Prince.23 Nevertheless,
because of the burdens of war the States consented to increase its payments to the Prince up to
55,000 guilder per month.24 Additionally, many of the cities agreed to a one-time 60,000 crown
payment for the relief of Leiden. When the States agreed to a new budget in December they
essentially allowed the individual cities greater control over tax collecting in exchange for
greater funds. In this regard the towns became fiscal intermediaries as they could borrow at
significantly better rates from their own burghers. In this way the financial power devolved to
the cities by 1576, but the spending power also remained local. Many of the receivers who were
tasked with sending along the taxes were also residents of the city, meaning that funds often
went towards local issues, like paying for soldiers in the town. Tracy again stated it best, noting
“In these years [1572-1576], Holland could be defended against Spain only by holding the
towns; the towns could only be held by professional garrisons; and the garrisons would not fight
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unless paid more or less as they demanded to be paid.”25 It was a system that worked well in
Holland, because of the challenges of tax collection outside of the cities.
The devolution of financial power to the cities was also a result of the style of fighting.
By 1575 the States were taxing at higher rates and collecting more revenue than before the
outbreak of war, but there were still considerable gaps between income and expenses in the
gemene middelen for a variety of reasons. First, the expenses associated with militarizing the
landscape were tremendous. The eyewitness Fruytiers estimated the damages from the relief of
Leiden alone to be around six million guilders.26 While this figure has generally been accepted
by historians as a good approximation of the damage, Tracy, who has probably conducted the
most research on the subject, suggests that this figure is probably more representative of the
damage from all the military inundations in Holland.27 In either case, this figure represents an
astronomical sum for the rebellious provinces. The six million guilders’ worth of destruction
represented nearly double the yearly tax revenues for Holland.28
Second, the receivers seemed to have had considerable difficult collecting taxes from the
rural sectors. At one point the States were willing to reduce the taxes on common lands from
three years to one if the money could be readily supplied upfront. This sort of short-term
sanction is hardly the type that would occur if the States had been regularly receiving their rent
25
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revenue.29 Later that year they found that many people were either carrying enormous debts or
arrested for lack of payment. In the same resolution, however, they note that they still needed to
pay for garrisons, so they authorized a nine-stuiver per morgen tax on land not occupied by the
enemy. Whether the land was in use and producing goods was a moot point.30
A month later the States altered the process of collecting the tax, but not the amount. In
the newer resolution, they noted that the tax would be collected whether the land was “above or
under water” (flooded or not) and the burden would be split, with the owner paying two-thirds
and the user of the land owing one-third of the tax. If the land was deemed to be completely
desolate and unusable, only the owner would pay.31 The next year in Rijnland the States decided
to lease out the rights to collect the nine-stuiver tax if the collector would provide money up
front; furthermore, they decided that the areas still flooded would only have to pay four stuivers
per morgen. This approach was hardly the most accommodating policy.32
The difficulty with the gemene middelen and the new receiver system was that the
military inundations created a nearly impossible situation for the financial system of Holland.
On the demand side of the equation, the war and repair work created enormous debts that
required quick repayment. On the supply side, the countryside was devastated which
undermined the receivers’ ability to collect revenues from those areas. A lot of the land that was
not flooded was often occupied or threatened by Spanish forces. As late as April 1576 the States
observed that the situation was still deteriorating, as daily more lands continued to be
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abandoned.33 The States continued to attempt to collect from these areas, but mostly with mixed
results. The fact that the States felt compelled to appoint Cornelis Dirksz van Coolwijk to the
new position of receiver for uncollected funds in early 1575 speaks volumes about the financial
situation of Holland.34 The unpaid taxes were becoming so vast that the States created a special
position just to keep track of the money which they were due. As Tracy observed, if it was not
for the respite resulting from the Pacification of Ghent, it was not clear how Holland would have
met its financial obligations.35

Repair work up to 1576

According to Tracy, one of the largest portions of debt for the rebellious provinces was
repairing the land and houses damaged by the military inundations. In actuality, however, these
debts were never actually repaid. Tracy could not find any source which mentions compensation
for property damage during his extensive research.36 That does not mean, however, that the
States of Holland did not attempt repayment. In fact, nearly every entry in the Resolutions of the
States of Holland in which a military inundation was ordered, the States promised repayment
from the gemene middelen. For instance, the act which ordered the flooding of Schieland,
Delfland and Rijnland for the relief of Leiden in 1574 also mentioned that the expenses of the
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cuts, and the subsequent repair will be carried out “unanimously” (i.e. shared equally) by the
common lands and the cities, and not less by the States.37 Similarly, when the States flooded the
Ablasserwaard in September 1574, they promised to bear the costs just like for the Leiden siege,
which was still ongoing.38 The fact that the States later passed specific taxes for dike and sluice
repair suggests that these were not just pro forma promises. They did intend to make up for the
damages from the inundations; financial realties however prevented them from carrying through
on their pledge.
Numerous issues complicated the repairs, such as the continued presence of enemy
troops, the confusion surrounding the form of government, and the lack of available funds and
materials. It took years for land to be cultivated again after a military inundation. Rijnland only
returned to any sense of normalcy after six years; the area around Gorinchem in southeast
Holland took nine years. The rural communities could not pay their taxes and went in debt to
cities, sometimes owing as much as 40,000 guilders, with an interest rate as high as 21 percent.39
In most cases the repairs for the military inundations began rather quickly, but were only partial
and most likely makeshift.
Clearly this was the case with the relief of Leiden and the repair of the Ijssel dike. In
November, roughly a month after the relief, the residents of Schieland wrote to Orange
requesting that they be allowed to begin repairing the dike.40 The States authorized the repair
work on the same day for all the cuts in the Ijssel dike, except for the one by Gouda, which they
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kept open to allow ships passage into central Holland.41 The States’ resolution to repair the Ijssel
dike instructed the Dike Count to carry it out with “the least damage and the least expense.”
The funds for the repair work to be provided from the remainder of Rotterdam’s 60,000-crown
subsidy which it was supposed to raise for the relief of Leiden.42
Rotterdam had trouble raising the funds, but not for lack of effort. Initially it attempted
to have the States consent to lowering its subsidy.43 When this failed the city attempted to raise
money via less traditional means. In December the city proposed paying for the repairs by
buying up grain with an interest-free loan and then reselling it at a profit.44 Within a few months,
however, Rotterdam complained about the condition of its grain supply, noting that its poor
quality affected its resale value which led the citizens in the city to struggle under the burdens of
their loan.45 In May 1575 the States ordered the permanent repair of the Ijssel dike, but this
effort stalled again because of Rotterdam’s difficulties. By the end of the month, an official from
Schieland requested that the States write to the city regarding its lack of payment. In place of the
portion of its 60,000-crown subsidy the official requested that the city provide pioneers and
laborers for the work.46 The next month the same official wrote to the States again, this time
requesting that he receive some form of a guarantee that Rotterdam would honor its promise to
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provide workers.47 Later that summer the States sent the Lands Advocate to negotiate with
Rotterdam over the issue, but with little resolution.48 Six months after the relief of Leiden the
Ijssel dike was still not fully repaired.
The area around the Ijssel dike was hardly a unique tale. Rijnland suffered serious
challenges as well. The rebel-directed inundations were exacerbated by Spanish attacks on dikes
and sluices near Katwijk, Huis ter Hart, and in the Rijn dike. As the Spanish forces retreated
from the siege they took out their frustrations on the water-management infrastructure. This
meant that the rebel inundations brought in water from the south while these Spanish action
brought in water from the north and east.49 A few months after the relief of Leiden the States
passed a resolution forbidding digging up any clay in region, as the land was already “very dug
up.” They worried that if another dike break should occur, specifically the Diemerdijk which
was still under threat from the ongoing siege of Amsterdam, then they might not have enough
material to carry out repairs.50 93 percent of the land of Alphen, to the east of Leiden, remained
desolate and unusable as late as 1576.51 It does not appear until any sense of normalcy returned
to Rijnland until 1580.52
There were some possible positive consequences to the inundations which should be
mentioned. Flood waters, in limited quantities, offered at least two opportunities for rural
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residents. First, there were numerous documented cases in which farmers would intentionally
bring in flood waters as a method of fertilizing. In the winter they would create small breaches
in the dike, or perhaps open sluices, to let in the nutrient-rich waters. This appears to have
happened in the Northern Quarter and Rijnland.53 Second, residents around Gouda had been
purposefully flooding land to create peat for centuries.54 It is unclear whether or not the rural
residents could capitalize on these opportunities. In all likelihood the ad hoc repairs and the
continued presence of soldiers made the task difficult. Some areas probably did profit from the
military inundations, but on the whole, they were more destructive than beneficial.

Waivers, exemptions and pioneers up to 1576.

While the need for dike and sluice repairs was clear to everyone, developing solutions
were much more challenging. For several years the States experimented with a variety of
alternatives to carry out the necessary works. Two approaches were the most widespread. First,
waivers and exemptions on specific taxes were the chief forms of relief for the countryside. But
this strategy came less in the form of repair and reimbursement and more in the form of reduced
tax burdens. In other words, the rural residents did not receive compensation from the States but
were rather “awarded” the right to pay the States fewer taxes. The States often rejected the
waivers as they tried to collect taxes anyway, although how much money they squeezed from the
rural populations is unclear.
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Second, many cities attempted to reduce their tax burden by providing pioneers or
laborers. This tactic in essence came from providing a form of Corvée labor tax in place of a
monetary one. This initiative removed the costs and delays associated with the bureaucracy in
the States of Holland. Laborers were in high demand, needed for fortification work, dike repairs,
and other activities related to the war. In place of having the States pay for these laborers
through tax revenues raised by cities, the cities could find a way to raise laborers on their own
initiatives and receive a tax reduction.
The repair work for the relief of Leiden provides some detailed accounts of the waiver
process in action. In January 1575, a few short months after the relief of Leiden, several towns
in the area asked for a waiver or termination of their payments because of the damage they had
suffered. The States promised to send out a commission to investigate and inform those
responsible for collecting taxes of their decision.55 The results of his findings are not known, or
discussed in the resolutions of Holland, but in June some of the same towns requested further
concessions.
This fact suggests that the commission’s results did not satisfy the rural residents, as
other towns began asking for waivers. The villages of Warmond and Oegstgeest near Leiden
wanted a termination of the rent taxes because they considered the land unusable as a result of
the floods.56 Alphen wanted a break for taxes on its horned beasts, cattle and other farm animals,
because of the desolation. The States requested that they remain patient as they promised to
address the matter at the first opportunity.57 Meanwhile, the villages of Valkenburg, Katwijk on
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the Rijn, and Katwijk on the Sea requested waivers on unpaid taxes dating from as far back as
October 1572. As a compromise the receiver suggested having rural residents pay half of their
taxes immediately while granting the villages a three-week extension for the other half. The
States decided to refer the case to the Court of Holland, seeking legal advice about what to do
with the land owners in the area. The Court recommended sending out two commissions to
conduct further reports.58 It is not exactly clear what this report turned up, but in any case the
whole process was slow moving.
Throughout the summer the States repeatedly made mention of the need to be more
vigorous with their tax collections methods, for they needed money to defend the southern
border of Holland from Spanish attacks. In any case, despite the official ruling on the waiver, it
appears as though the States received very little, if any, income from these lands for several
years.59 By April 1576, the States appeared to be willing to get whatever it could from the rural
areas of Rijnland. On this date it granted a six month waiver on several taxes on the condition
that the villages contribute to the common cause as much as possible.60
Villages in Schieland and Delfland were having difficulties with tax collection as well.
Even before the relief of Leiden these areas had suffered during the war, but the inundations
generated even further complications. In June 1575 the receiver for the area wrote to the States
of Holland regarding no less than eight separate problems he was experiencing with tax
collecting. He noted that in 1573 there were fires in the area and the following year the land was
under water. Regarding a waiver, the States mentioned that the area will have to suffice with

58

RSH 1575, 365, 6 June 1575 and RSH 1575, 497, 14 July 1575.

59

‘t Hart, Dutch Wars, 106.

60

RSH 1756, 69, 28 April 1576.
122

one already in place, although it is not quite clear what this entailed. In the future, however, they
would have to pay like other areas.61
The following month the water board of Delfland requested money from the States for
sluice and mill repair. The States declined because at that point the Spanish were threatening
Schoonhoven, Oudewater, and Woerden. For the moment, they recommended leaving the land
uncultivated since the enemy threat was still present.62 In February 1576 the residents in
Delfland requested that their burdens be reduced because of the inundations. The area was not
completely abandoned, but the flood damage created considerable changes in the area resulting
in a great confusion. The local residents pleaded with the States, noting that they needed to use
the money for dike and sluice repair just so they could begin collecting taxes again. 63 There was
simply not enough money in the rural sectors for dike repair and taxes.
The island of Goedereede in the southwest was one of the few success stories in terms of
exemptions, but only because the States of Holland had little other choice. Since the midsixteenth century the city of Goedereede had difficulties maintaining its harbor, with several
ships getting mired in the mud. The sea dikes were desolated and unable to protect the land, as
evidenced by the fact that the fields had remained under water ever since the All Saints Day
Flood in 1570. According to a report from 1575, the walls of the city were half burnt while the
canals and harbors only held about a half foot of water, not nearly enough for sailing and
navigation. There was too much water on the land for agriculture, not enough to support
shipping. The local residents believed that in order to keep the land habitable they needed to
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rebuild one of the main sluices in the St. Pieter’s polder along with several embankments
throughout the island. Because of this great desolation they requested an exemption for the
majority of their taxes. The States decided to reduce half of their debt on land taxes and horned
beasts, hold them exempt from one of the upcoming land taxes, and resolved to discuss further
remissions in the future.64 A few months later the bailiff of the island requested a further
remission on all animal taxes, to which the States obliged for two years.65 It received further
exemptions in 1576 and 1577.66 The island received a respite in the form of waivers and
exemptions, but only because it had suffered so long from flooding. Even then, it was not until
1589 that the harbors and canals were finally made navigable and the city’s defenses secured.
Waivers and exemptions were one avenue for tax reduction; the second alternative was
for a water board, town, or city to supply workers or laborers for a specific project. There were
numerous resolutions which discussed the possibility of lowering a particular city’s or region’s
tax requirements, but none proved more popular than substituting pioneers, or laborers, for work
on fortification. For several months the States debated over an allotment or quota for the
numbers of workers a specific region would provide. By 10 February 1576 the quota system was
finally agreed upon: Rijnland would provide one hundred and twenty five workers, Schieland
fifty two, Delfland one hundred and eight, and Zwijndrechtwaard seventy six. These laborers
were to help build the fortifications along Holland’s southern and eastern borders.
The individuals drafted in these villages (perhaps unwillingly) would be paid ten stuivers
a day for their four-month term by the region itself. Later that month the States expanded the
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quota to allow cities to provide pioneers. It was understood that all cities across Holland would
provide pioneers for fortification work. The one exception was Brill, which was in the process
of strengthening its own defenses and needed the labor for local use. The States agreed that the
money raised by the city to pay for the pioneers could be deducted from its tax burden.67
This approach became a popular strategy for cities to lower their debts, but in the rural
areas it seems to have been less effective. After some initial difficulties the cities of Dordrecht,
Delft, Rotterdam, Schiedam, and Leiden found a way to arrange the payment of pioneers for
work on fortifications at Krimpen.68 Gouda effectively leveraged the collection of its pioneers
for a reduction of garrison soldiers in the town. Using the city militia for its defense would cost
the city less. In this regard Gouda emerged as a double winner, paying less in taxes and
decreasing its defense bill.69 It is also telling that when the States needed to quickly erect
defenses around Brill, they requested pioneers from several cities in the area rather than money.70
It was more expedient to arrange workers directly, rather than securing the money for the
workers.
In the countryside, however, the States encountered much more opposition because of the
need to look after local repairs. In June the receivers for several areas noted they were having
trouble raising pioneers because it interfered with dike laws and other regulations concerning the
maintenance of embankments. The islands in southern Holland, such as Strijen, Overflakee, and
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Beverland, all requested exemption from drafting pioneers because they were needed for local
dike repairs. The States responded in typical fashion that the receivers had to be more rigorous
with the extraction, and collect in full.71
The waivers and pioneer labor initiatives served to impair the rural area’s ability to repair
the damages from the inundations. In terms of the waivers and exemptions, the States took a
hard line on tax collection. Only Goedereede received any waivers of note, and this was only
because the island was barely habitable. Commissions and Court cases slowed the States’
attempts to collect taxes, but they almost always demanded full payment. The pioneer
redemption policy also hurt the rural areas. It directed funds and labor away from the necessary
repair work. The widespread emigration from the countryside to the city only exacerbated the
problem. This process gave the cities an excess of labor while rural areas struggled.72 Some
rural residents immigrated to the city, some were drafted into pioneer work elsewhere; those that
remained were heavily taxed and forced to deal with the aftermath of the inundations.

Dike Repair Efforts during the Pacification of Ghent, 1576-1579

The rest and reprieve so desperately needed by the Hollanders came in the form of the
Pacification of Ghent. Throughout the summer and winter of 1576 Spain had difficulty paying
its soldier’s wages. This failure resulted in a string of mutinies among Spanish troops across the
Low Countries, culminating with the “Spanish Fury” in 1576, where Spanish soldiers burnt and

71

RSH 1576, 98, 21 June. The States reiterated the need for rigorous pioneer redemption again
in July. RSH 1576, 125, 29 July 1576. For the issues in the islands see RSH 1576, 161, 21
September 1576; RSH 1576, 174-5, 16 October 1576.
72

‘t Hart, Dutch Wars, 101-125
126

plundered Antwerp for days. In the aftermath, the various provinces united together briefly to
expel the Spanish troops under the direction of the Orange and the States General. The
Pacification of Ghent was a fragile peace lasting only until 1579, but it offered an important
opportunity for the States of Holland. All the cities in the province finally declared for the
Revolt, with Amsterdam being the last in 1578, and the peace gave them an opportunity to begin
repairing the damage and repaying some of their debts.
Before the Pacification, the finances of the States of Holland were in little better shape
than those of the Spanish. Tracy mentions that if not for this respite it was not clear how the
States of Holland would have met it obligations.73 They had already suspended the repayment of
the interest on some of their major debts between 1572-1576 which seriously damaged their
credit worthiness and ability to borrow. Simultaneously they promised Orange increasingly
large sums of money for continuing the war. This policy brought them to the brink of financial
collapse in 1576, but following the Pacification they were able to begin putting their financial
house in order.
Following the Pacification of Ghent, the States found a variety of ways to restore its
credit and keep money flowing into its coffers.74 This development had important ramifications
for the repair work to the damaged dikes and water-management infrastructure. On 17 October
1576, two weeks before the States of Holland officially ratified the Pacification, they passed their
first resolution directed towards repair work for the inundations across the province. This act
authorized a four-stuiver tax on each ton of beer poured in cities, to be used to rebuild the sluices
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and dikes cut or opened for the war across the province.75 The States were also more willing to
give breaks to cities to help out with dike repairs. They gave the town of Schoonhoven a partial
waiver on excise taxes for three months with the provision that the untaxed moneys go towards
repair work.76
On 27 February 1577 the States of Holland passed another important resolution relating
to the reparations from the military inundations. Following the terms of the Pacification of
Ghent, they declared that only water board officials who had served the Prince could now hold
office. In short, the loyalists officially lost their seats on the water boards, although many had
already fled from Holland anyway.77 The officials who remained were instructed to carry out
reports on the dikes and sluices over the next month in order to see which areas were most
damaged and still in danger.78 The results, however, were not promising.
In April the water board officials in Rijnland noted the that Spaarndam dike needed “very
necessary repairs” and that the area stood in great peril. Throughout the war the Rijnland
officials had been unable to collect any taxes for several years, compounded by the fact that the
fighting left the land damaged and impoverished. In order to finance the necessary repairs the
hoofd ingelanden, elite residents of the water board but not necessarily members, were willing to
take out a 6,000-pound loan to help augment the taxes from the States for the repair work.79 This
suggests that locals with access to money were willing to support the repair work.
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In the end the all-important Spaarndam received partial repairs, but it proved to be too
costly to restore it to its pre-war state. The Rijnland water board estimated that it would cost a
total of 36,000 guilders to repair.80 Furthermore, the States decided that it would only pay for
stopping the breaches, and rebuilding the sluices but nothing more. Any other damages incurred
from the military inundations and the relief of any cities would not be reimbursed by the States.81
The States intended to stop the bleeding, but planned to do nothing for the blood already spilt.
Shortly afterwards the States discovered that they did not have enough money in the
common funds to pay for all the dike repairs. The four stuiver per ton of beer tax issued in 1576
had apparently not achieved the desired results. By 20 February of the next year the States had
instead confirmed that henceforth the money from this tax would be used for ammunition and
fortifications.82 They decided instead to use the money from a 100th penny, a one-percent tax on
the value of property, in order to pay for the dike repairs. In May they decided to raise the
money for repairs with loans which would be repaid by the 100th penny collected over the course
of the year.83
The collection of the 100th penny tax, however, proved to be a complicated and divisive
affair. The issue revolved around the determination of a rental property’s value. The Northern
Quarter of Holland wanted to use rental contracts to determine land value, while southern
Holland planned to use rental contracts for the first installment, but then use a new valuation
system for the second installment. The next year, several cities in southern Holland joined the
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Northern Quarter in calls for using rental contracts which again complicated the tax collection.
Even more frustrating, from the States perspective, they discovered that in some cases villages
had lied about the value of their properties in order to pay less. The States compounded this
problem by earmarking the 100th penny funds for activities well beyond the projected collection
amount.84 On 14 May 1577 the States explicitly stated that it did not have the funds to pay for
the dike repairs and the fortifications, which was also slated to come from the 100th penny. In
order to rectify the situation they proposed organizing a number of loans backed by the 100th
penny tax.85 This meant that the States again could not carry through with their promise to carry
out dike repairs across the province.
In 1576 the Pacification of Ghent promised relief from the problems caused by the
military inundations. Just two weeks before the States of Holland ratified the Pacification, they
passed the four stuiver per ton of beer tax for dike repairs across the province. When this stalled
they earmarked the 1577 100th Penny tax for dike repairs, but tax collection and the repayment of
other debts affected the repair work. By the end of the Pacification of Ghent, in1579, the States
were still dealing with repair and reparations from the inundations. In a resolution from that year
the States required that any villages requesting a waiver must provide documentation of how
long it was flooded and any structures which were burnt. The villages were given one month to
supply the information to the Dike Count for consideration.86
Clearly the effects of the military inundations lingered. After three years of relative
peace during the Pacification, the States had yet to develop a clear picture of the extent and
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duration of the various inundations across the province. They had made genuine attempts at
repairing the damaged water-management devices with the four stuiver and 100th penny taxes,
but the initiatives invariably stalled. Even the Spaarndam, which protected the interior of
Holland from flooding, only received partial repairs. By 1579 there was simply no adequate
provincial policy for carrying out the dike repairs and addressing the problems arising from the
military inundations.

Civic Conflicts

It is ironic that at the same time that the military and financial pressure on the States of
Holland abated during the Pacification of Ghent, increasing urban rivalry threatened the unity of
the province and the poldermodel broke down. Holland would develop a reputation for
particularism and urban rivalry as cities placed civic interests over provincial ones. The
militarization of the landscape broke the poldermodel, yet the war against a common enemy in
the Spanish often acted as a seperate binding agent, providing a degree of unity among Holland’s
cities. The Pacification of Ghent removed that binding agent from Holland, and the disputes
arising from the inundations generated discord and division within the province. The conflicts
over water-management issues during the Pacification were some of the most vocal disputes of
the early Revolt.87
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At the same time that the States began authorizing taxation for dike and sluice repairs
urban rivalries began complicating the matter. The same resolution that authorized the four
stuiver tax on beer also contained provisions for civic interests not necessarily related to dike
repair. Leiden wanted the money to be used for the immediate repair of the Spaarndam, which
had been seriously damaged during the sieges of Haarlem and Amsterdam. Rotterdam was still
having financial issues, perhaps related to the repayment of the 60,000 crown loan for the relief
of Leiden and thus wanted to retain the tax money for its own citizens. Schiedam and Brill were
willing to consent to the tax if they could receive some form of contribution for defensive works
in their city.88 The States authorized the repair of the Spaarndam within three days, which was
seemingly the most pressing issue, but in other respects water-management issues threatened to
destroy the fragile peace in Holland.89 The unresolved repair and repayment issues from the
military inundations had left significant political scars, with the result that many cities chose
local interests over provincial ones.

Gouda and the Leidschendam

The question of with the city of Gouda and the Leidschendam lock was the most wellknown and perhaps the most contentious problem resulting from the militarization of the
landscape. During the siege of Leiden Orange had created a breach in the dam to bring in ships
to help relieve the city. His promise to repair the cut immediately after the siege proved a hollow
one, with the result that Gouda became increasingly disgruntled. Gouda had protested against
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the cut for a variety of reasons, noting the cost of repair (which they estimated at 12,000
guilders), the flood damage (as they were still enduring flood waters well into 1577), and that it
diverted toll revenues towards Delft.90
Only a few months after the relief of Leiden, Gouda began to voice its complaints
regarding the Leidschendam. In January the city magistrates and the Prince exchanged a series
of letters but resolved very little.91 Frustrated, the city regents began voicing their complaints
much more publicly. So openly in fact, that Orange wrote to them personally, urging them to
remain silent for the time being. As the fighting was still ongoing, he worried that the Spanish
spies might get wind of the internal discord and would interpret the conflict as a sign of
weakness.92 In these early days Orange preferred to bury the issue and resolve it later.
The Prince’s warning appeared to have had some effect, as Gouda remained largely silent
and conciliatory for most of the following year, but they were clearly still unhappy. There were
some repairs to dikes around Gouda but not the Leidschendam.93 By the end of the year,
however, the regents had reached their limit and became more forceful with their demands. On
21 December 1576 they lodged a formal resolution in the States that the lock should be returned
to its former condition prior to the Revolt.94 By New Year’s Eve the representatives from Gouda
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requested that the city should be relieved of all inconveniences resulting from the cut in the
Leidschendam, but the States struggled to meet Gouda’s demands.95
The dispute over this important dam raged throughout 1577 and revealed the fragility of
the newly established unity within Holland following the Pacification of Ghent. In January the
city was the only one to veto a small land tax, justifying its position on the fact that its
complaints remained unresolved.96 When this tactic failed, Gouda became more intransigent.
Later that month the regents informed the States of Holland that they would stop sending
representatives. At this point the Prince referred the issue to the Court of Holland for advice.
Gouda held firm, and in February told the States that henceforth it would stop providing tax
revenue for the Gemeene Middelen until the Leidschendam was restored.97 The States might
have thought that Gouda was bluffing, or perhaps would have withdrawn their complaint,
because it was not until late May that they finally wrote to the city regarding their absence from
meetings and lack of tax revenue.
For the majority of the summer and remainder of the year, Gouda remained absent from
the States gathering, although they did send representatives to discuss the 100th penny tax. By
August the States wrote to Gouda again regarding its absence. After the city missed out on an
important gathering about Holland’s union with Zeeland the Prince finally resolved to make a
committee to resolve the conflict.98 In the end the city took matters into its own hands and sent
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out its town militia to destroy the opening in Leidschendam on 23 December 1577.99 Gouda
found that in terms of water management, it preferred to go its own way.

Haarlem

Haarlem took the opportunity afforded by the war to address one of its own long-standing
grievances. Throughout the sixteenth century the city had attempted to secure better water
conditions by damming up the smaller Leed (now Liede) and Penningsveer rivers which
branched off the larger Spaarn river. These closures would divert ship traffic along the Spaarn
and through the city, which would increase its toll revenues. They would also increase the
current in the Spaarn which would help improve the city’s water quality.100 While these changes
would benefit Haarlem, they would also put greater strain on the Spaarndam dike and its sluices.
For this reason the Rijnland water board had prevented the city from stopping the two smaller
rivers.
The city and the adjoining water works experienced a great deal of suffering during the
first years of the Revolt. The city obstinately resisted a prolonged siege by Alva at a heavy cost.
During the siege, both the rebel and Spanish forces breached nearby dikes, including the
Spaarndam dike, in order to control access to the city. During the siege there were accounts of
people forced to eat horse, cat and other unnatural foods. Once the city fell to Alva, it had to pay
for the new Spanish garrison. In total, the city estimated it lost an estimated 350,000 pounds
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from plundering and destruction, not including the cost for garrisoning troops.101 Shortly after
the siege the States of Holland offered to help those affected by the fighting, but with limited
success as exiles from Haarlem continually requested waivers on their debt over the next several
years.102
The city remained under Spanish control for three years, and at some point during that
period, it took the opportunity to block the Leed and Penningsveer rivers. It is not clear who
directed the stoppages. It is possible that the city regents took the initiative to improve its
waterways and navigation. The Rijnland water board members who remained loyal to the king
could also have been involved. They had fled to Utrecht when the Revolt began, but had kept
open communication with Haarlem and other Spanish-controlled cities. The Spanish army could
have ordered the river closures in an effort to disrupt communication between the Northern
Quarter and southern Holland.

The members of the Rijnland water board that sided with the

rebels knew who to blame. They were convinced that Haarlem had closed the Leed and
Penningsveer with “great preparation.”103
Shortly after the ratification of the Pacification of Ghent the city reconciled with the
Prince and the States of Holland. The States recorded their agreement with Haarlem on 26
December 1576, but by 4 January of the next year they felt compelled to write to the city
informing that they were not to interfere with ships passages to the Northern Quarter via the two
rivers. Apparently the city had attempted to keep the waterways closed and ensure ship traffic
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passed through the city. By April they had to remind Haarlem of the agreement, and that the city
had promised to keep Leed river open.104
Over the next several years Haarlem and the Rijnland water board were involved in a
drawn out dispute over the matter. In August 1578 the water board officials complained that
Haarlem’s stance led to irreparable damage, and that the city may have been using its militia to
enforce its wishes illegally.105 Haarlem countered by denying responsibility for the waterway’s
obstruction, claiming the Spanish commander Count Bossu had ordered there closure.
Furthermore, the city asserted that a privilege from 1565 granted them permission to block the
two rivers. This approach essentially allowed Haarlem to side-step responsibility for the
damage. More importantly, it gave them a legal avenue to prevent the re-opening of the rivers.
Among the many terms of the Pacification of Ghent was the promise to uphold and honor the
traditional liberties and privileges of the Low Countries. In this regard, removing the dams from
the two rivers was a violation of the Pacification.106 Eventually the Prince created a commission
to look into the issue, which sided with the Rijnland water board in 1579. Haarlem’s argument
simply did not make sense on a variety of levels. If it had obtained the privilege in 1565 why did
the city not use it before the Revolt? Also, if it did have the right to dam up the rivers, why did it
try to pass the blame onto the Spanish commander? 107 In short, Haarlem’s argument did not
hold any water.
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After the Prince made his initial decision in favor of the Rijnland water board, the dispute
shifted to debates over general compensation for Haarlem’s suffering during the siege. The city
and water board did agree to build two duiker dams, dikes with inbuilt doors, which would help
divert water into the Spaarn river and improve the city’s water, but did nothing for diverting ship
traffic. Following this partial victory, Haarlem attempted to excuse itself from the costly repairs
to the Spaarndam dike and adjoining sluices. The city argued that the siege and occupation
affected its ability to pay for the sluices in the Spaarndam.108
While the debate over the stoppage to the Leed and Penningsveer rivers was not as
vociferous as those of Gouda and the Leidschendam, it was no less significant. Disputes over the
river closures stalled and delayed repairs to the important Spaarndam dike. For the Rijnland
water board this was the critical issue for protecting the area from further flooding. This matter
was the first issue they discussed during its meeting on 21 September 1577, following a five
years hiatus because of the war. They noted that it needed “very necessary repairs,” but were
disconcerted by the immensity of the task. In some areas the devastation was so complete that it
was not clear where the dike had run before the war. Collecting the money and organizing the
labor also proved complicated. The Rijnland water board did receive some money from the
100th penny tax, but not nearly enough. Some towns, such as Woerden, asked for an exemption
on its taxes for dike repairs because of its suffering and desertion during its siege. There were so
many abandoned lands and houses near the Speeringmeer lake that the water board needed to
carry out a re-zoning commission in order to carry out taxation in the area. The hoofd
ingelanden organized a 6,000 pound loan to finance the other necessary repairs, but this surely
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was only a stopgap measure.109 Haarlem’s stance over the closure of its two small rivers only
served to complicate, delay, and impede the necessary repairs.

Dordrecht and the Alblasserwaard

Dordrecht’s main concern regarding the dike repair centered on the Alblasserwaard.
Located at the intersection of a number of rivers the city enjoyed a privileged position as it held a
number of staple and river toll rights during the Middle Ages. Everything from salt, to beer,
wine, and a vast array of other commodities had to be unloaded or taxed at Dordrecht. Over the
course of several centuries various cities and institutions challenged this economic privilege until
Dordrecht’s only remaining asset was that it was the symbolic first city of Holland, being able to
vote immediately after the nobility in the meetings of the States of Holland. By the time of the
Revolt Dordrecht’s staple rights and authority had largely been reduced to the several nearby
villages in the Alblasserwaard and Krimpenerwaard.110 This development meant that the city
had a vested interest in maintaining and protecting these two regions.
Unfortunately for Dordrecht, the Alblasserwaard had been one of areas hit hardest by the
military inundations and flooding in general. The area only experienced short periodic dry spells
between the All Saints Day Flood in 1570 and 1576, when repair work began.111 Dordrecht had
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largely opposed military inundations in the Ablasserwaard as it had a vested interest in the land’s
preservation. When Spanish troops began lodging there, however, the decision to flood the area
became an obvious one for the rebels.
Dordrecht and the States of Holland employed a variety of tactics to carry out the repair
work in the Albasserwaard, but with very little success. In many ways, the area was a lost cause
as natural and man-made inundations caused too much damage. Nevertheless, repair work began
in the summer of 1576 but a lack of funds was immediately apparent. In June the States created
a commission to repair the easternmost embankments, hoping to pay for the repairs with the
gemene middelen, or common funds, raised from provincial excise taxes. They also authorized
the commission to take necessary materials directly from Dordrecht, an indication that funds and
material were lacking. In July the States tried to entice the collectors of the gemene middelen into
action by allowing them to keep any extra money they collected for the repair of the Wolfersdijk,
which raised some additional funds, but not enough. 112
At the beginning of October 1576 the States noted that they had no available funds for the
necessary dike and sluice work in the Ablasserwaard. As a response they authorized an
additional one-stuiver tax on each ton of beer poured in cities throughout Holland for the next
three months. They later extended the coverage of this tax, foolishly hoping that it would raise
enough money to repair all the dikes cut during the war.113
In truth, it probably would not have been enough for the Albasserwaard alone. Once the
100th penny tax was authorized for dike repair throughout Holland the States still introduced a
monumental thirty-stuiver per morgen of land tax in the Albasserwaard. This land tax would be
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collected regardless of the condition of the land, and the States proposed instituting martial law
within fourteen days to ensure that the funds were collected. The Dike Count and the water
board followed this with a request for an exemption on all taxes for six years. The States denied
this request, but allowed the excise taxes to be used for dike repair. It does appear as though
some of the repair work had been carried out since the Dike Count began receiving
reimbursement for repair work from the 100th penny tax, but ultimately with little success.114
In August 1577 the Alblasserwaard was still in disrepair. The dike at Papendrecht was in
a “sober and dangerous” condition according to one report, with numerous spaadstekens,
meaning the abandonment of dike maintenance responsibilities by local residents. The locals
literally stuck a shovel (spaad) in the dike to denote their relinquishment of dike care. The States
discussed the possibility of raising 15,000-16,000 pound loan for the dike work. But the next
day they reversed their decision and decided to suspend the repairs. The area remained in
desolation, as evidenced by a resolution in September of the following year with the States
noting that they were still finding the works in this area increasingly expensive. As such they
began discussions with the count of Papendrecht about the possibility of having people
permanently abandon the area to reduce repair costs.115
Dordrecht continued to plead with the States regarding its obligation to repair the damage
from the military inundations, but to little effect. Roughly a month after this last request the
States decided it would only pay for the stoppage of the dike cuts, but nothing further.116 In this
case, despite Dordrecht’s best efforts to hold the States accountable, and some sincere efforts by
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the States to repair the damage, the destruction in the Ablasserwaard appears to have been rather
permanent.

Brill

Brill was the site of the first military inundation during the fighting in Holland and the
city would feel its effects for some time. The consequences came in the form of insufficient
funds for new fortifications. The city defended the Holland side of the Maas estuary, and it
served as an important stronghold against invasion from the sea. As early as 1575 the city had
begun improving its defenses, which, interestingly enough, coincided with another round of
military inundations.
A few months after the commencement of the project the States decided that each city
would be put on a quota system for new fortifications except Brill. The resolution made no
mention of how Brill was to raise the funds, but two resolutions several months later give an
indication. One resolution allowed the city to have the dike count of the island of Voorne collect
funds, while the other mentioned that the city will receive some funds from Zeeland as part of
the union between the two provinces.
The collection of funds from Voorne and the surrounding areas proved to be a difficult
affair. At one point the island representatives considered selling lands to raise funds rather than
collecting taxes. They also put Jonkheer Johan van Woerden van der Vliet in charge of the
whole island, appointing him as governor of Brill and the dike count and bailiff of Voorne.
Despite these initiatives the island was in no condition to begin providing funds for costly
fortifications. This is clear from the appeal for a waiver by residents of the nearby island of
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Bommende, requesting various exemptions because of the ruin and devastation. Along with the
partial tax breaks which the States allowed, it also paid 2000 pounds for dike repair.
Because of these difficulties Brill began to leverage its consent to various States
resolutions in return for the guarantee of funds from Zeeland as part of the union between the
two provinces. The city consented to both the four-stuiver tax on beer and the 100th penny if
they could get money from Zeeland, first requesting 400 pounds per month, but later reducing it
to 300. It is ironic that these two resolutions would have actually provided funds for much
needed dike repair, thus allowing the city to collect taxes across the island to pay for
fortifications. But these taxes represented long term solutions while Zeeland’s money offered
immediate benefits.117 In any case, Zeeland’s support in the venture was tenuous at best. It did
not have the same financial resources of Southern Holland, had endured devastating military
inundations as well, and it did not like sharing the costs of joint projects. The Burgomaster of
Zierikzee stated it best when he noted, “In the name of freedom we are going under
[financially].”118
Because of the necessity of a strong fortress at Brill, the Prince authorized the monthly
payment of 300 pounds for three months. The city also received some funds from the 100th
penny tax for fortifications and dike repairs around the city. The agreement cost the those living
outside the city, as part of the agreement involved taking funds for dike repairs on the nearby
islands of Putten and Overflakkee for use in Brill. In the end, it appears as though Brill still went
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into debt to pay for the fortifications, but ultimately received reimbursement from the 100th
penny.119 In this case of brinksmanship Brill came out the clear winner.

Conclusion

The States of Holland struggled to establish effective forms of rule in the first years of
the Revolt. Many of the traditional institutions remained, such as the Stadholder and the States
of Holland, but their roles, responsibilities, and relationship to each other changed. Before the
Revolt, both the Stadholder and States had ruled at Philip II’s command. He installed the
Stadholder of his choosing and he summoned the States to discuss matters of import, usually
taxation.
Without the Habsburg sovereign as a reference point the different institutions and
provinces of the Revolt had to redefine their relationship to one another. When Orange returned
to Holland following the capture of Brill, he directed one of his associates to arrange the first
meeting of the States of Holland without a summons by Philip II. One of the State’s first acts
was to recognize him as Stadholder. This raised the obvious question of who answered to
whom? Other matters, such as the best means of coordinating their efforts, via a Landraad or
other councils, all complicated the establishment of an effective form of rule.
This confusion trickled down the layers of government and affected the States of
Holland’s ability to pay for the war and repair the damages from the military inundations. There
were a number of important offices that were vacated as loyalists fled Holland. This turnover
hurt the States’ ability to collect taxes, as the new officials (often with less experience) had to
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learn on the job under duress. By the Pacification of Ghent in 1576 it appeared as though the
coffers were about to run dry.
There were attempts to retain and sustain the poldermodel, but these were undermined by
the military inundations. The prolonged negotiations between the States, Stadholder, and other
rebellious provinces were typical of poldermodel politics. Similarly, the expansion of
represented cities in the States of Holland from six to eighteen is an excellent example of the
poldermodel at work. The different cities which were affected by the ongoing war had a chance
to meet, discuss, and debate all the important matters of state and taxation.

Yet the strategic

floods which ravaged the province ensured that one of the topics which consistently appeared on
the docket was the most controversial and divisive.
The temporary reprieve offered by the Pacification allowed the States an opportunity to
follow through on their promises to repair the damages from the military inundations. They
agreed to a number or resolutions directed towards repair work such as the four stuiver per ton of
beer tax and the 100th penny. For the most part, however, these initiatives stalled because of the
difficulties collecting the money and because the States earmarked the funds for too many
purposes.
At the same time as the States attempted to repair the damaged dikes and sluices, the
discontent from the militarization of the landscape threatened the fragile peace of the
Pacification. Gouda was upset enough at the unrepaired Leidschendam that it refused to send
delegates to the States of Holland for nearly a year. Haarlem took the opportunity with the
Revolt provided to secure better transportation and river access with the closure of the Leed and
Penningsveer rivers. The debates over the legality of these actions delayed the repairs to the allimportant Spaarndam dike. Dordrecht did its best to look after its hinterland in the
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Alblasserwaard with little success, while Brill conceded the money for dike repairs to its
hinterland in exchange for new fortifications.
The military inundations achieved short term successes for the rebels, but created longterm problems. The intentional flooding gave the rebels the ability to resist the Spanish force
until the latter’s finances crumbled and the soldiers mutinied. The same waters that ushered the
Spanish out of Holland also brought with it desolation and divisiveness. The inundations made it
more difficult for the States of Holland to establish their authority and develop effective forms of
rule. The intentional flood were a low cost short term alternative to a larger army, but they had a
high cost to the longer term political stability.
The intransigent nature of this bout of civic particularism resulting from the floods
permeated the States of Holland and affected the functioning of the poldermodel. Particularism
existed in Holland before the Revolt and the inundations and became entrenched in the political
fabric of the Dutch Republic. The vital difference between the particularism arising from the
militarization of the landscape is that it broke down the poldermodel. During the Pacification, a
time when the States could have been consolidating power and formalizing modes of
governance, they were consumed with infighting and internal strife. In that atmosphere each
city decided to pursue its own interests over provincial ones. There were little if any debates or
willingness to compromise. Haarlem took it upon itself to open up the rivers and Brill held up
dike repairs taxes across Holland until its needs were met first. Gouda provides the best example
of the breakdown of poldermodel as it simply refused to send delegates to the States of Holland.
How can the poldermodel function in the absence of discussion? In this regard, the Prince was
right to ask the city to remain silent about its complaints regarding the Leidschendam in 1575,
the debate foreshadowed of future divisions.
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CHAPTER FIVE: REPAIRING THE POLDERMODEL: THE POLITICAL CAREERS
OF ABRAHAM VAN ALMONDE, PAULUS BUYS, AND JOHAN VAN
OLDENBARNEVELT

Introduction

The lack of a unified institutional response to the conflicts and dilemmas associated with
military inundations was a double-edged sword. The fact that the States of Holland struggled to
find any answers to these problems also meant that individuals were free to develop their own
potential solutions. There was an opportunity for ambitious bureaucrats, politicians, and others
to solve the problems on their own initiative. Those with water-management experience were
best positioned to take advantage of this opportunity. Not only did they have the requisite
capabilities to deal with dike repair and other administrative issues relating to the tactical
flooding, but there were many vacant offices in water boards and the States of Holland that
needed filling. Many officials in Holland had remained loyal to Philip II and the Spanish
monarchy and fled abroad (usually to Utrecht), abandoning their offices. This political vacuum
meant that established officials could expand their power and prestige, while younger and less
experienced officials could gain a foothold in Holland’s politics in such a way that would have
been more difficult in times of peace. In other words, the combination of military inundations
and vacant offices created a distinct need for officials who could handle water-management
politics and also provided a path for them to further their careers. Three individuals in particular
highlight the unique political opportunity which the military inundations created: Paulus Buys
(1531-1592), Johan van Oldenbarnevelt (1547-1619), and Abraham van Almonde (1533-1593).
These three figures have received significantly different amounts of scholarly attention.
Buys has received far less scholarly attention than Oldenbarnevelt, the architect and founder of
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the Dutch Republic. Nevertheless, these two statesmen had much in common. Both came to
think of themselves as Hollanders even though they were born in Amersfoort, in the province of
Utrecht. They both studied law abroad in France, which was common practice for many
professionals in the Low Countries, although Oldenbarnevelt also pursued studies at Louvain,
Cologne, Heidelberg and Padua before finally receiving his degree in law. Upon returning both
worked in the Court of Holland and later became Lands Advocates. Importantly, both also
served on regional water management boards. Buys was unofficially involved with the Rijnland
water board as early as 1565, but officially began serving on it in 1577 until his death in 1594.1
Oldenbarnevelt developed his expertise in water management serving in the Court of Holland
before the Revolt. He did not begin sitting on the Delfland water board until 1589, as one of the
important property owners in the area, and then was officially sworn in as a member in 1593.2
Almonde followed a much different trajectory. He was born into the nobility of Holland and had
an almost guaranteed seat on the town council of Delft and the water board of Schieland. He
used his skills in water management to the benefit of the province and was a key figure in
settling some of the smaller disputes.
Each of these individuals used his knowledge and expertise in water management to
resolve lingering problems from the military inundations. At the same time, their problemsolving abilities in this matter opened up doors for them to advance their careers. Almonde came
from a privileged background, but his ability to coordinate dike repairs and appraise the damage
from flooding earned him the place on numerous committees in the States of Holland. Through
these committees he helped establish the verponding tax which stabilized the province’s
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finances. Oldenbarnevelt enjoyed no noble privileges, but through education and hard work
became an expert in feudal dike law. During the Revolt he helped coordinate the financing for
the dike repairs on the island of Schouwen in Zeeland for the States of Holland which introduced
him to the world of interprovincial politics. Furthermore, the city of Rotterdam appointed him as
its pensionary or legal advisor, and he used his skills to help it improve its finances, increase its
influence in the Schieland water board, and oversee necessary dike repairs. Of these three
individuals, Buys was the most established by the time of the Revolt. He already played an
important role in provincial politics. During the war, he used his knowledge in land reclamation
to justify Holland’s dubious claim to land that actually belonged to the neighboring province of
Brabant, which helped secure the military defenses of Holland’s southern border. The final
example in this chapter, concerning Amsterdam’s Satisfactie (accord) with the States of Holland,
demonstrates how these three figures incorporated water-management politics to help resolve
conflicts and rebuild the poldermodel.
In many ways, repairing the poldermodel entailed satisfying civic interests, as the
Amsterdam example highlights. The disputes during the Pacification of Ghent provided a salient
lesson for the States of Holland, civic particularism overrode provincial concerns. In order for
substantive and worthwhile negotiations to take place city interests needed to be satisfied first.
Each of the individuals listed above heeded this reality. The verponding, which Almonde played
an important role in establishing, guaranteed that funds went to the cities first. Oldenbarnevelt’s
tenure as pensionary of Rotterdam allowed the city to take control of its finances and extend its
influence over water-management priorities in the Schieland water board. Buys helped ensure
that once the war resumed, the fighting would take place outside of Holland, saving all the cities
in Holland the tribulations of further fighting in Holland. The case of Amsterdam’s satisfactie
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demonstrates how these figures could work together to satisfy the city’s interests while serving
the greater good of the province. The military inundations significantly broke the poldermodel
and dis-incentivized the cities from taking part in the broader provincial debates. These three
figures helped bring the cities back to the negotiation table.

The Career of Abraham van Almonde

Abraham was born into the Holland nobility, and officially became the Lord of
Beukelsdijk, Bloemersdijk and Altena when his father died in 1555. The Almonde family was
active in water management and politics throughout the sixteenth century; as they regularly sat
on the town councils of Delft and served on the water board of Schieland in southeastern
Holland.3 Abraham benefited from his family connections but still distinguished himself through
his own accomplishments. He had begun serving on the water board of Schieland in 1567,
before the Revolt began, and would hold onto the office until his death in 1593. In 1591 he was
also selected as a member of the Rijnland water board. This honor not only serves a testament to
his knowledge and abilities in terms of water management, but also his role in the aftermath of
the military inundations. Despite his noble lineage, Abraham van Almonde’s life seem to have
barely registered in historical and contemporary accounts. Neither A.J. van der Aa’s nor P.C.
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Molhuysen and P.J. Blok’s compendious biographical encyclopedias on the Netherlands have an
entry on him although they do mention some of his descendants.4
Abraham appeared to have largely abstained from politics before the Revolt. The only
known correspondence between him and the Prince regarded the implementation of various
placards in 1566.5 By 1574, however, he was appointed as one of the regents of Delft and
afterwards began appearing regularly in the States of Holland. At this point it is likely that he
received his seat in Delft because of his family connections, but his experience in water
management made him a treasured asset in the States of Holland.
Over the course of 1575 and 1576 the States would send him to oversee a number of
water-management cases across southern Holland, from the town of Brill in the southwest, to the
Alblasserwaard in the southeast, and the Rijnland and Schieland water boards in between. It was
under his command that the dikes were cut around Brill in 1575 as part of an attempt to stall a
Spanish invasion from the southwest. This military inundation aside, the States used him more
often for his ability to repair flood damage. During his stay in Brill, they also ordered him to
oversee the construction of a new sluice in the nearby Vekhoek polder and the repair work for
the surrounding dikes.6 Only a few months later he was part of a commission to oversee dike
repairs in the critically damaged Alblasserwaard, which had been flooded in connection with the
relief of Leiden. Later in the same year, he coordinated repair work with the water boards of
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Schieland and Rijnland to repair the flood damage after the siege of Woerden, working on the
Ijssel dike and the embankments around Gouda.7
Almonde was often the States of Holland’s first choice when it came to matters of dike
repair and maintenance. They valued his ability to develop timely and efficient plans for repairs.
In many ways he was like an early modern claims adjustor, establishing repair estimates and
acting as a liaison between the States and the local residents as they carried out dike repair. His
activities during his first two years in the States of Holland demonstrated his worth, and opened
up doors for his future.
His biggest achievement for the States was the establishment the verponding in 1581, a
levy on real property that helped to stabilize the province’s finances. This tax provided reliable
revenue from the rural sectors of Holland, the areas which had been most affected by the
inundations. This was a colossal task. Even in the best of times governments in the early
modern period had difficulty developing reliable records for taxation purposes. The possibility
of an income tax was still centuries away, while the property registers which did exist were
“almost always seriously incomplete and hopelessly outdated.”8
The Revolt further complicated the process of tax collection because of the disruption
wrought by the military inundations and the changing ownership patterns in the countryside.
The war in general, and the military inundations in particular, caused a great deal of upheaval to
the rural sectors of Holland. Nearly half of the province lay under water at some point during the
first years few years of the Revolt in Holland. In some areas the changes to the landscape were
so dramatic that local officials could not determine who owned a given property, let alone how
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much the owner would owe in taxes.9 The slow pace of the dike repair meant that many in the
rural sectors were displaced for years, sometimes never to return. As some regions lay under
water for years, it meant that farmers and other rural workers were forced to find other means of
providing for themselves and their families. With their livelihood threatened they were still
pressured to pay for rents and taxes on land and services from which they could receive little to
no benefit or income. The urban populations, conversely, while suffering from particular sieges,
were in a much better situation, specifically financially. A significant portion of rural wealth
went to the cities during this period. As one infantry captain noted, “Here are many towns
wishing that the war may last longer, because they are enriched by it. A house that was rented at
twenty guilders now yields a hundred.”10 In fact, after 1580 the land ownership patterns changed
drastically from countless small-scale holdings to medium and large-scale.
To complicate matters even further, there were numerous debates over how to carry out
land taxes and problems with their collection. These issues plagued the collection of the 100th
penny tax as some cities wanted to assess the value of land based on rental contracts while others
wanted to use tax assessments that predated the Revolt. The problem with the latter approach is
clear, as these assessments could not reflect the great changes to the landscape and
landownership resulting from the war. Nevertheless, the majority of cities used the pre-Revolt
values, with the exception of Leiden, Gouda, and Dordrecht. The problem with rental contracts,
as the States discovered, was that many landlords and leasers created false contracts in an effort
to reduce their tax payments.
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After several years of complications with the collection of the 100th penny, the States
finally did away with it in place of the verponding, or a levy on real property. Doing away with
the 100th penny and instituting a new tax proved to be a complicated affair. In 1581 the States
began the process of discontinuing the 100th penny and implementing the new verponding.
Because of increased burdens for the war the States agreed to establish the verponding while
simultaneously imposing a 100th penny tax in cities, and two 100th penny taxes, or a 50th penny
tax, on the countryside. The penny taxes were estimated to raise a total of 165,000 pounds, with
110,000 coming from the rural sectors of Holland. Like the 100th penny tax, the verponding was
an extraordinary contribution that the States could collect as needed. They set each verponding
to raise roughly 100,000 pounds per collection and often issued multiple assessments per year.
Unlike the 100th penny which was a one-percent tax on the value of property, the States set the
verponding to raise roughly 100,000 pounds per levy based on a quota system. Depending on
current needs, the States could issue multiple verpongingen per year.
Almonde’s experiences and abilities in dike repair and water management gave him the
opportunity to take part in establishing the taxation policies for the province. The States selected
Almonde and four others to oversee the collection and liquidation of the 50th penny in July 1581.
Over the course of the next year this committee, along with the Receiver General Cornelis van
Meirop, increasingly found that the money from the penny taxes was not meeting the financial
needs of the province. During the same time the States continued to appoint Almonde to dike
repair issues across the province. He negotiated with Gouda and the Schieland water board over
the construction of a new dike outside the city. A few weeks later he oversaw the dike repairs on
the island of Voorne.11
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While Almonde was busy with his committee work and overseeing water management
cases across Holland, the States were finding the collection of the verponding to be a
complicated affair. According to a resolution on 30 July 1581, the States intended the quota for
the verponding to take into account the physical and financial conditions of the towns and cities
in the province. By 24 August the rates for the cities were set, but the States struggled to find a
way to accurately gauge assessments for the countryside. In September they decided to use the
100th penny assessment for movable goods, and the schiltal, a province-wide assessment land tax
from 1514, as the base for land values. If these were missing, the States recommended the use of
morgenboeken or molenboeken, tax records used by water boards to pay for dike upkeep and mill
construction.12
By 3 July the States reported to the Prince about “great inequalities” in the verponding
assessment and collection. The central issue revolved around addressing the widespread changes
from the war. As such they decided to create a committee to oversee the project, composed of
either three or seven qualified individuals. Almonde was on both the three-and seven-person
lists because he fit all of the necessary qualifications. Unlike the sometimes vague instructions
for some of the other committees, the States of Holland included a specific list of various
requirements which the potential committee members had to meet. In addition to making sure
that this new committee would not interfere with their other duties, the States wanted a “neutral”
person from each quarter that could competently assess the dramatic changes in the landscape.
They were instructed to use several previous tax assessments, both before and during the Revolt
to estimate the value of a piece of land to arrive at the fairest valuation. Next, they were to
address all the changes from the war, taking into account any villages that were “burnt and
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ruined,” or “land that was changed through the breaking of dikes and the introduction of flood
waters.” Finally, to make sure that there was no chance for fraud, they made sure that none of
the committee members could survey the city or surrounding area in which they lived.13
After several months of waiting, the Prince finally selected the seven-person committee
on 8 November 1582, and work could begin in earnest even though it achieved very little
initially. The first task for the commission involved clarifying some of their instructions which it
had received from the Prince. For the most part his instructions were almost identical to their
own drawn up months before, but the members still felt the need to insert their own
“interpretation of the instructions” for the verponding. This “interpretation” was a very brief
document, mostly discussing how to take into account changes from previous assessments. For
instance, it discussed how to estimate a house’s value if it was not included in the 10th penny tax
in 1563 by using their neighbor’s tax records. It also included a discussion about how to
evaluate land that was unreclaimed prior to a 1569 audit.14
Over the next year Almonde and the committee would finally solve the complicated
issues of establishing the verponding, and creating a stable collection method for rural taxes. In
the new method of collection local officers such as the sheriff, town alderman, or another sworn
official would carry out the assessment, as they had “the best knowledge of the land” in an
around the village. They were also instructed to measure out the land, down to the thumb-length,
in order to estimate its true worth.15 In other words, in place of the committee traveling across
Holland to assess the dramatic changes in villages resulting from the war they passed the
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obligation onto local officials. However, what kept local officials from cooking their books as
they had before?
In addition to the oath which the officials swore promising to carry out the allotment
correctly, there was another enforcement mechanism which ensured better collection. A major
goal of the verponding was to pay back loans that were guaranteed by the gemene middelen,
excise taxes, but not payable from it. For the most part these were loans to local residents, which
the town or city magistrates could then pay directly from the verponding. If the local official
falsified their verponding account to report a lower amount, then it would take longer for the
local residents who were owed money to get repaid. This method of collection proved to be
more successful than the 100th penny and previous tax methods, and helped bring in reliable tax
revenue from the rural sectors of Holland which often paid less than the cities.
The verponding became an important component in Holland’s pyramid of credit and a
sort of social lubricant to reduce civic particularism. Each assessment raised around 100,000
pounds, and the tax could be levied several times per year depending on current needs. The
States used this money to pay portions of the different loans contracted for the war. The
verponding was not enough to wipe away these debts, but they helped Holland maintain its credit
worthiness. A significant number of these loans were from better-off citizens in the cities. As
such, the States specifically ear-marked verponding payments from specific villages for burgher
loans from a particular city. For example, one of the assessments for the town of Rijnsaterwoude
went to Amsterdam in 1586 and Delft the following years. There cities argued over who would
be paid first, but the regularity of the verponding gave them confidence that they could repay the
loans to their citizens.16 The lesson from the civic particularism arising during the Pacification
16
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of Ghent was that cities needed to have their needs met first for the poldermodel to function.
Almonde and the verponding committee were clearly aware of this fact, and ensured that money
went to the cities first. In short, the revenue stream did enough to maintain Holland’s credit
worthiness and keep the cities happy.
Almonde turned out to be a capable servant for the States of Holland. He came from a
privileged background, but his familial influence rarely extended beyond the city of Delft and the
Schieland water board. Almonde’s water-management experience and expertise brought him
provincial recognition, as the States utilized his skills in dike repair and land assessments. He
repaid their faith in him with the development of the verponding, which allowed them to
generate dependable revenue streams from the countryside. There was nothing easy about the
development of this tax, but it proved important for repairing the poldermodel. Cities proved to
be the most intransigent and the revenues from the verponding not only spread around the tax
burden, ensuring that the countryside provided funds for the war, but also guaranteed that the
cities needs were satisfied first.

The Political Career of Johan van Oldenbarnevelt

Very little in Oldenbarnevelt’s background suggested he would become one of the finest
statesmen in Europe. Oldenbarnevelt’s family history could hardly have been more checkered.
His father was continually in trouble with the law, and may have even been banned from the city
for a period. As Jan den Tex, the best known biographer of Oldenbarnevelt stated, “Seldom has
a Dutch statesman come out of such a degenerate nest.”17 After finishing Latin school in his
17
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home town, young Johan traveled to The Hague and served as a lawyer’s apprentice. In 1566 he
left Holland to study law, bouncing around five different universities in Europe before finally
earning his degree in law and returning in 1570. Early that year he passed the bar and began
serving as an advocate for the States in the Court of Holland.
It took a couple of years for Oldenbarnevelt to find his role in the Revolt. When fighting
broke out in 1572, Oldenbarnevelt pledged his support to the Prince and the States of Holland
even though the majority of the Court chose the loyalist side and fled to Utrecht. He resided for
a short period in The Hague, but quickly moved to Delft when Orange reestablished the Court of
Holland there in November. The city had walls and provided more security for the Prince and
the fledgling rebel government. At the outset Oldenbarnevelt had little, if any, contact with the
rebel leadership. While he remained in The Hague he tried to organize the town’s defenses
against the Spanish, collecting voluntary funds and creating an improvised militia. He was also
involved in a feeble military attempt to break up the siege of Haarlem. He was fortunate to
escape unharmed as the leader of his command was killed in action.18 These events persuaded
young Johan that he was clearly not cut out for a military career.
Instead, Oldenbarnevelt found that he could best serve the Prince and the Revolt with his
expertise in water management. Upon his return to Holland in 1570, he quickly became an
expert in feudal dike laws and drainage issues. He established a “lucrative practice” serving as a
lawyer for nobles, Dike Counts, and cities. The States of Holland often used his services for
water-management cases. Oldenbarnevelt’s skills in water-management cases became the key
that opened up doors for his political career. He mentioned this fact himself in his
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autobiography, noting, “Nearly all the Nobles, Lords, many towns…and nearly all the dikereeves [counts] and polders board officials” were his clients in civil cases.19
Dealing with dike laws and polder societies gave him the skills necessary to heal many of
the rifts caused by the war. In 1573 the Prince tasked him with resolving a dispute between
farmers who were being harassed by “friendly” English troops under the command of Thomas
Morgan in the Hoekse Waard in southern Holland.20 A few years later Orange appointed him as
a special commissioner to look into possible cases of treason in the Northern Quarter in which
torture and other dubious methods had extracted confessions. Oldenbarnevelt never served on
this commission however, since the Pacification of Ghent in 1576 led to the prisoners’ release. 21
What is important about these early episodes is that they demonstrate that Oldenbarnevelt
had begun to carve out a niche for himself as an individual who could resolve lingering problems
resulting from the war. The representatives in the States of Holland clearly saw his potential as
they appointed him as one of the original members of the Council of Appeal. In fact, he was
instrumental in helping set up the Council, whose stated objective was to restore peace and
resolve any injustices which had occurred during the war.22
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This talent for resolving problems created by the war was also evident in his role with the
military inundations and their aftermath. It was in this regard that he truly distinguished himself.
He received a first-rate introduction to military inundations while serving on a commission for
cutting dikes to relieve the siege of Leiden. His exact role in this enterprise is unclear, but he
likely directed the digging and cutting of dikes, helping to minimize the damage and coordinate
the financial and jurisdictional matters with local polder boards. Den Tex notes that this could
have been an important education for the future advocate.23 It does appear to have been a
launching point for his career since after this point he began to appear regularly as an advocate in
the Court of Holland, specifically in cases dealing with water management and with the
confiscation of church and émigré property, all of which were contentious issues.
The widespread use of military inundations in the early years of the Revolt in Holland
and Zeeland created opportunities for Oldenbarnevelt to showcase his abilities. For instance, one
of his first assignments for the States General was to help settle dike repair financing issues on
the island of Schouwen in Zeeland as a result of the siege of Zierikzee in 1575-1576. These
were important and complicated negotiations, even if they were only a “Holland-Zeeland
matter.”24 The damage was apparently considerable enough for the regents of Zierikzee to note
the “great affection they have for the poor drowned fatherland,” arguing that if the Schouwen
dike was not repaired immediately it would lead to “inestimable, but also irreparable damage.”25
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After some initial attempts by Zierikzee to secure funds from the city of Bruges in
Flanders were refused, the city opened talks with the Prince of Orange to arrange the repair
work. On 31 March 1577 Oldenbarnevelt served on a committee tasked with the inspection of
the dikes not just on Schouwen, but also on the nearby islands of Overflakkee, Voorne, and
Putten, which were still in disrepair. After several months of aborted attempts to raise the funds,
the two provinces finally reached an agreement whereby Holland would lend Zeeland a sum of
21,810 pounds, which would be added to the 100,000 pounds it promised as part of the union
between the two provinces.26 The city of Middelburg complicated the negotiations by refusing
to authorize the loan, as it did not want to pay for the war debts of the province while it had
remained under Spanish authority. Oldenbarnevelt was one of the chief negotiators in this
matter, getting the city not only to sign off on the loan, but also to further support the union
between the two provinces.27
Oldenbarnevelt’s knowledge in water management earned him a place on the committee
to work with the States of Zeeland and introduced him to the world of interprovincial politics.
Following this initial success, the States of Holland regularly chose Oldenbarnevelt for their
negotiations with Zeeland. Over the next few years, he continued to represent the States of
Holland in their dealings with other provinces. He played a significant role in drafting of the
Union of Utrecht in 1579, the defensive alliance among the northern provinces.
Another important step in Oldenbarnevelt’s young career was his role as the pensionary
for the town of Rotterdam. Although he was not the regents’ first choice, he repaid their
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decision by playing a key role in enhancing the city’s status in Holland. The role of the
pensionary was largely to look after the financial matters and serve as an advisor to the regents.
Oldenbarnevelt accomplished a lot of impressive feats for Rotterdam, but he also learned a great
deal from his experiences, noting in his own autobiography that, “ [I performed] extraordinary
services for the city and Holland during my nine years” in the office.28 He helped turn it from a
“petulant” young city, into the most important of the small cities, those which were only awarded
representation in the States during the Revolt, as opposed to the big six cities which had voting
rights prior to the Revolt.29 Oldenbarnevelt helped the city take control of its finances, increase
its influence in Schieland, and carry out dike repairs resulting from the military inundations.
When he took the office of pensionary on 28 December 1576, Rotterdam was one of the
few cities in Holland which was well positioned to be able to settle its finances and watermanagement issues on its own terms, even if this fact was not immediately apparent.
Throughout the sixteenth century Rotterdam’s water-management policy was often at odds with
the other cities in Schieland, particularly in terms of turf mining. Several of these cities, Gouda
in particular, were supported in large part through peat mining and trade, which led to
widespread fen and lake creation. The dike count of the Schieland water board had attempted to
slow down the Gouda turf trade, but not too rigorously as those who held the office often had
economic incentives not to injure the turf industry. Furthermore, wealthy investors from Gouda
and Delft would often secure their interests by manipulating the poorer villagers throughout
Schieland by buying up their land and then hiring them as laborers, ensuring there was land for
exploitation and cheap workers. Many people in Schieland feared the creation of another great
28
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inner lake just like the Harlemmermeer in Rijnland. Because of the importance of the turf
industry, however, the landscape continued to deteriorate, which led to fen and land creation.
During the Revolt and its widespread use of intentional flooding, the nightmare became a reality
and only the highest elevated cities of Schieland were spared the worst of the widespread flood
damage.30
The outbreak of fighting in 1572 put Rotterdam at odds with its neighbors in terms of
finances as well. The establishment of the regional receiver system in 1574 seemed to be an
indication of its low standing among the other Holland cities. In this system, the money
collected in Rotterdam was sent to the collector Pieter Hanneman in Delft who functioned as the
receiver for goods in Schieland and Delfland. These meant that even money destined for local
use had to be filtered through the regional receiver system, which usually took a cut of the taxes
for other purposes. The fact that Gouda, also situated in Schieland, became the regional center
for tax collection in Schoonhoven, Brill, and Voorne must also have been a real “poke in the
eye” for Rotterdam, especially as it tried to achieve hegemony in Schieland to secure its water
management goals.31
The two issues resolved themselves in Rotterdam’s favor when the States of Holland
began authorizing the sale of confiscated ecclesiastical and émigré properties. As early as 1573
the States began these sales to help fund the war, although it was initially done on an ad hoc
basis as the Prince had his reservations about the process. Rotterdam appears to have been one
of the first cities to benefit from this policy as they used the money raised from these sales to pay
off old debts and as leverage to achieve financial and environmental security. In Rotterdam the
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money from these sales went to wealthy urban investors in the form of a credit, which they then
used to buy up domain lands throughout Schieland.32
At the same time the city also called in an old debt owed to them by the States of Holland
to extend its influence over its hinterland. In the early years of the war Rotterdam had loaned the
States 19,000 pounds, which the latter had difficulty repaying. As the States began carrying out
the sale of ecclesiastical property to pay off old debt, the regents of Rotterdam refused to
authorize the sales until its own debts were satisfied first. The commissioner for the sale of the
goods called the pursuit “fruitless” until the issue was resolved. After several months of debate
and discussions, the city and province finally reached an accord on 14 February 1576 where, in
return for writing off the States debt, Rotterdam purchased the rights to the offices of the dike
count, bailiff, and sheriff in the Schieland water board. Schieland became a de facto colonial area
of Rotterdam.33
Oldenbarnevelt became the pensionary of Rotterdam after the city had negotiated the
purchase of the offices in Schieland, but he still managed to play an important role. It was
largely his responsibility to defend and justify these actions after the fact, a duty which he took
very seriously. The sale of these offices generated considerable insecurity and conflict in
Schieland. Many rural residents were rightly concerned about repairing the damage from the
military campaigns of the previous few years and feared that these events might delay the dike
32
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restorations. The office sales also displaced those already in the offices as Rotterdam appointed
their own officials. This turnover meant that important members of rural communities and other
cities lost the revenues from these positions. To some people, Rotterdam’s purchase of these
offices signaled a change in water management and economic policy in Schieland. For
example, Gouda and Delft interpreted the appointment of a well-known beer brewer as the dike
count as a direct attack on their beer industries. For the short term, however, these issues
remained a moot point, since the States reneged on their agreement with Rotterdam almost
immediately and refused to ratify the sale of the offices.
The States’ refusal, along with the frustrations of the regional receiver system convinced
Rotterdam that it might benefit from forging its own path. Rotterdam was not alone in its
objections as many cities felt the current system favored some cities above others. As such,
Rotterdam began undermining the system by paying its soldiers directly, as opposed to funneling
their money through regional receiving center. The city went a step further in the summer of
1577 by simply naming its own receiver without the State’s permission. The States obviously
could not accept Rotterdam’s position and gave the city three months to send their money to the
receiver in Delft, threatening trade penalties for non-compliance.34
At Oldenbarnevelt’s insistence, however, Rotterdam refused to back down, and with
good justification. According to den Tex, this was the only time during Oldenbarnevelt’s tenure
as pensionary that he incited the town to a strong line of opposition.35 He also took the
opportunity to remind the States of Holland that as long as the sale of the Schieland water board
offices remained unconfirmed, it still owed the city 19,000 pounds. In the meantime the city
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receiver, who also happened to be a good friend of Oldenbarnevelt, had already collected 8000
guilders worth of taxes in the city and surrounding villages. The city used this money to repair
the dikes at Cappelle and along the Ijssel which had been broken for the relief of Leiden. The
regents of the city rightly believed that each city having its own collector did not damage
Holland and the common cause, but in fact had proven more efficient and had better served the
province. That the city used local funds for local dike repairs serves as a testament to this fact.
This episode is important for a variety of reasons. First, it introduced Oldenbarnevelt
more thoroughly to the world of civic politics, the pervasive influence of particularism, and to
the power of the purse strings. Rotterdam was not alone in its call for its own receiver, and
ultimately every city would secure control over the method of its tax collection shortly
thereafter.36 Second, that the city used the money for its own water-management initiatives is
telling. As pensionary, Oldenbarnevelt would clearly have had a hand in these decisions, and it
showed him the political possibilities of shrewd water-management politics. He satisfied the
provincial need for money and the city’s needs for greater control over its environmental destiny.
These are lessons which he would carry with him going forward.
One of Oldenbarnevelt’s principal duties as the pensionary of Rotterdam included the
sale of domain lands and offices, which were another means for cities to generate revenue
outside of taxes. Before the Revolt these domain lands and offices were royal Habsburg
possessions which they would lease out for income generation, such as toll rights, alum licenses,
and offices. Prior to the Revolt the States of Holland administered these lands as a guarantee for
the money they lent to the monarchy. During the war the States repurposed this money for a
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variety of needs, with Oldenbarnevelt playing a leading role in the redeployment of the revenue
for dike repairs.
Rotterdam benefited from the sale of confiscated goods, allowing the wealthy city
burghers to buy up nearby lands and increase their influence in Schieland. The first round of
sales was finished before Oldenbarnevelt became pensionary, but he must have noted their
importance, for he was appointed to a commission to oversee the sale of domain lands in the five
great cities. Since Amsterdam had only recently rejoined the States of Holland in 1578 against
Spain, the sale of its domain lands was a separate issue still being negotiated as part of the city’s
satisfactie with the States. Over time, however, Oldenbarnevelt would help administer the sale
of domain lands in Amsterdam as well.37 In addition to the great cities he also oversaw sales in
Gorinchem, and of course, Rotterdam. Over the next several years he served on commissions
such as these, whose main goal was to liquidate the States’ debts, most often with the repayment
of renten, or bonds owed to the wealthy urban burghers.
The sale of domain lands could raise significant funds, some of which Oldenbarnevelt
directed towards dike repair and other water-management issues. Initially the 100th penny tax,
the one percent tax on the value of land, had been allocated for funding the major dike repairs
across Holland. As noted, it does not appear as though all of the tax funds reached their
destination. Oldenbarnevelt was clearly aware of this fact as he served on a commission to look
into uncollected money from the tax.38 As the 100th penny was not securing the payments for
the necessary dike work he turned to another source of revenue: the sale of domain lands. An
indication of the profitability of these ventures can be seen in the sale of domain lands in
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Zwijndrecht and Putten. The sales there helped to liquidate, or at the least, considerably
decrease, a 50,000 pound loan from the city of Dordrecht.39
Domain lands were an attractive investment for wealthy urban burghers, and could serve
as an important revenue stream for cities and the States of Holland.40 On the Prince’s advice the
States established a commission in 1580, which included Oldenbarnevelt, to oversee the
expansion of domain sales to help reduce the debts on their outstanding renten. The
management of renten debt was an important part of Holland’s credit worthiness. The States of
Holland had cancelled the repayment of the debt from 1572 until 1576, and following the
Pacification of Ghent had been attempting to get their finances in line.
The sale of domain lands towards the renten payments was another step in this direction.
Interestingly, the same resolution which authorized the domain sales for renten also decreed that
Oldenbarnevelt’s commission should take into account the debt which the land would incur from
dike repair and deduct it from the sale. This statute essentially passed the onus of repair onto the
buyer. It appears to have been an extremely effective tactic. The domain lands around Alkmaar
sold by the commission amounted to 81,453 pounds. This specific sale again mentioned the
clause about the dikes, but did not mention the reduced cost from the dike repair.41
Before the Revolt, Oldenbarnevelt held a lucrative position as a lawyer in cases regarding
feudal dike laws. He served as an advisor to nobles, cities, and even the States of Holland in
these matters. During the war, he sided with the Prince and the rebels in opposition to the
Spanish. Through his expertise in water management he quickly established himself as a central
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figure in the political world of the Revolt. It was because of this background that he served on
the commission to finance the dike repairs on the island of Schouwen, which served as his
introduction to inter-provincial politics. During his time as the pensionary of Rotterdam he
helped the city rebuild its finances and establish a greater influence over Schieland. This
resulted in the repair of several dikes that were damaged from military inundations. Similarly,
while serving on the committee to oversee domain sales in the cities throughout Holland he
ensured that the transactions resulted in dike repair and maintenance. In short, Oldenbarnevelt’s
expertise in dike laws and water management opened up political doors, and he used it to the
benefit of his client, in this case Rotterdam and the States of Holland.

The Career of Paulus Buys

In many ways Paulus Buys is a forgotten figure of the Dutch Revolt; the last biography
on him was published in 1895. At that point the biographer noted that Buys was “still an
unknown entity,” citing the fact that the date of his official confirmation as Land’s Advocate was
still unknown.42 Perhaps part of the issue is that Buys had a contentious personality, both
historically and in the historiography as well. Periodically throughout his political career he was
involved in high-profile disputes. The most well-known occurred with Sir Robert Dudley, the
Earl of Leicester, during his stay as governor-general of the United Provinces in 1585-1587,
when he got Buys drunk and had him arrested. This episode essentially ended Buys’ political
career, but even in his later years he quarreled with Jan van Hout, the town secretary of Leiden,
and a representative of the important land holders of the Rijnland water board.
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Before the Revolt, however, Buys appears to have been more of a conciliatory figure, or
at the least, an individual interested in keeping the peace. He began his career as a lawyer in the
Court of Holland and by 1561 he became the pensionary of Leiden, providing legal advice for
the city’s regents. When the iconoclastic riots broke out in Flanders and Brabant in 1566, Prince
William of Orange and the States of Holland sent Buys and Jacob van Eynde, the current lands
advocate, as their representatives to the States General in Brussels to negotiate with the
Habsburg regent.43
Already in these early years Buys was an ardent supporter of the Prince and a proponent
of civic liberties and privileges. It is possible that Buys was actually one of a select few
politicians that formed a secret committee to keep in contact with Orange when he fled the Low
Countries to Germany in 1568 to escape Alva’s punishment for his role in the early revolt.44
Throughout 1560s Buys supported a policy of religious toleration within Leiden, like many other
Holland regents. He openly opposed Alva and Philip II’s policies on the persecution of heretics
and the collection of the 10th penny on the grounds that they would create discord in Holland.
During the same period Buys was also an involved with the water board of Rijnland.
After the All Saints Day Flood in 1570 Buys worked with members of the Schieland and
Delfland water boards to repair the damage. In particular, the joint committee looked after the
breach in the Diemer dike, situated along the Zuiderzee near Amsterdam, which lead to
inundations in all the water boards. He also helped with the delicate task of maintaining the
Spaarndam, as he took part in a series of negotiations with Haarlem over the construction of a
new sluice in the dike. He later worked with Haarlem to prevent the construction of a dike in
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Wijkermeer which would lead to increased water in the IJ river and increased pressure on the
Spaarndam.45 In short, he had a background in solving intricate and complex water management
issues.
During the Revolt Buys employed his talents in the service of Orange and the States of
Holland. He was present at the first meeting of the States when they gathered on their own
authority in liberated Holland in 1572, and probably served a vital role as he was well known.
He carried out many of the duties of the vacant land’s advocate office, since van Eynde had been
arrested for heresy and died in captivity a few years previously. By December 1572 The States
confirmed Buys as the land’s advocate.46
Over the next few years he would also play an important role in carrying out the military
inundations during the siege of Leiden. After ensuring that his home city came over to the
Prince’s side within during the summer of 1572, he helped oversee the dike breaches that helped
rescue Leiden only a few years later. He gave instructions for breaching the Ijssel and Maas
dikes and carried out inspections throughout the Schieland and Delfland water boards to ensure
the flood waters were moving north towards Leiden.47 Before the siege ended he also assisted
with military inundations in the Alblasserwaard in an attempt to prevent a Spanish attack from
the rear.48
It appears as though these difficult days during the first years of the fighting put a strain
on Buys as his conciliatory personality grew more abrasive. He threatened to resign several
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times, mostly over salary issues, but also over matters of procedure, such as being allowed to
open letters without all representatives of the States of Holland being present.49 Furthermore, he
was keenly aware of how to exploit a situation for his own benefit. In the middle of September
1574, when the successful relief of Leiden (his own city!) hung in the balance, he made sure to
remind the States that they owed him roughly 2,500 pounds for his services over the last two
years.50 Actions such as these made Buys an increasingly divisive figure, but one whom the
States desperately needed because of his abilities. Later that same year the States refused to
grant his resignation or select another advocate to help share the responsibilities of the position.51
He was for them a necessary headache.
Buys understood the importance of his privileged position, he continually asked either for
his dismissal or more compensation. In May 1575 he asked again for his dismissal because of
the difficulties associated with establishing an effective government. The representatives in
Holland were split on the issue of his resignation, with Leiden, the nobility, and Delft wanting
him to continue; Rotterdam, Dordrecht, and Gouda were willing to let him leave, while the
remaining cities deferred to the Prince. Buys remained in the office, but a week later (as if to test
their patience) he again asked for money. This time, it was in the middle of negotiations with
Zeeland over forming an effective union and further solidifying the relationship between Orange
and the States of Holland. He finally got a partial payment in June, but the dispute over his
resignation and salary would run throughout 1575.52
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Buys’ grievances were not unfounded, however, even if he timed the airing of these for
maximum effect. Buys often acted as the intermediary between Orange and the States of
Holland. Buys would keep up communications with the Prince while the latter was away while
also serving on a number of commissions and delegations. Orange had Buys preside over the
Council of State while he was absent from Holland in 1573, a few years later in 1575 he
represented the Prince at peace talks in Breda, and served on the delegation to Brussels to
conclude the Pacification of Ghent. 53 These were not unfamiliar roles, since as previously noted
he might have been on a secret committee to keep in communication with the Prince prior to the
Revolt.
These matters of high politics occupied a great deal of Buys’ time, but he remained active
with water-management issues. When the Rijnland water board began meeting again in 1577,
Buys received a seat for life and remained active in the organization. He was at nearly every
tribunal meeting, which took place four times per year, and oversaw the inspection and
compliance of all laws pertaining to the dikes and fen areas throughout Rijnland. His few
absences were conspicuous enough for the secretary to make specific mention; if he missed a
meeting it was because he was conducting affairs for the Prince or the States.54 It is unclear
what role he played in the actual organization for the repair work in Rijnland, but shortly after he
received his seat he helped organize financing for the dike repairs across Rijnland, paying
particular attention to the Spaarndam dike.55
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In addition to helping with dike repairs in across Holland, Buys used his water
management experience to help establish military defenses along the province’s southern border.
The Pacification of Ghent was a fragile peace, and it was clear to many in Holland that the war
would soon return. The Spanish commander Mondragon’s daring crossing of the Zijpe channel
between the provinces of Zeeland and Brabant in 1575 demonstrated that Holland was
vulnerable from an attack from the south. The States of Holland decided that the best approach
to prevent further incursions was to strike at the root of the problem. Mondragon began his
invasion from the northern shores of the province of Brabant. Rather than building defenses all
along the shores of southern Holland, it made more sense to disrupt the fewer bases of the
Spanish attacks in northern Brabant.
This approach involved Holland maintaining a significant military presence in the
province of Brabant, which generated resentment from its southern neighbor. The Prince and the
States of Holland understood the precariousness of its southern defenses even before the
Pacification of Ghent. During the temporary truce they worked hard to shore up these
vulnerabilities. In a variety of ways, numerous towns and villages in northern Brabant came
under Holland’s control. In 1577 the Prince signed a satisfactie with the town of Heusden in
Brabant which formally brought it under the jurisdiction of Holland. Less formally, Holland
occupied the nearby town of Sint Geertruidenberg even though Brabant claimed it. To the west,
the three villages of Klundert, Rugenhil, and Fijnaart asked for a safeguard and protection from
the Prince and the States of Holland when Spanish forces returned to the area in 1579.56 In
effect, Holland annexed part of Brabant.

56

RSH 1579, 281-282, 19 November 1579.
175

Militarily these acquisitions made sense, but the States of Holland still found it difficult
justify these claims on legal grounds. According to Tracy, “Orange and the Lords States [of
Holland] espoused a maximal understanding of Holland’s boundaries. They wanted not just
everything within the historic borders – including towns that were still loyal to the king- but also
what had been added by conquest, along the strategic south-eastern frontier [in Brabant].”57
However, under the terms of the Pacification, the province of Brabant was an ally. How could
Holland warrant the appropriation of land from an ally for military purposes?
In 1581 a dispute arose between the provinces of Holland and Brabant over the
administration of the villages of Klundert, Rugenhil, and Fijnaart. Under the terms of the
safeguard, Holland had the right to collect taxes in the area to pay for its defense, but Brabant
officials had obstructed Holland’s appointed rentmaster from collecting these fees. The States of
Holland responded by writing to the States of Brabant, noting that the Holland rentmaster had the
appropriate authority, and further, Klundert, Rugenhil, and Fijnaart had “always been part of
Holland’s ground.” Understandably, the States of Holland were willing to stretch the truth in
order to protect its southern border.58 The issue became a talking point at a meeting of the States
General in February 1582. Part of the secret instruction given to Buys and the other Holland
representatives was that they must “beyond all doubt” secure these islands for Holland as they
are necessary for Holland’s defense. The States tasked the committee to convince the other
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provinces in the States General that this area had always been part of Holland, and it was their
right to collect taxes for its defense. 59
Buys used water-management policies to enforce Holland’s claim to these villages.
Immediately after the dispute arose between the two provinces, Holland sent a committee to the
island to inspect the tax records of the Dike Counts of the villages. These records provided the
clearest measure for assessing the verponding and other taxes in the villages. At the same time,
the records also gave an indication of the quality and condition of the dikes in the area. These
initiatives helped Holland establish its authority in the villages, but how did the States justify
their presence there in the first place? Buys found the answer in dike laws. He argued that the
States of Brabant had never taken formal control of the areas because they were new villages,
settled on reclaimed land from the sea. Since the residents had only built dikes in the last three
decades, “those of Brabant had taken no single act of possession in the form of contributions
[taxes].” In other words, Buys classified these as new lands that were essentially up for grabs.60
Buys also made the argument that the States of Brabant owed the Prince these villages for
lands lost elsewhere, but the water-management activities had a more lasting impact. In 1580 the
city of Breda, the ancestral home of the Prince in the Netherlands, defected to the Spanish. Buys
argued, rather weakly, that this event justified the Prince’s appropriation of Klundert and the
other villages.61 Tellingly, however, in 1584 the Prince wrote to the village residents regarding
his claim to the area. He only briefly mentions the Marquise of Bergen op Zoom’s claim to the
area [on behalf of Brabant]. Instead, the entire twenty eight page letter is filled with issues
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relating to water-management concerns. The letter provides an exhaustive overview, history,
and plans for the installation of Dike Counts, taxation policies for dikes and sluices, and
construction projects detailing the height, width, and location for embankments.62 Buys
understood that the Prince and Holland’s influence over the water management in the villages
served as the best justification for their annexation of these villages. Military needs necessitated
the seizure, water management needs justified the authority.
This letter and the improvements in the area are important for a variety of reasons. This
letter was one of the Prince’s last, as he was assassinated roughly two weeks later on 10 July
1584. The new reclamations and fortifications at Rugenhil were later to be named Willemstad in
his honor. Interestingly, the city came to serve as a testament to the marriage of water
management and defensive considerations (See next chapter). The city perfectly exhibits the
careful planning of polder reclamation while also exhibiting ideal fortification specifications.
At the beginning of the Revolt, Paulus Buys was already an influential figure in
Holland’s politics and an active participant in the Rijnland water board. In those first years of
fighting he labored under the pressure of establishing a stable and successful form of
government, one capable of financing the costly war. At the same time, his knowledge and
experiences in water management served him well. He helped save his home city of Leiden,
overseeing dike inspections and dike breaches during the military inundations. Furthermore, his
role in the appropriation of the villages of Klundert, Rugenhil, and Fijnaart helped secure
Holland’s southern border. After the Prince’s assassination Buys’ influence grew, and he played
a vital role in securing the Treaty of Nonsuch with England, and the establishment of the Earl of
Leicester as Governor General of the United Provinces (1585-1587). The treaty would end in
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failure and spell the end of Buys’ political career, but his accomplishments in the States General
with the justification of the annexation of Brabant land demonstrated his political acumen. He
was one of the most qualified individuals to help reorganize the war effort and direction of the
rebellion after the Prince’s death. In other words, he was a qualified candidate, even if he
ultimately failed. It is also telling that after his inglorious departure from Holland politics he
remained an active member in the Rijnland water board.

Satisfying Amsterdam – Almonde, Buys, and Oldenbarnevelt in action

In addition to the lingering problems from the military inundations, Amsterdam’s
position in Holland generated considerable discontent in the province. At the start of the fighting
in 1572 the city remained loyal to Philip II, and endured a prolonged siege at the hands of the
rebel forces. It remained loyal to the king until 1578, when the city regents signed a Satisfactie
with the Prince and the States of Holland. Part of the agreement involved the prohibition of
Protestant worship within the city, but the new vroedschap (city council) which took over only
four months later reneged on this part of the arrangement. This change raised the question as to
whether the whole Satisfactie should be voided. In reality, the establishment of Protestant
worship in the city offered the States of Holland a pretext to secure better subsidies from
Amsterdam. The initial agreement stipulated that the city would not be liable for any provincial
debts from 1572-1576. In other words, the city would not pay for the Revolt. For the next three
years, the States of Holland and the city renegotiated the terms of the Satisfactie. In this round of
negotiations Johan van Oldenbarnevelt, Paulus Buys, and Abraham van Almonde each played an
important role in the new accord.
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One of the lesser-known disputes which became part of these negotiations, was watermanagement politics relating to the Diemer dike and lands east of the city. Each of the
individuals listed above would play his part in securing a new Satisfactie between the States and
Amsterdam. Oldenbarnevelt had the uninviting task of justifying the need for these new
negotiations and keeping the pressure on Amsterdam. Almonde served to assess the condition of
the dikes and damage to the area, and help establish a plan for improving the flood defenses.
Buys got involved to help secure permission and support from the province of Utrecht, since
these plans affected the water conditions of Holland’s neighbor. In the end, Buys failed to
convince Utrecht to approve the plans, but in the process of negotiating with the province he
found common ground with Amsterdam, which helped secure a new Satisfactie in 1581.
Oldenbarnevelt’s role in the new accord with Amsterdam has little to do with water
management, but more with applying political pressure to the city. The States of Holland
selected Oldenbarnevelt as their chief negotiator. It was his job to convince the Prince, who
acted as the arbitrator, that the establishment of Protestant worship in the city violated the first
accord. This alteration, however, was exclusively a civic matter, and had little to no bearing on
the States of Holland or the benefit it derived from the agreement. That part of the agreement
had been included for Amsterdam’s benefit. Oldenbarnevelt had to argue that this change
somehow injured the States and required new negotiations. It was “chicanery.”63
Nevertheless, Oldenbarnevelt took his charge seriously and did his best to represent the
States of Holland. He began by attempting to make Amsterdam appear unreasonable in the
negotiations. At the outset, the city was willing to do away with the agreement and all of the
favorable clauses it contained within it in exchange for money. It was willing to be bought off.
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Oldenbarnevelt proceeded to offer an insultingly low amount, knowing that Amsterdam would
decline, and he could argue that the city was not negotiating in good faith.64 He repeatedly
returned to this theme in his negotiations. In his report to the States of Holland on the ongoing
talks he made sure to underline the terms, “infringed” and “impertinent” in regards to
Amsterdam’s stance. At the same time, he attempted to force the city to take responsibility for
provincial debts for the war, arguing the city was saved just like all the other cities of Holland.65
While Oldenbarnevelt put pressure on Amsterdam, Almonde began assessing the flood
damages to the area around Amsterdam. The area extending southeast from the city to the
Utrecht border formed an important region for flood defense, and later military defense, but it
was in a poor state by the time of the Satisfactie. The relatively short Diemer dike which only
stretched thirty kilometers, protected around 20,000 morgens of land and was in critical
condition (See Figure 4).66 The All Saints Day Flood in 1570 demonstrated the destruction
which a breach could cause, as the storm broke it at several locations, flooding large swaths of
land around Amsterdam. The openings were closed to prevent further flooding, but
comprehensive repair work stalled because of the war. Further damage occurred when the
Beggars cut the dike in 1573 during the siege of Haarlem, in an effort to circle around
Amsterdam and reach the Spanish forces. Further cuts followed during the siege of Amsterdam
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Figure 4: Map of the Diemer dike. Fransen, “Een kleine dijk,” 19. The black line denotes the
Diemer dike. This area proved to be an important consideration in the talks between Amsterdam
and the States of Holland.
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as the rebels tried to isolate the city. A final breach occurred from natural forces in 1577.
Clearly there was a considerable amount of repair work required for the area.67
Almonde was the first to get involved with the repair work a few months after the initial
Satisfactie in 1578, but he accomplished little at the outset. The States of Holland assigned him
to the committee to look into the construction of a new dike near Muiden and negotiate with
Utrecht over funding the operation. After an initial survey, the committee estimated the cost of
constructing a new dike to be around 50,000 pounds, which amounted to a monumental price tag.
They justified it by noting the great deal of suffering and misery which they encountered in the
area.
Afterwards the States of Holland assigned Buys and Jan Claesz Cat, a burgomaster of
Amsterdam, to further investigate the situation. Amsterdam provided some initial funding, well
short of the estimated amount, in return for a small reduction of the city’s debt. The States
revisited the situation the following spring and found a temporary solution with the construction
of paalwerken, a series of poles and earth works at the base of the dike. These help to break up
the waves and prevent further erosion of the dike in the short term.68 The fact that Amsterdam
was willing to invest in the water-management infrastructure in return for debt reduction
demonstrates its interest in the area, and formed an avenue through which the city and States
could build consensus. It was an excellent opportunity for the poldermodel to function.
Over the next few years Buys and Almonde engaged in prolonged negotiations with the
States of Utrecht which helped to build a working relationship between Amsterdam and the
States of Holland. These talks revolved around the construction of a new dam south of the town
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of Hinderdam and the stoppage of a small adjoining river. In June 1580, the States of Holland
appointed Buys, Almonde, and Willem Bardesius, a member of the Amsterdam vroedschap to
carry out negotiations with Utrecht. The talks appear to have been rather complicated, as the
three were negotiating not only with the magistrates of the city and States of Utrecht but also the
Utrecht nobility, several religious houses, and other property owners in the affected area. In
September Buys reported back that negotiations were ongoing, but hoped to secure funding from
Utrecht along with a local tax on those who would be affected, “as was always done in previous
times.” When the negotiations with Utrecht stalled, the States of Holland authorized the
construction of a small sluice near the town of Muiden. This was another short-term solution.69
In the end the States could never get Utrecht to pay for any of the project as it had the
upper hand and the higher land, but that does not mean these negotiations were not without
benefit for the relationship between Amsterdam and Holland. Utrecht was not as threatened
from flooding and had less of a vested interest to pursue flood protection in this area.
Nevertheless, in these negotiations the States granted Amsterdam considerable latitude, and at
times even followed the direction of the city. During the debates with Utrecht the States of
Holland were quite willing to let Amsterdam extend its influence in its hinterland, which proved
useful in their ongoing disputes with the city over the remediation of terms of the Satisfactie.
After the failed talks with Utrecht the States of Holland offered the city greater control
over the nearby Diemer dike, which proved to be a breakthrough in the talks between city and
province. The States of Holland agreed to allow Amsterdam to take part in an inspection of the
Diemer dike to “prevent fraud and abuses.” The major issue regarded ships unloading their
cargo on the dike, which not only damaged the dike, but also impacted Amsterdam’s harbor
69
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revenue. Amsterdam chose Bardesius to oversee the inspections, since he was the supervisor of
Amsterdam’s dockyard, and had already developed an understanding of water-management
issues during his negotiations with Utrecht. Furthermore, the States authorized Bardesius and
members of the Amstelland water board to assess a ten-pound fine on their own authority for any
violations.70 In short, Amsterdam gained control over the Diemer dike, which meant it could not
only look after its own flood defenses, but also its bottom line in the form of harbor revenue.
Just two weeks after the talks concluded on the Diemer dike Amsterdam and the States of
Holland agreed to a new Satisfactie, signed in December 1581. The document mentions the
city’s right to collect taxes from its hinterland for its defenses. In previous discussions the city
was primarily concerned with its flood defenses, but now turned its attention also to military
defenses, as the Spanish threatened an invasion from the Zuiderzee and from the east. In this
regard, the States granted the city considerable latitude regarding its water-management
concerns. This aspect became part of the give and take which characterized the new agreement.
Amsterdam agreed to take on a portion of Holland’s war debt, and in exchange its burghers
could begin receiving repayments on previous loans. The water-management aspect of the
debate might have been a smaller matter in the larger discussion over religion and debts from the
war, but it showed the State’s ability to compromise.71
The importance of this part of the agreement for Amsterdam is evidenced by the speed
with which the city began exercising its new authority. Roughly a month after the agreement the
city began looking after its defenses. It immediately began collecting taxes for fortifications in
the city, and almost simultaneously began looking into a new dam and fortifications in the
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village of Muiden. Amsterdam took the lead in creating a multi-city commission to look into
the matter which reported back a month later. The committee found that the new dam would
require considerable work: three large dike sections, two duikeldams to help collect mud, and a
small sluice, which they estimated to cost around 30,000 pounds. Amsterdam agreed to front
around 10,000 pounds and to raise the remaining funds with taxes.72
In the end the issue stalled again because of the cost of the venture and a lack of support
from Utrecht. Amsterdam, despite the States’ assistance, was still unable to force through
changes which could adversely affect Utrecht, and was hesitant to take on the extra debt. The
situation remained unresolved for the next decade, with the area apparently still in a perilous
condition. In this regard it is little surprise that the area around Muiden and to the south would
form the first waterline, a system of defenses that allowed the systematic inundation of lands to
prevent enemy passage (see next chapter). Throughout the 1580’s Amsterdam attempted direct
negotiations with Muiden and Utrecht to improve the situation but had little success.
The situation finally improved in 1591 with an accord between the States of Holland and
Utrecht, and the Rijnland, Delfland, and Schieland water boards. In order to prevent flooding
they agreed to broaden the Diemer dike, make it a uniform height, and angle the dike towards the
paalwerk which would reduce erosion and enhance the dike’s longevity. The central figure in
this later agreement appears to have been Oldenbarnevelt, who had taken an interest in the matter
once he had become the lands advocate.73
After three years of negotiations Amsterdam and the States of Holland finally agreed to a
new Satisfactie thanks to Buys, Almonde, and Oldenbarnevelt. In their own way, each of these
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individuals played a role in the new accord and helped to reestablish working relationship that
had been injured during the Revolt. Almonde developed plans for repair work in area protected
by the Diemer dike, Buys carried out negotiations with the States of Utrecht and built up good
will with Amsterdam, while Oldenbarnevelt put political pressure on the city. In the end, the city
took on some of the provincial debt from the Revolt in exchange for greater control over its flood
and military defenses. Was it a perfect solution? Probably not, Oldenbarnevelt’s zeal in these
talks made him life-long enemies in Amsterdam and earned him a reputation for obduracy.74
Nonetheless, solutions such as these were necessary for rebuilding the poldermodel in Holland.

Conclusion

Almonde, Buys, and Oldenbarnevelt’s experience in water management served
themselves and Holland well. The military inundations created a need for men of their talents to
find solutions to the enduring difficulties resulting from the tactical flooding in the province. In
their own way each of these men helped to repair the poldermodel in the province. The disputes
during the Pacification of Ghent sent a clear message to the States of Holland, that city interests
overrode provincial ones. Each of these individuals found different ways of satisfying civic
needs and desires.
Almonde helped establish the verponding which produced dependable revenue from the
countryside, the area hardest hit by the inundations. This tax became an important component of
Holland’s pyramid of credit. The debates and negotiations surrounding the levy were complex,
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and made even more complicated as a result of the floods. Yet Almonde and the verponding
committee found a workable plan to raise revenues from the countryside and satisfy the cities.
Acting as the pensionary for Rotterdam, Oldenbarnevelt greatly improved the city’s
finances and environmental security. He successfully defended the city’s purchase of the offices
of the Schieland water board and the installation of its own receiver. The city used this money to
carry out necessary dike repairs and improve its position within Schieland. These episodes not
only served Rotterdam and gave the city satisfaction, but helped advance Oldenbarnevelt’s
career. His problem solving abilities in water-management issues also opened up doors for him
in provincial and inter-provincial matters. He helped set up domain sales throughout the
province which aided the repair of still damaged dikes across Holland, and also served on the
inter-provincial committee to finance dike repairs in Zeeland.
Buys’ greatest achievement in repairing the poldermodel was to act on Holland’s behalf
in inter-provincial matters. This fact is evident in his dealing with the heated negotiations with
Brabant and his role in the negotiations with Amsterdam. Buys secured Holland’s security
through his justification of the annexation of lands in Brabant, on the grounds that they were
unclaimed lands. This rational was a pretext for Holland’s seizure of the lands for military
purposes, but it was effective enough to bring them under the States of Holland’s control.
The negotiations with Amsterdam over a new Satisfactie provide a salient example of
how these water-management politics could give the city satisfaction and help restore the
poldermodel. Amsterdam rejoined the other cities of Holland in 1578, but had reservations about
taking on provincial debts contracted during the war. Oldenbarnevelt pressured the city into a
new round of negotiations, Almonde developed repair plans for the Diemer dike and other flood
measures in the city’s hinterland, and Buys championed Amsterdam’s cause in the talks with the
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city and province of Utrecht regarding the new plans. The talks with Utrecht failed, but Buys
engendered goodwill with Amsterdam. In the end, the States granted Amsterdam greater control
over its hinterland to the southeast in exchange for taking on part of the provincial debt.
The continued importance of these three politicians is evident after the Prince’s
assassination on 10 July 1584. They would play an important role in filling the power vacuum in
the politics of Holland and the States General. Already after an unsuccessful attempt on
Orange’s life in 1582 Buys, Oldenbarnevelt, and the Haarlem burgomaster Nicolas vander Laan
had been assigned to discuss several “secret cases” of Holland with the States General. 75 This
apprenticeship in rule apparently paid dividends as Oldenbarnevelt was one of the “seventeen
gentlemen” who met at Delft to make arrangement for the government of Holland after Orange’s
assassination.76
After the Prince’s death these three politicians experienced differing levels of success.
Almonde continued on in largely the same role, working behind the scenes on individual water
management cases for the States of Holland. Buys’ role in Holland politics came to a jarring halt
when he fell out with Leicester. In a private letter, Leicester referred to Buys as an atheist,
villain, and dissembler who sought to make himself great; he arranged to have Buys arrested and
put on trial. Oldenbarnevelt, who became the new lands’ advocate in 1586, did the most to direct
the opposition against Leicester and later successfully came to Buys’ defense.77 This was
another striking example of how the lives of these two lands advocates intertwined.
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After Leicester’s resignation in 1588 Oldenbarnevelt began playing an increasingly
important role in the domestic politics of Holland and its relationship with its neighbors through
the States General. Through it all water-management politics remained an important part of his
statecraft. This fact is evident in his dealings with Amsterdam in the lead up to the negotiations
over the Twelve Year Truce in 1609. This temporary peace with the Spanish threatened
Holland’s commerce in general, but Amsterdam’s in particular. In order to entice the
Amsterdam regent’s into the going along with the peace talks Oldenbarnevelt offered them the
chance to invest in the lucrative reclamation of the Beemster Lake in the Northern Quarter. He
knew that the red tape associated with the project would lead to lengthy delays, so he found a
legal technicality to rush the patent through the administrative process. Usually it took two to
three months to gather all the relevant information and negotiate with local interests before
reclamation or other water works could be carried out. The patent for the reclamation of the
Beemster lake only took twelve days. Oldenbarnevelt took the view that it was better to ask for
forgiveness than permission, as all the complicated negotiations took place after the patent had
already been approved, which significantly weakened the bargaining power of local
communities. This “surprise attack” ensured that the wealthy investors of Amsterdam, along
with his brother Elias van Oldenbarnvelt, received the rights to reclamation and made a
handsome profit on the venture.78 According to one historian, the Beemster was reclamation
“perfected and mathematicized” and came to inspire a fury of other reclamation projects
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throughout Holland and the Northern Quarter.79 Clearly, water-management politics was an
effective tool in Holland, and an important component of the poldermodel.
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CHAPTER SIX: MAINTAINING THE POLDERMODEL – EXPORTING AND
SYSTEMATIZING THE INUNDATIONS

Introduction

The tactical inundations during the first years of the Revolt in Holland, from 1572 until
the Pacification of Ghent in 1576, proved to be a useful military tool but a disruptive political
one. In 1579 the war resumed following the Pacification’s collapse. The goal, from Holland’s
perspective, was to find a way to utilize military inundations that avoided destruction and
political discord within the province. The answer to this dilemma came in two forms. First, the
States of Holland ensured that the military inundations occurred on “foreign soil” in the nearby
provinces of Flanders and Brabant. In effect, they tried to export the inundations out of Holland.
Second, the States attempted to integrate their fortifications within the existing watermanagement systems, simultaneously improving a town’s defenses and allowing for the
widespread and systematic inundations. These two tactics were not mutually exclusive.
Although the Pacification failed to unite the Low Countries permanently, it did help
provide a sense of clarity going forward helping to delineate the different combatants and
provide something resembling a front line. After the Pacification fell apart the various
provinces joined either the Union of Arras or the Union of Utrecht. The Walloon provinces
along the French border, reconciled with Philip II and the new Spanish governor of the Low
Countries, Alexander Farnese, the Duke of Parma. In the north, the provinces of Holland,
Zeeland, Gelderland, Friesland, and Utrecht along with sections of Groningen joined the Union
of Utrecht (See Figure 4). The Union formed a defensive alliance against the Spanish. Holland
was the pre-eminent power behind the Union of Utrecht, as evidenced in the fact that some
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detractors termed in the “Hollandsche Union.” As the States of Holland provided the greatest
portion of the war budget it called the shots. Within two years after the ratification of the Union,
Holland took control of key towns for its defense in the provinces of Gelderland and Brabant.1
In short, Holland took the lead in the Union of Utrecht and ensured that it met their defensive
needs.
Those provinces which did not side with either Union, specifically Brabant and Flanders,
were caught between the hammer and the anvil. The States of these two provinces vacillated,
hoping to secure better religious freedoms and put greater power in the States General, which in
theory still represented all the provinces of the Low Countries. In actuality, the States General
came to represent only those provinces in the Union of Utrecht, and the States of Flanders and
Brabant were seen more as an ally than a member.2 The two provinces’ delays meant that they
became the front line between the States Army, representing the States General, and the
resurgent (and better paid) Spanish forces under the command of the Duke of Parma. Beginning
with the southernmost cities of the Low Countries, Parma commenced a methodical crawl
northward subjugating all in his path. He proved to be the most successful Spanish commander
during the Revolt, conquering more cities than any of his predecessors or successors.3
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Figure 5: Map of the borders of the Union of Utrecht. Tracy, Founding, 166. This map depicts
the borders of the Union of Utrecht as of 1584. By 1579, the States of Holland had already taken
control of the garrisons in Bommel and Tiel in Gelderland, along with Heusden (not pictured) in
Brabant.
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On the “foreign soil” of Brabant and Flanders the States of Holland and the States
General had little incentive to use any restraint and resumed military inundations similar to the
ones in the first years of the Revolt. During the siege of Antwerp (1584-1585) and the related
skirmishes, the use of strategic floods was common and their effects were as devastating, if not
more so, than those experienced during the relief of Leiden. In eastern
Brabant the States Army used fire and scorched-earth campaigns to cow the inhabitants into
submission and prevent them giving any aid to Spanish forces. In other words, The States of
Holland and the States Army had no problem with unleashing the twin weapons of fire and
water, so long as they occurred outside Holland’s borders.
In areas closer to home, the States of Holland attempted to systematize the floods so as to
limit the collateral damage. These measures were part of a larger process of instilling discipline
and order within the States Army.4 They did this through the construction of fortifications not
only in Holland but in the frontier cities in the adjoining provinces, which created a buffer for the
province and helped “close the garden.” Under the direction of the fortification engineers Adrian
Anthonisz and Simon Stevin they developed a style of defenses known as the “Old Netherlandish
System.” This fortification method involved the use of earthen embankments, extensive outer
defenses, and the use of wet ditches. This last feature involved the integration of the
fortifications within the existing flood defenses and water-management systems already in place.
At the same time Dutch military planners began contemplating the possibility of
systematic and planned inundations. The end result of this long line of thinking resulted in the
first waterline in 1589, a series of defensive fortifications capable of flooding an entire region
4
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with the express goal to prevent an enemy attack. The underlying premise of this waterline was
not only to defend the province of Holland, but also to limit collateral damage through directed
flooding. In short, the States of Holland preserved the poldermodel after the Pacification of
Ghent by passing the burdens of the inundations onto “foreign” provinces while attempting to
limit the scope and damage arising from the inundations closer to home by restraining and
regulating them.

Flooding on Foreign Soil - The fall of Antwerp (1584-1585)

Prior to the Pacification of Ghent, the provinces of Flanders and Brabant had been spared
from the more tenacious and ruthless parts of the war, but that would change once the fighting
resumed in1579. They suffered isolated incursions by the Sea Beggars, such as the burning and
plundering of the town of Axel in Flanders in 1574, resulting in the destruction of two-thirds of
the town’s structures. Though devastating, attacks such as these were limited in number.5
During the Pacification, the States of Holland made a concerted effort to push the front lines
further south with the de facto seizure of land in north Brabant.6 These limited acquisitions were
the extent of Holland’s interest in the south, as their priorities lay to the east, securing defenses
along the major waterways there through which Holland could still be invaded. Conversely,
Parma devoted considerable attention towards recapturing the city of Antwerp and, by extension,
the provinces of Flanders and Brabant. In this regard, military inundations offered the States of
Holland the possibility of delaying and complicating Parma’s re-conquest without tying up a lot
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of their resources. The effectiveness of the military inundations would determine the outcome of
the siege of Antwerp, the fate of Antwerp would decide the fate of Flanders and Brabant.
The city of Antwerp, and the adjacent region of northern Flanders, was ill suited to
endure devastating tactical floods. The city of Antwerp lay on the Scheldt river which drains
into the Scheldt estuary and from there to the North Sea. During the Middle Ages northern
Flanders had only been protected from flooding with great difficulty. The sixteenth century
proved no less problematic for the area. A major flood in 1530 resulted in the “drowned lands”
of the island of South Beveland at the mouth of the Scheldt river. Despite attempts by merchants
in Antwerp and nearby Mechelen to reclaim the land it was a lost cause. The All Saints Day
Flood in 1570 led to the widespread abandonment of lands and a political contest among several
provincial, civic, and regional organizations over paying for the repair work, estimated around
91,000 guilders.7 Further to the east around Axel, water management suffered because of
economic woes resulting from the declining salt trade and political re-alignments between the
city and local water board.8 All across northern Flanders the water-management infrastructure
was in dire need of repair and restoration.
When Parma first approached Antwerp on 3 July 1584 he found the area immediately
around the city already flooded on the Prince of Orange’s orders. These opening salvos set the
tone for the general course of the siege. The States Army used these floods in an effort to disrupt
Parma’s “unvarying routine” of siege warfare. This involved isolating the city from the
surrounding countryside with cavalry attacks, setting up siege lines around the city, and if a city
was situated on a river, like Antwerp, constructing a river blockade. The States Army hoped the
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Figure 6: Inundations during the Siege of Antwerp. Fans Hogenberg, Dijken doorgestorken bij
Antwerpen, 1585. Available at Rijkmusem: http://hdl.handle.net/10934/RM0001.collect.447991.
This image provides a view of the dike breaches associated with the siege of Antwerp, visible at
the top of the image. Note the various broken dikes and the fortresses which Parma constructed
on the remnants. The famous boat bridge is visible in the center of the picture. Note also the
extent of the flooding.

198

inundations would prevent Parma from encircling the city and isolating it. The tactic failed,
however, as Parma quickly captured the Koevenstein dike on the eastern bank of the Scheldt
river.
Parma and his forces were the clear victors in the early stages of the siege. The initial
round of dike breaches and flooding had not had the intended effects. Although large sections of
the countryside stood underwater it was not enough to drive out the Spanish forces.
Additionally, many sections of the dikes still stood above water and they became the sites of
small pitched battles which the Spanish usually won (See Figure 5). These victories allowed
them to set up small forts and redoubts and tighten their grip on the city. Furthermore, Antwerp
became increasingly isolated as many of the surrounding towns which had sided with the Union
of Utrecht surrendered to Parma, some without a shot fired.
The biggest obstacle, however, from the States’ perspective, was Parma’s floating boat
bridge. It comprised a series of interconnected boats which stretched across the Scheldt river
with defensive fortifications on each shore. It took him several months to construct, but once
completed, it effectively completed his encirclement of the city. The States Army could no
longer resupply the city via the Scheldt river. The strategic location of the blockade downriver
(north), also allowed Parma to escape having to attack the city’s modern and imposing citadel
which was located upriver.9
The rebels were not without alternatives, however, and tried to break up the siege both
directly and indirectly. The most direct route for the rebels was to demolish the boat bridge
which choked the city. Parma had staked the success of the siege on his ability to close off the
9
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city, noting that it would either be “his sepulcher or his pathway into Antwerp.”10 Conversely,
this logic meant that destroying the boat bridge would save the city.
Fittingly, the final plan for breaking the blockade came from a disgruntled Italian military
engineer, Federigo Giambelli, who prior to the Revolt had sworn his loyalty to Philip II. The
Spanish king’s rejection of Giambelli’s numerous plans for war machines and other military
technologies left the Italian disgruntled. He left Italy and settled in Antwerp, vowing that, “the
Spanish would one day hear him spoken of in a way that would make them regret they had
scorned his offers.”11 The Spanish siege had landed on his doorstep, and he did his best to fulfill
his pledge.
His plan was nothing revolutionary, but it proved effective. It entailed a different take on
the use of fire ships, burning vessels which were sent sailing among an enemy fleet that wreaked
havoc in naval battles. In place of a fire ship, Giambelli proposed sending an explosive ship. He
loaded two small ships with shrapnel and roughly 6,000 pounds of gun powder, and sent them
down the Scheldt river on the night of 4-5 April 1585, almost a full year after the siege had
begun. One of the ships got stranded on the bank, but the other found its mark, erupting with a
deafening explosion.
The bombing served its purpose, but had perhaps been too effective. The explosion
decimated the western side of the bridge, killing roughly 800 soldiers and commanders. Months
later the Spanish were still removing dead soldiers from the site of the detonation. The shrapnel
had a blast radius of several miles, and it took minutes for some of the pieces to finally land.
Such was the shock that the defenders in Antwerp forgot to send up a rocket to signal the
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awaiting Holland-Zeeland fleet to enter the Scheldt and relieve the city. The delay allowed the
Spanish to reestablish their control over the river, and the direct route was closed. The States
Army could not save the city through a frontal assault on Parma’s forces.12
At the same time that the rebels struggled to break up the siege directly, they also
employed more indirect tactics. The indirect approach involved military inundations all along
the northern coast of Flanders (See Figure 7). Many of the small towns in the area, such as
Terneuzen and Axel, had reconciled with Parma even before siege of Antwerp had begun.
Zeeland rightly feared that these towns could serve as a launching pad for attacks and quickly
recaptured Terneuzen in 1583, which then actually served as a center for attacks by the States
Army against nearby Axel and Hulst. Once secured, the rebels used Terneuzen as a base of
operations and began utilizing inundations throughout the area.
This capture of Terneuzen was only the first step in widespread inundations along the
coast of Flanders. Over the summer of 1584 the States forces broke dikes and closed sluices in
order to drive out Parma’s forces from the area. The Spanish attempted to close the sluices and
prevent the breaches, but the area between Axel and Terneuzen became abandoned as sea waters
flooded the land. Terneuzen became a veritable island, easily defensible, and a thorn in Parma’s
side.
The rebels followed up this victory by discussing the possibility of opening up a water
passage to Ghent by flooding the land southwest of Axel. The stated goal of the inundation was
to organize the laborers as quickly as possible in order to breach not only the dikes along the sea
but all the interior dikes, so that “the water may course up to the city of Ghent.” The States
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Figure 7: Inundations along the northern coast of Flanders. De Kraker, “Flooding as man-made
disasters: Special flooding events in coastal Flanders and the inlets of the SW Netherlands, 14001600” Zeitschrift für Geomorphologie 59 (2015), 118. The areas around Hulst (A) and Axel (B)
were flooded in relation to the siege of Antwerp. The lands in Zeeland were already inundated
from natural forces earlier in the sixteenth century (E). The States forces flooded the polders in
Ijzendijke (D) and Aardenburg (C) in 1584 and again in 1621.
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Army also anticipated that these floods would hinder the ongoing siege of Antwerp.13 This
undertaking was on the scale as that of the relief of Leiden. However, disputes between the
States of Holland, Zeeland, and Brabant in the States General over the possibility of French aid
delayed the cuts until the matter became a moot point with the surrender of Ghent to Parma.14
Ghent’s capitulation was soon followed by Antwerp’s, but not before another attempt at
tactical floods by the States Army. They tried once more to capture Koevenstein dike on the east
bank of the Scheldt to flood the area and drive out the Spanish forces. The States Army along
with forces from Antwerp attacked the Spanish solders on the dike from both sides, hoping to
capture it and create a breach. When this failed the Spanish became “masters of the inundation”
around the city, as well as the river.15 The direct and indirect tactics of the States Army failed,
and the city finally surrendered on 15 August 1585 after enduring the siege for a year.
The military inundations carried out by the States Army before the fall of Antwerp failed
to have the desired effect, but there were some unintended consequences which benefited the
States forces. As a weapon the flooding had failed, but it had also helped establish an effective
defensive zone along the coast of northern Flanders. The flood waters had been more powerful
than originally anticipated, and washed away around 10,000 hectares of productive farmland.
The force of the currents and their scouring made the repair of some of the sea dikes nearly
impossible. Under the direction of the William of Orange’s second son, Maurice of Nassau, the
rebels followed up on this advantage with the capture of Axel with little difficulty. As this was
one of Maurice’s first military feats, it is interesting that he showed no hesitation to cut the
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nearby dikes and prevent the city from receiving any reinforcements. His actions demonstrate
his faith in strategic floods as a useful military tactic, and the fact that they took place in Flanders
removed the adverse political consequences.
This latest round of inundations served to create a provisional water barrier which
defended both the States Army’s defenses at Terneuzen and Axel as the two towns became only
accessible via water. Flooding the lands made for a durable defensive perimeter that the Spanish
struggled to breach. Zeeland took control of the two towns in order to arrange their governments
and military defenses, since they had already been administering the former for several years and
were better positioned to help safeguard the area. Two decades later after Maurice’s capture of
Sluis in 1604, this water barrier extended almost the entirety of the northern coast of Flanders,
from Axel and Terneuzen in the east to Sluis, Ijzendijk and Aardenburg in the west.16
In many ways the fall of Antwerp meant the collapse of the States of Holland’s war
efforts in Flanders and Brabant except for the northern fringes of these two provinces. The
military inundations failed to break up the siege of Antwerp, but from Holland’s perspective it
was little ventured, little gained. The States of Holland sent plenty of money south, but its
investment in terms of military personnel was tepid and its priorities lay elsewhere. As Tracy
observed, “In sum, while Parma concentrated on Flanders and Brabant, Holland focused on
defending positions in Utrecht, Overijssel, and Gelderland, [to the east] on the rivers along with
Holland might be invaded.”17 Similar to the situation in Holland in the 1570’s, the floods were a
more convenient alternative to traditional military campaigns and maneuvers. Stated differently,
the military inundations in the “foreign” province of Flanders offered all the military advantages
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associated with tactical flooding and none of the political downsides. Whether the inundations
succeeded or failed, it was up to the States of Flanders, not Holland, to clean up the mess.

The Meierij, Scorched-Earth campaigns, and further inundations

The States of Holland and the States Army moved away from inundations and began
using fire to secure their strategic objectives along the eastern front, in the provinces of
Friesland, Gelderland, Groningen, Overijssel and Brabant. Here, the goal was to prevent local
populations from providing aid to Spanish forces. This approach produced varying degrees of
success. In Overijssel the States Army had to abandon the practice, while in the Meierij, the
district surrounding the Spanish held city of ‘s-Hertogenbosch, suffered from repeated fires.
When the scorched-earth failed to produce the desired results the States Army began instilling
discipline in their forces in the Meierij. The fires had not scared the inhabitants of the Meierij
into submission, so the States hoped that a more orderly and disciplined army might bring them
over to their side. Neither scorched-earth campaigns nor well-behaved military brought the
region over to the States’ side, so when the town of ‘s-Hertogenbosch needed capturing in 1629
the States Army implemented inundations on a massive scale.
Surprisingly, the resolutions in the States General and States of Holland which authorized
the burning and plundering in these regions often coincided with calls for greater discipline and
organization in the army. The States wanted an orderly and restrained army as it carried out acts
usually associated with mutinous and ill-disciplined forces. Not surprisingly, however,
Overijssel was the only province which benefitted from this “discipline” (of not having their land
set ablaze) since it had representation in the States General and could argue its case. In 1584, in
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response to reports that farmers in Overijssel had aided Spanish forces the States Army adopted a
scorched-earth tactic as punishment. Shortly thereafter, the province issued formal complaints in
the States General regarding this “misunderstanding” and the resulting destruction of land. The
States General then prohibited the use of scorched-earth tactics in any lands in which fell under
its jurisdiction.18
Since the Spanish remained a threat to Overijssel, the States Army continued to use
scorched-earth tactics, but sparingly because of the hostility they provoked. The criticisms
reached a crescendo when the nobility complained that friendly soldiers in the area had done
more damage to the province than the Spanish, or the Turks, would have ever done.19 In
actuality, however, the States were restrained and limited their burning to a small area around the
town of Zutphen.20 Overijssel escaped the worst of the destruction.
The Meierij in Brabant, on the other hand, had no political representation in the States
General until much later when it became part of the Generality lands, and because of this fact it
endured a tremendous degree of suffering and devastation. The destruction here was not
happenstance, but rather a calculated maneuver on the part of the States of Holland and States
General. The town of ‘s-Hertogenbosch served as the most important and powerful city in the
Meierij district, but it had reconciled with Parma almost immediately after the Pacification of
Ghent ended.
This development meant that the southeastern corner of Holland and the States General’s
defenses were compromised. Almost immediately the States wrote to the magistrates of nearby
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Gorcum about stopping the Dieze River and flooding the area around ‘s-Hertogenbosch. They
also considered sinking ships to help disrupt the cities trade and communication.21 The flooding
and disruption of trade appeared to have had little effect.
Over the next few years the local inhabitants experienced a nearly endless succession of
lawful and unlawful plundering. In 1581 the States forces began looting the area on official
orders, followed by mutinous States Army soldiers from nearby areas. The town of ‘sHertogenbosch attempted to raise its own forces to protect the area, but they intended to pay for
it with taxes raised in the Meierij. Once it became apparent that the rural populations had no
more money to give, the soldiers from ‘s-Hertogenbosch began robbing the area they were
supposed to protect.22
By 1583 the States General decided that the pillaging the Meierij was not achieving the
desired effects and took aim at the economic foundation of the area. This round of fighting was
more targeted and ultimately more destructive. A resolution in the States General noted that any
villages which fed or helped the enemy should be “devastated, destroyed, and burnt.”23 The
States would keep up this pressure throughout the decade as a few years later the States will
continue “with the devastation and burning of all places, houses and villages” necessary to
secure their objectives. Thirty or forty villages, as well as the cities of Helmond and Eindhoven,
were burnt to the ground.24
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From a military and strategic perspective the scorched-earth policies in the Meierij
accomplished little beyond the widespread depopulation of the area. The town of ‘sHertogenbosch continued to get supplies by river and remained a threat to Holland and its allies.
In response, Maurice and the States changed their tactics in 1588, and attempted to abide by the
rules of war. Armies were instructed to purchase their supplies and could only lodge in a village
for a single night. The States forces maintained these standards for the most part and only
violated these rules during prolonged sieges.25 Perhaps a softer touch could win over the Meierij
if not the town.
The fire and water approach achieved mixed results in terms of strategic importance, but
from the States of Holland perspective the most important considerations is that the maneuvers
occurred in other provinces. The strategic floods during the siege of Antwerp failed to save the
city and put large sections of the coast of northern Flanders under water permanently.
Fortunately, from the States’ perspective, the inundations did not drown the land entirely, but
isolated the States Army’s positions in Axel and Terneuzen, improving their defense. The use of
fire in the Meierij achieved little beyond introducing widespread misery and suffering to the
area. The plundering and scorched-earth tactics were intended to bring the town of ‘sHertogenbosch to heel. No matter the results, it was up to the people living in Flanders and
Brabant to deal with the aftermath.
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Fortifications

During and after the Pacification of Ghent the States Army did well to shift the front lines
of warfare away from Holland and into the provinces of Flanders and Brabant in the south, and
into allied provinces in the east. Their goal then became to keep the situation that way, which
could best be accomplished through the construction and improvement of fortifications. This
plan required a great deal of adaptation and ingenuity on the part of the Dutch fortification
engineers; but harmonizing the flood protection with military fortifications could greatly
improve a town’s defense.
This section provides an examination of the theoretical and practical developments of
fortification design in the Low Countries. In terms of theory, the best practices of the time came
from Italian engineers who argued that fortifications should be built according to idealized
designs. These ideas came to the Low Countries before the Revolt, but never established roots in
Holland and the other provinces included in the Union of Utrecht. Instead, the “Old
Netherlandish style of Fortifications” that emerged during the Revolt adapted parts of the Italian
theories to the swampy geographic conditions of the Low Countries.
Fortification building was another element in the militarization of the landscape during
the Revolt. Unlike the inundations which damaged and destroyed dikes, sluices, and other
devices of flood protection, the fortification involved harmoniously fitting the military defenses
within the water-management infrastructure. An effective fortification needed to provide both
environment and military protection, saving its inhabitants from flooding and enemy troops. In
this regard, the fortification systems which emerged during the Revolt rested on synthesis and
the integration of new fortifications into existing flood defenses. The two best-known military
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engineers from the period, Adrian Anthonisz (1541-1620) and Simon Stevin (1548-1620), knew
this fact well and utilized their background in water management to blend environmental
considerations with military ones. In terms of practical considerations, the section closes with a
discussion of the fortifications at Gorcum, Naarden, and Willemstad. Each of these projects
encountered differing levels of complexity integrating them within the flood defenses.
For most of the sixteenth century Italy was the center of fortification innovation. The
Italians developed a number of defensive designs to cope with the new pattern of warfare
resulting from the introduction of gunpowder. These early iterations focused on theory rather
than practice, with many of the treatises beginning with a lengthy exposition on geometry. The
underlying premise of the new style of fortifications was to create situations where the defenders
could direct their fire at the enemy’s flank as they approached the walls. Enfilade fire, as it was
known, was much more effective than fire directed at front of an enemy assault. In order to
achieve enfilade fire, fortification were designed with firing angles in mind and ensuring that
there were no “dead zones,” areas which could not be targeted with artillery. Italian engineers
came to value the idea of “modular repetitiveness” and the importance of bastions to provide the
necessary platform for defensive artillery.26 By the mid-sixteenth century these were combined
with the construction of pentagonal citadels which were intended to both dominate the
surrounding region and hold the local populace in check.
The introduction of Italian fortifications in the Low Countries began in 1540 when the
Habsburg ruler Charles V decided to update the defenses of Antwerp. From this date until the
Twelve Years Truce in 1609, no less than sixty different Italian engineers plied their trade in the
area. For the most part Holland remained unaffected, for a variety of reasons. Initially the work
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focused on the southern provinces since Charles wanted to shore up his defenses along the
French border. Additionally, most of the knowledge only passed by word of mouth or through
fractional sources such as manuscripts and drawings, as opposed to formal treatises and
publications. Furthermore, the Italian engineers struggled to construct their fortifications based
on their preferred method of perfect geometry and the Renaissance notion of the “ideal city,” and
instead had to be more adaptable in their approach.27
While the Dutch borrowed a number of innovations from the Italians, such as the
effectiveness of the bastions, they developed their own “Old Netherlandish System of
fortification.” According to the military historian Olaf van Nimwegen, the chief characteristics
of this system were, “bastions set at an interval equivalent to the range of a musket shot – 300
paces or 225 meters – a fausse-braye, a wet ditch with ravelins, a continuous covered way along
the outer edge of the ditch, and hornworks.”28 This system differed from the Italian designs in
two significant respects. First, the Dutch used earth to build their fortifications as it was cheaper
and easier to find than the stone used by the Italians. Second, they used wet ditches to surround
the fortifications which suited the high water table of many areas in the Low Countries.

27

Charles van den Heuvel, ‘Papiere Bolwercken’: De introductie van de Italiaanse stede-en
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fausse-bray is a defensive wall, a raveline is a triangular fortification, and a hornwork is a
hornshaped defense.
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Most historians mention these discrepancies with little comment.29 The inclusion of
these fortifications systems within the existing water management networks of the Low
Countries, however, required considerable adaption and ingenuity. Not only did the new
defenses have to protect against an enemy attack, they also had to protect against flooding.
Integrating military defenses into flood defenses was a complicated affair.
For instance, the city of Edam, located north of Amsterdam, had numerous problems with its soil
quality. During the construction of its new fortifications 1585 the soil consistently washed away,
meaning that the town’s defenses were lower than the adjoining dikes. If an enemy controlled
the dikes around the town, they had the high ground and could fire down into the city. In 1586
they resolved the soil erosion and elevated the town’s defenses to the same height as the dikes.30
The town of Oudewater, in southeastern Holland, had recovered relatively quickly from the
Spanish massacre in 1575 and were given new defenses as early as 1585.31 The project required
a significant modification to the city’s waterways and adjoining rivers, which were only
undertaken after prolonged negotiations between the States of Holland and the villages
surrounding Oudewater.32 Brill, conversely, had attempted to improve its defenses since the first
years of the Revolt yet still encountered problems. By 1586 the city complained of its debts
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from maintaining its dike and building new fortifications. Despite the money which Brill had
already paid they still required two new bastions by the harbor and were having issues with
leaking sluices.33 Nearly every town which received new fortifications also required
modification of its water-management infrastructure to some degree (See Fortress Comparison
Chart below).
Clearly combining flood defenses with fortifications required considerable ingenuity and
fortification engineers with a background in water management. The two most important
engineers during this period, Adrian Anthonisz and Simon Stevin highlight the importance of
this background. Anthonisz was the most important figure in the development of the Old
Netherlandish system, working on no less than twenty-nine different fortifications for the States
of Holland and the States General. Stevin appears to have participated in fewer projects but
provided the theoretical underpinning for the Old Netherlandish system. In short, Anthonisz was
practical while Stevin was theoretical, but each contributed a great deal to fortifications and the
use of water for defense.
Anthonisz had a thorough understanding of water-management practices before the
outbreak of the Revolt. Anthonisz’ family background most likely put him on this track, as his
father helped with the reclamation of the Zijpe polder in the Northern Quarter of Holland. By
1566 Adrian had carried out a number of survey projects, and in 1568 the Court of Holland
appointed him as one of their surveyors because of the quality of maps. Two years later the
Rijnland water board also called on his services. In other words, by the time of the Revolt he
was already skilled in the arts of surveying, dike construction, and reclamation.
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Fortification comparison table: Details the extensive work required to fit defenses into
existing water-management systems
26 August 1586
Location
Workum
Werkendam
Gorinchem
Schoonhoven
Oudewater

Woerden

Muiden
Naarden

Medemblik

Brill

Heusden
Louvestein
Geertruidenberg
Edam
Moninkdam
Klundert

Thiel

Recommendations
Bastions, bolwerks, higher walls, and storage for
gun powder/ammunition
Sconce
Not listed
Rebuild broken walls, breastwork along the Ijsell,
haven and dike repair work, and two sconces
Repair sunken wall, work with surrounding villages
and dike count to heighten and repair sections of the
Ijsell dike. (In the case of dispute with dike count
over the Ijsell dike, the fortifications will receive
priority)
Not listed specifically, but Anthonisz already
developed a plan and is to coordinate their
construction with Leiden
Build up the west side defenses
Stone bridge along one of the walls, filled with dirt
underneath to complete the breastwork, and the
adjustment of part of the dike to deepen the canal
Change and enlarge the western bolwerk through the
demolition of several houses, a mill, and a smaller
bolwerk
Construct two small forts by the haven, repair fallen
walls and breastwork, repair sluices which are not
allowing the passage of water
Repair part of fallen bolwerk
“Deepen” the defenses with a counterscarp
Rebuild fallen walls
Elevate the bolwerk to the height of the dike along
the south side of the city
Palework along the waterside of the fortifications
and rebuild fallen walls
Broaden the walls all along the waterway and
construct the breastwork (This sufficed for the
moment, but they note further improvements will
still be required)
Anthonisz needs to visit the town before developing
plans
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Cost
(in pounds)
Not listed
2,000
12,000
5,800
1,900

3,500

5,000
1,900
(provided by
Amsterdam)
6,000

1,500

6,000
Not listed
2,200
1,500
Not listed
1,300

Not Listed

11 May 1588

Location
Woudrichem

Werkendam
Gorinchem
Schoonhoven
Oudewater

Woerden
Muiden

Gouda
Rotterdam
Schiedam
Weesp
Louvestein

Hoorne
Enkhuizen
Maaslandsluis
Bommende
Delfshaven

Recommendations
Palisades on east wall which was damaged by the
Maas when the dike broke, Haven improvements,
and redirecting part of the river
A sconce and a palisade with more housing for the
soldiers
New walls, as well as unlisted works already agreed
upon by the city and the States of Holland
Elevate the walls along the haven and improve the
breastwork,
Breastwork between the watermill and the
Waterport, and place a breastwork in one of the
long walls
A bolwerk
Elevated the dike and complete the city walls in
agreement with most recent plans, and place a
bolwerk along each side of the city running with the
Liet-dike
Many places have no fortification, rebuild fallen
walls, and elevate the them along with the bolwerks
Repair the walls
Not listed
Two small bolwerks, a sconce outside the city, and
improve the dike
The walls have fallen and the canal filled with sand,
recommend building new defenses outside of the
existing ones and rebuilding them is not practical
In a sober state and would be unable to sustain an
enemy attack
Also in a sober state
Rebuild fallen walls to protect against the scouring
of the Maas
Deepen the wet ditch and improve the walls
(Considered a priority)
Not listed

Cost
(Guilders)
2,400

300
6,000
1,500
25,000

4,000
8,000

1,000
1,500
800
2,500
4,000

4,000
5,000
1500
4,000
3,000

Source: RSH 1586, 367-370, 26 August – 11 October 1586; RSH 1588, 145-156, 11 May 1588
.
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When fighting began in 1572 in Holland, Anthonisz assisted with the improvement of the
fortifications for his native city of Alkmaar. He started out on a commission to appraise the
value of houses which needed demolished for the new defenses, but by the end of the short siege
he was given full authority over the city’s fortifications. His exploits in Alkmaar soon earned
him the opportunity to ply his trade elsewhere.
Nearly all of Anthonisz’ fortifications involved the practical matter of marrying watermanagement needs with military concerns. In 1575 and 1576 he oversaw defensive works in
cities and towns across and the Northern Quarter. In the city of Hoorn he worked on combining
the new fortifications with the harbor improvements. In 1577 he began coordinating the
complicated fortifications at Naarden, east of Amsterdam (see below). He worked extensively
on the fortifications at Schoonhoven in southern Holland in 1582 to ensure the new wet ditches
which drew in water from the Lek river did not undermine the city’s walls. By 1584, he had
distinguished himself enough that the States of Holland and Utrecht named him the
superintendent of fortifications for Holland, which increased his already taxing work load. This
was the same year that he also began work on the defenses at Willemstad (see below).34
Like Anthonisz, Simon Stevin had an accomplished background in water management
activities, which he used to help develop the theoretical underpinning of the Old Netherlandish
system of fortifications and develop methods in which fortifications could use water to improve
their defenses. Stevin had considerable hands-on experience in water-management designs, but
his lasting achievements were in his ability to abstract and systematize this knowledge so that he
could share it with others. For instance, in 1586 he published “The Principles of weight in
water,” which was the first serious advancement in hydrostatics since Archimedes, and also
34
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published a number of works on the best cogs and staves for use in windmills. He developed the
molengang, a system for the systematic drainage of lakes with water-lifting mills working in
tandem. He received a patent for this invention in 1589, but never got the opportunity to use it.
The first documented case of its use was in 1609, after his patent expired, by the famous
reclamation expert Jan Adriansz Leeghwater. After this point the use of the molengang helped
with the widespread land reclamation in Holland throughout the early seventeenth century.
Stevin played a vital role in the development of the Old Netherlandish system despite the
fact that he only worked on a limited number of actual fortifications. His major accomplishment
was in the systematization and dissemination of Anthonisz’s ideas and the Old Netherlandish
system. Although Anthonisz accomplished a great deal in terms of improving the quality and
quantity of fortifications in the young Republic, he did little in terms of spreading his ideas and
techniques beyond the small cadre of fellow military engineers with whom he worked.
Stevin, conversely, was superb at summarizing and systematizing the existing practices
for dissemination to a wider audience. This approach is clearly evident in his 1594 work The Art
of Fortification, which provides a mathematical foundation for the development and construction
of fortresses. This work served as the textbook for fortifications, beginning with definitions for
the twenty-one components of a fortress, then moving onto the mathematical premises for an
ideal fortification, before ending with discussion of debates within the field, and how to adapt
ideal designs to particular locations. In general, his maxim for dealing with these issues was that
the engineer should attempt to make the fortifications as close to the ideal design as possible.35
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Stevin’s ideas regarding water’s use in defenses is best seen in his work, New Manner of
Fortifications through a pivoted sluice lock, published in 1617. In this pamphlet he laid out how
his new sluice design could help improve fortifications through twelve different hypothetical
examples. The chief virtue of his design was that because of its robust and multifunctional
construction it could better regulate the water level in the wet ditches surrounding towns and
fortifications. It should be noted here that he never succeeded in getting his sluice built, but it
still provides a good understanding for Stevin’s views on water defenses.
Three characteristics define Stevin’s views on water defenses: completeness, integration,
and accessibility. Completeness meant that the wet ditch needed to surround the fortification
completely. Any shallow or silted up sections of the wet ditches undermined the defenses
entirely. Integration involved the incorporating the defenses into the existing water-management
system, or conversely, adapting geographic conditions to suit the fortifications. He included
several examples of how this could be achieved. For instance, if the water source for the wet
ditch was a small river which could not always provide the necessary quantities of water there
were a number of different options. The town could build sluices along the river to store water,
which could then be released as needed. Alternately, the town could create a reservoir inside the
defenses which could pump water into the wet ditch using a water-lifting mill. Furthermore, in
terms of integration, the wet ditch should complement the other forms of defense. For example,
he notes the great advantages of constructing a ravelin adjacent to the sluices and the waterlifting mills, as each component protects the other. The wet water-lifting mill keeps the wet ditch
full, the wet ditch prevents enemies from approaching the ravelin, the ravelin provides cover for
the water-lifting mill. The integrated system is a harmonious one. The final characteristic is
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accessibility. By this, Stevin meant that the wet ditch could also allow ships to reach the
fortified town. The area adjacent to the sluice essentially formed a harbor (See Figure 8).36
Stevin provided theoretical description of the possible uses of water in defenses. The
fortifications constructed at the towns of Gorinchem, Naarden, and Willemstad provide succinct
examples of the range of difficulties and the potential which these fortifications offered. These
three towns occupied the corners of Holland’s defensive land perimeter. Naarden was the
northeastern corner, Gorinchem lay directly south, occupying the southeastern corner.
Willemstad, situated in former Brabant lands covered the extreme southwest corner, with the rest
of Holland bordering a body of water either the North Sea or the Zuiderzee. Gorinchem was still
in a precarious position environmentally when fortification work began which complicated and
delayed the project considerably. The area around Naarden was in better shape ecologically but
political disputes delayed the construction. Willemstad did not suffer from any of these
difficulties, allowing the military engineers to build an ideal fortification.
The many military inundations during the first years of fighting in Holland hit the town
of Gorinchem hard. The town lay in the southern end of the Ablasserwaard along the Merwede
river. By 1582 one official in a nearby village complained that the whole water-management
infrastructure there was still unusable as a result of inundations related to the relief of Leiden
eight years prior. The following year there were reports that some dikes had still not been
repaired, a situation which became worse when heavy storms hit the area during the fall. 37

36

Simon Stevin, “Nieuwe Maniere van Stercktebou door Spilsluysen” in Engineering ed. Ernst
Crone, E.J. Dijksterhuis, R.J. Forbes, M. G. J. Minnaert, and A. Pannekoek, vol. 5 of The
Principal Works of Simon Stevin, (Amsterdam: C.V. Swets & Zeitlinger, 1966), 83–195.
37

Vermeersch, “Oorlog, steden, en staatsvorming,” 44-45.
219

Figure 8: Simon Stevin’s Idea fortification system. Stevin, Nieuwe Maniere, 146. This image
depicts one of Stevin’s more elaborate fortifications designs with his sluice. The fortified town
(A) has a number of integrated defenses. The ravelines (F and G) lie in front of the wet ditches
and overlook the two harbors (NM and OP). The sluices (HI and KL) lie in both sets of ditches
near a water lifting mill (not pictured). The dikes (D and E) protect the land behind the town
from flooding.

220

The States of Holland named Adrian Anthonisz to oversee the city’s fortifications, with
work beginning in 1584. Once construction began on the city’s defenses the precarious watermanagement systems in the area hindered the entire project. At the outset Anthonisz discovered
that the dikes and sluices in the land of Arkel to the north of the town were in disrepair and
needed attention before real work could begin on the fortifications. The situation further
deteriorated with a broken dike far to the east in the Bommel region by the city of Nijmegen.
The broken dike diverted a great quantity of water from the Waal river towards the
Alblasserwaard, which put a great strain on the Dief dike, which protected the entire eastern
border of the Alblasserwaard. The damaged dike by Nijmegen essentially began a domino effect
of potential flooding westward which threatened Gorinchem and its fortification project.
Maintaining and improving the Dief dike, however, required considerable negotiations
involving the town, States of Holland, residents of Arkel, and the Count of Culemborg. The
States tried to act as an intermediary and negotiate among these parties but encountered
immediate difficulties as it became apparent the Count of Culemborg had numerous problems
with the water-management infrastructure in his lands. He had failed to repair the broken dikes
in Bommel, had problems with spade-stekens (land abandonment), and needed to build sluices in
the Lek dike which protected the northern border of the Alblasserwaard.
In the end it took a concerted intervention on behalf of the States to complete the
necessary repairs and complete the fortification project. They sent in Abraham van Almonde to
oversee the repairs to the Dief dike. At the same time they promised to help with the
construction of two sluices in the Lek Dike. They decided to leave the broken dike by Nijmegen
for the time being since it proved to be a nuisance for Spanish forces in the Bommel area. By
1600 the city had a complete set of fortifications, with eleven bastions and a well-regulated wet
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ditch after both the States and the town contributed enormous amounts of revenue toward the
project. The ecological instability around Gorinchem served to complicate the entire project.38
The fortifications for the city of Naarden demonstrate the political difficulties in these
construction projects. Naarden and its surroundings offered the most likely route for an enemy
attack on Amsterdam from the Zuider Zee or through Utrecht. For this reason, the area
essentially became a hinterland for the powerful city to exert its political muscle and ensure its
own environmental and military security.
Amsterdam exhibited this influence most often with the power of the purse strings, using
its finances and wealth to secure its ends as evidenced from the negotiations discussed in the
previous chapter. For example, in 1584 the city paid a considerable amount for new sluices to
help drainage excess water from the Naarden lake.39 Over the next several years Amsterdam
came to increasingly finance construction projects near Naarden and Muiden as disputes over the
right to tax residents at the Kever dike located in between the two cities. The litigations dragged
on for several years which affected their revenues, meaning that when funds were short
Amsterdam would step in and resolve the situation.40
Beginning in 1585 the States of Holland began fearing a possible invasion by Spanish
forces from the east via the Zuiderzee or Utrecht. To protect their eastern border they extended
Amsterdam’s authority over the area putting the city in charge of coordinating with Adrian
Anthonisz for all the fortifications to the east in Naarden, Muiden, and Weesp. In 1586 they
decided that these fortifications still required further integration into the existing water systems.
38
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Naarden in particular needed a new stone sluice, deeper canals, and improved walls. Amsterdam
again took the lead in arranging the finances for the work and coordinating with Anthonisz.
The fortification at Naarden proved massive, dwarfing the smaller city located inside of
it. This design caused problems as previously communal lands were incorporated into the
defenses, stretching from the city towards the nearby Naarden lake. There were talks about
having Naarden take sixty morgens of land to divide among the poor to compensate them for
their loss. These ultimately stalled, and when the fear of an invasion became more pressing the
States of Holland had Anthonisz work with Amsterdam’s regents to buy up the land so the
fortification could finally be completed, and the area could once again be “fruitful.” When
Muiden needed supplies for repairs to the palisades and other defenses Anthonisz was ordered to
get supplies directly from Amsterdam. The political issues complicated the defenses in this area,
and it was only Amsterdam’s financial and political sway that overcame the challenges.41
The fortifications at Willemstad demonstrate the possibilities when the watermanagement and political issues were in better alignment, serving as “one of the finest examples
of fortress construction in the ‘Old Netherlandish Style.’”42 Originally the city was named
Rugenhil and was one of villages which Paulus Buys helped secure for Holland from Brabant as
discussed in the previous chapter. His depiction of the land as virgin land was appropriate as it
had been reclaimed in the course of the sixteenth century. The fact that it took considerable
work to build the dikes and drain the water from the land meant that the new settlements
exhibited a clear organization from the outset. This circumstance, coupled with the fact that
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there was only a small population in the town and few pre-existing structures to deal with, meant
that the Dutch could build fortifications at Willemstad based on idealized designs.
Plans for the fortification began as early as 1583 and within two years Anthonisz was
making plans for completing the work. The project seems to have proceeded rather quickly due
to the lack of any environmental or political complications. Holland had extended its authority
of the area rather heavy handedly, but also had conducted thorough assessments of the conditions
of the water-management structure. This state of affairs meant that Holland would experience
very little political opposition from the local residents (and the opposition that did exist was not
recognized as it was essentially considered conquered territory). Additionally, the military
engineers could build the fortification based on the most idealized plans and seamlessly integrate
them into the water management network. The fact that the final design was almost identical to
the original plan attests to the relatively trouble-free process of the construction project (see
figures 9 and 10).

Waterlines

At the same time that fortification engineers were busy integrating individual defenses
into local water-management systems, military planners also began thinking about using water
more expansively. This approach entailed the inundation of an entire region with the express
purpose to prevent an enemy attack. The genesis of this idea is unclear, but there were
numerous examples from which the Dutch could draw inspiration such in those in the Northern
Quarter and the siege of Antwerp. What is clear is that military planners began thinking about
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Figure 9: Plan for the defenses of Willemstad. Westra, Bouwers van Sterke Werken, 10. Plans
drawn in 1583 by fortification engineer Abraham Andriessen.
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Figure 10: Actual defenses of Willemstad. Van de Ven, Mand-made Lowlands, 131.
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how to carry out the inundations systematically, as evidenced in the example of the fortifications
at the town of Werkendam near the border to the province of Brabant. By 1589, both the States
of Holland and Utrecht had developed formal plans for a water line to protect against a possible
Spanish invasion from the Zuiderzee. The proposal “For the defense of the Nether-sticht and
Holland” was the first formal articulation of a waterline.43 The plan called for the systematic
inundations along the Holland-Utrecht border.
The origin of the waterline has proven difficult for historians to pinpoint with any
certainty. Wim Klinkert dates a provisional waterline to shortly after the relief of Leiden, when
the Sea Beggar leader Diederik Sonoy organized a series of inundations across the Northern
Quarter in 1575. In that year the rebels learned of a massive Spanish invasion to capture
Alkmaar. The “secret” plan had been leaked, allowing the Prince to advise Sonoy to take the
necessary precautions. In place of man-power Sonoy used water-power, creating a wall of floods
from Petten to Monnickendam, inundating three separate polders. The flood waters stretched
across the entire Northern Quarter from east to west and prevented a second siege of Alkmaar.44
Adriaan M.J. de Kraker suggests the inundations during the siege of Antwerp could have
given Dutch military engineers the idea. Regarding the numerous strategic floods he states,
“Moreover, repairs could not be undertaken because of the ongoing war and this soon made the
Dutch realize that such a vast flooded area could be useful in the defensive strategy against the
Spanish.” According to de Kraaker this area served as an informal water line until special sluices
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were installed to specifically flood polders in times of war. His article does not mention when
these sluices were built, but notes that the water line functioned until the year 1800.45
Chris Will begins his study of waterlines in 1585 with the little-known defeat of the
States army by the village of Amerongen along the Utrecht-Gelderland border. After this defeat
the States army opened sluices by Vreeswijk along the Lek river to prevent any further Spanish
advances. According to Will this event demonstrated the possibilities of a waterline, even
though at that point no concrete plans for the creation of one existed. The first official plan for a
waterline began in 1589-90 when Holland and Zeeland felt threatened by a possible Spanish
attack coming from the Zuiderzee. As such, both provinces began researching the creation of a
defensive line which could inundate large swaths of land to prevent an invasion.46
Even if the conception of the waterline cannot be pinpointed, the tactic was part of a
broader trend to regulate inundations. In this regard the history of the fortifications and floods
around the town of Werkendam along the southern border of Holland are instructive. The
fortification lay at the confluence of the Maas, Waal, and Linge rivers. It served as a useful
location to monitor traffic along the rivers and prevent enemy advancement along over land from
Brabant.
The geographic features of the area made it easy to carry out inundations but difficult to
control them. This can be seen in a series of disputes between the nearby cities of Dordrecht and
Gorinchem in 1581 over the stoppage of a small river. The former had stopped the river on its
own authority because it felt it impinged their river toll revenues, allowing some ships to bypass
the city. As these closures threatened to flood the entire region around Werkendam, Gorinchem

45

De Kraker, “Flooding Events,” 120-3.

46

Will, Sterk Water, 29-30.
228

reopened the closures. The disputes lasted well over a year with the States of Holland, the
Prince, and the Court of Holland all involved. In the end, the Court sided with Gorinchem since
the closures to the small rivers could lead to widespread flooding.47
Once it became clear that Antwerp would surrender to the Spanish in 1585, the States of
Holland looked to Werkendam to improve its southern defenses. Part of the project involved
making adjustments to river dikes which protected the land from flooding. While the changes
had not led directly to inundations, it was feared that any break in the new dikes would lead to
the widespread abandonment of land around Werkendam. After consulting with Anthonisz and
the Gorinchem regents, the States authorized the construction of a supporting embankment to
protect the land.48 At this point the enemy threat had abated; so with reduced military threats the
States of Holland looked to protect the land from environmental damage.
Two years later in 1589 the situation had reversed itself, meaning the States revisited the
defenses at Werkendam. The whole eastern frontier, from Njimegen to the river Ems, was under
Spanish control. Along Holland’s southern border the situation was little better since the English
garrison at nearby Geertruidenberg sold the town to Parma.49 A week after the city went over to
the Spanish, the cousin of the stadholder Maurice, Philip of Nassau, began overseeing the
immediate improvement of the Werkendam defenses. This involved a 10,000-pound payment
for completion of the fortification, including the breastwork and crown work for the adjoining
dike. The last part of the plan involved inundating the area around the unfinished fortress to
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create a water barrier, allowing them time to complete the project. Philip of Nassau ordered two
to three dike breaches “in order to prevent the arrival of any enemies or riders [cavalry].”
Similar to previous resolutions calling for military inundations, the States of Holland wanted to
carry out these floods “to the least damage of the land” and promised that they would pay for the
damages.50
Interestingly, however, the proposed inundations never took place as debates in the States
of Holland about how to carry out the breaches and their effectiveness prevented their
implementation. Only two days after the States ordered the dike cuts they wrote to the regents of
Gorinchem and Dordrecht, reminding them of the seriousness of the situation. They flatly told
the cities that the defense of Werkendam was the best way to prevent an enemy invasion. The
States implored the regents to be diligent with the necessary arrangements of labor and material
for the fortifications, while also reminding them that they would be “faultless” for the dike
breaches as they had been ordered by Philip of Nassau. Philip himself had reservations,
although, as his discussions with local residents convinced him that the proposed cuts would not
have the desired effects. As the fortification work was progressing rather quickly, Philip decided
not to breach the dikes at the present.
Over the next week he continued to research the best plans for the inundations, with the
critical issue revolving around the ideal amount of flood water. The proposed cut in the Waal
dike, downriver from the nearby city of Woudrichem, would not bring in enough flood water to
prevent enemy movements. Conversely, the plan for a breach in the Maas dike, upriver from
Woudrichem, would bring in far too much flood waters and damage the fortifications at
Werkendam. In the end the inundations never occurred as Anthonisz and Philip continued with
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the fortification at Werkendam and the adjoining sconce on the nearby dike. They made it clear,
however, that in case of an actual attack they would not hesitate to flood the land.51
The Werkendam example demonstrates that the States of Holland military planners were
interested in systematizing and regulating military inundations. Over the course of the spring
and summer of 1589 there were lengthy debates over how best to carry out the inundation. First
the States planned to use floods to create a barrier allowing laborers time to finish the
fortifications. As the work on the construction progressed well, the discussion then turned to
how best to inundate the land. What was the right amount of flood water, and which dike
breaches could achieve the desired result?
The Werkendam example is a microcosm of the larger discussions over military
inundations and the construction of a water line. The water-management historian G.P. van de
Ven provides a clear connection, noting,
Basically the system of the water defense line was very simple. The sluices of
innumerable low-lying polders were opened and water was let in, though not too little
water, for in that case the enemy troops could wade through. On the other hand not too
much water, for then the barrier could be taken with ships.52
This quandary was the same with Werkendam, only instead of worrying about attacks from ships
there were fears of damaging the fortifications. The major difference between the two was that
while the Werkendam floods were only meant to inundate a small area, the goal of a water line
was to create an impassible flood zone across entire regions. Additionally, the waterlines
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required fortifications to protect the higher elevated positions along dikes and roads that were not
flooded.
Around the same time as the debates over Werkendam, Maurice and other military
leaders began thinking about constructing a water line along the Holland-Utrecht border. The
Spanish victory at Amerongen in 1585 never resulted in a full-fledged invasion of Holland and
Utrecht, but it raised alarm bells. When the threat was most acute, as in the spring of 1588, the
States of Holland and Utrecht agreed to keep up constant communication and arrange a watch
along the Diemer dike and further south near the town of Hinderdam.53
Simultaneously both states began making arrangements for improving the fortifications in
the area along with plans for a water line. “For the defense of the Nether-sticht and Holland,” as
the plan was known, called for better fortifications all along the Vecht and Vaart rivers and
around the city of Utrecht (See Figure 11). It also included plans for systematic floods along the
same route. The sluices at the town of Hinderdam, near Naarden, would bring in water from the
Zuiderzee from the north while sluices at Vreeswijk could bring in water from the Lek to the
south. The waterline never materialized at this point because of disputes between the two
provinces over the path of the inundations. Furthermore, military successes elsewhere removed
the threat. By 1590 the strategic position of the Holland made the water line unnecessary.54
Although the immediate need for a waterline between Holland and Utrecht had passed,
the idea that they could use floods in an orderly and systematic fashion for strategic purposes still
captivated the imagination of the military thinkers in Holland and its allies. In a final attempt to
subdue the city of ‘s-Hertogenbosch and the Meierij in 1629 the new stadholder Frederick Henry
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Figure 11: Proposed inundations for 1589 Waterline. Will – Sterk Water, 31. This image shows
the flood path for the proposed inundations stretching from the Zuiderzee (top) to the Lek
(bottom).
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used a water line. During the siege he constructed a massive siege line around the city. In the
process he stopped two the Aa and Dommel rivers which flowed into the town. This served two
purposes, to reduce the water flowing into the swamps surrounding ‘s-Hertogenbosch and to
create a make shift water barrier behind the States army, protecting it from an attack from the
area. When a Spanish attack directed towards Holland threatened to end the siege he ordered the
inundation for the entire region of Altena to the north. Fire in the form of scorched-earth tactics
did not defeat ‘s-Hertogenbosch and the Meierij, water did.55 The fires did not bring the local
residents to the States’ side, nor did a more orderly and disciplined army. The States’ expert use
of water management finally subdued the city and region.
During the same year, 1629, Frederick Henry and the States of Holland and Utrecht
formalized the Old Holland Water line, previously discussed in 1589. According to Marjolein ‘t
Hart it was during this year, 1629, that the famous Holland waterline was created, which
involved inundations all along the Holland-Utrecht border. Frederick Henry arranged thousands
of pioneers and laborers to carry out the inundations, but again a Spanish withdrawal made the
strategic floods unnecessary.
It was not until 1672 that the Dutch would actually utilize the Holland waterline. In this
rampjaar (disaster year) the French king Louis XIV threatened to conquer the entire Dutch
Republic. In response the stadholder William III carried out the inundations which were talked
about in 1629. In both years local population conspired to sabotage the inundations. Some
farmers constructed unapproved dams while others secretly drained their fields. It was only
when William III threatened death penalties that locals complied with the directives to flood their
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lands.56 No matter how much the military planners systematized and regulated the military
inundations, they were still floods, and centuries’ worth of experience had taught the Dutch that
they were something to be avoided.

Conclusion

Rebuilding the poldermodel in Holland proved to be a challenging affair, so when the
war resumed attention turned towards maintaining it. The States of Holland developed two clear
strategies towards this end. They continued to militarize the landscape for strategic purposes, but
with two significant changes. The first involved ensuring the most destructive encounters
occurred on “foreign soil,” and the second entailed the development of effective fortifications
that protected the land from flooding and the Dutch from military attacks.
Shifting the theater of war to neighboring provinces was hardly a novel concept, but it
was effective from Holland’s point of view. Militarizing the landscape in nearby Flanders and
Brabant offered all the short term military benefits with none of the long term political
ramifications. The series of strategic floods during and after the siege of Antwerp were low cost
alternatives for Holland that still held out the possibility of saving the city. At the very least, the
strategic floods delayed and halted Parma’s advance northward. The fact that the inundations
were just as environmentally destructive meant little to Holland. The scorched-earth tactics in
the Meierij likewise generated considerable misery and destruction. Militarizing the landscape
in these ways required less money, and allowed the States to focus on the second approach,
fortifications.
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This tactic involved improving fortifications across Holland and its allied provinces, and
integrating these defenses into the existing water-management systems. This process was a
complicated one, and it is no surprise that Adrian Anthonisz and Simon Stevin, the two military
engineers most responsible for developing the Old Netherland fortification system, were
experienced water-management professionals. The defenses at Gorinchem and Naarden
demonstrate the political and ecological challenges in such projects. Stevin’s idealized designs
formulated in New Manner of Fortifications and the real-life defenses at Willemstad
demonstrated the strength of fortifications which harmoniously combined military defenses with
flood defenses. These fortifications served to keep the fighting out of Holland.
Over time military planners also considered the possibility of combining these two
approaches with waterlines. These were essentially ready-made floods which could put large
swaths of land underwater to prevent enemy passage. Although the origin of the idea has been
difficult to pin down, the example of the fortifications and inundations around Werkendam are
indicative of the broader trend in regulating and systematizing floods. The best military
inundations required just the right amount of water. There were lots of discussion about the use
of waterlines, and several instances when the military leaders almost used the maneuver, but it
was not until the French invasion in 1672 that it was put to the test.
These two approaches helped to preserve the poldermodel in Holland, exporting the
inundations and limiting their damage when they did occur in the province, but the States did
their best to avoid testing the strength of the newly rebuilt poldermodel. Within the province, the
States were keen not to work with local populations to avoid open conflict. During the
fortification work at Gorinchem the States brokered a number of negotiations with the city, the
Count of Culemborg, and affected local residents. The States ended up paying for a considerable
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portion of the defenses, but the manner in which they conducted the affair limited discord. At
the town of Werkendam the military leaders entered into numerous discussions with local
residents over how to flood the area in such a way that secured the military objectives and while
limiting the environmental destruction. It took considerable work to rebuild the poldermodel,
and the military and political leaders were rightly hesitant to jeopardize it.
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CONCLUSION

The only recorded resolution for the noon meeting of the States of Holland on 17 May
1583 reads, “Absolutely nothing is resolved.”57 The military inundations in the province during
the first years of the Dutch Revolt ensured that days such as this one were an anomaly, since the
delegates were often busy resolving issues arising from the militarization of the landscape. In
many ways these strategic floods tore apart the social fabric of Holland. For centuries those in
Holland worked tirelessly to protect the land from flooding. In the process they developed the
poldermodel, which promoted discussion, debate, and compromise as the best way to avoid
disastrous inundations. During the war these values were discarded in the name of military
necessity.
The strategic floods struck a landscape that was already in critical condition. Long-term
peat mining and the disastrous All Saints Day Flood in 1570 left the dikes and flood defenses
across the province in disrepair. The States of Holland’s pleas for tax waivers and exemptions
fell on the deaf ears of their Habsburg rulers, adding to the already growing discontent of many
in Holland against their sovereign and his administrators. When fighting broke out in 1572,
those who rose up in revolt were seriously outmatched in terms of manpower and organization.
This fact made the military inundations such an appealing option in terms of military objectives.
During the first four years of fighting in Holland, the rebels repeatedly released flood waters
upon the land.
The Pacification of Ghent in 1576 appeared to offer the rebels a reprieve from the
burdens resulting from the floods, but the temporary cessation of fighting actually set off a round
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of divisive political conflicts in Holland. Long standing criticisms over unrepaired dikes, tax
collection, and the allocation of the limited funds that were available generated a round of
particularistic conflicts where cities looked after their own concerns. Gouda in particular, simply
refused to send delegates to the States of Holland until the opening in the Leidschendam was
repaired. Individuals with experience in water management such as Johan van Oldenbarnevelt,
Paulus Buys, and Abraham van Almonde found solutions to these problems. These figures
helped establish a reliable tax base with the verponding and allowed cities to extend their
influence over their hinterland as seen with Rotterdam and Amsterdam.
When the fighting resumed in 1579 the States of Holland made a concerted effort to push
the front line of the conflict onto neighboring provinces. In these locations they pursued a
destructive brand of warfare, similar to the style of fighting in the first four years. Whether it
was fire or water, what mattered most to Holland is that the destruction occurred elsewhere.
Closer to home, military planners and engineers attempted to implement a sense of order and
discipline in the inundations. They incorporated the new style of fortifications within the
existing dike, sluice, and embankments already in place which greatly improved a town’s
fortifications. In the waterlines, they tried to create ready-made floods that could hinder and halt
enemy’s advance.
This dissertation posed the research question: What happens to the poldermodel when
polders were intentionally destroyed during the Dutch Revolt? In short, the militarization of the
landscape in the form of strategic floods broke the poldermodel. Yet this was not the only
consequence of the inundations. As previously noted, these intentional floods struck at the core
of Dutch society. For centuries, the Hollanders diligently worked to protect their land from
flooding. During the Revolt, the rebel forces violated this tacit rule of Dutch life as they
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militarized the landscape and weaponized the flood waters. Is it any wonder that tremors from
these events would be felt elsewhere? The range and variety of topics discussed in this
dissertation are a result of those tremors. The reverberations of military inundations were felt in
domestic politics, financial and taxation matters, fortification designs, and intra-provincial
negotiations.
Going into this research, I promised myself that I would let the sources speak for
themselves and not try to fit them into some prepackaged argument. I should have been more
careful with what I wished. Reading through the Resolutions of the States of Holland and the
other sources, there was a cacophony of voices discussing the military inundations. The people
of Leiden offered shouts of joy as the saw the waters creep towards their city. Those in Gouda
raised their voices in rage, and then fell silent refusing to talk with the other rebellious cities.
Politicians like Johan van Oldenbarnevelt spoke the language of water management, and slowly
helped the cities of Holland learn how to once again sing in relative harmony. Others, like
Simon Stevin and Adrian Anthonisz simply spoke in terms of rationalization and
systematization, about how those in Holland could best utilize water for military purposes.
While there is a plethora of voices calling out from the historical source material, there is
a distinct shortage of scholars today willing to listen. Individuals like myself, who stake their
claim at the intersection of environmental history boulevard and military history avenue, are all
too few. This dissertation demonstrates that there are numerous paths of investigation which
sadly remain untraveled. The militarization of the landscape was not limited to Holland in the
late sixteenth century. Wars stretched all across Europe in the early modern period, yet we know
surprisingly little about how the environment impacted, and was impacted by these events. So
much of the scholarly attention has focused on the monetary colors of gold and silver in these
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encounters, but there is a good case for re-examining warfare through an environmental green
lens, or in the case of Holland, a watery blue one.
This type of research is vital for a number of reasons. First, it fills in a sizeable lacuna
within the existing scholarship. Military history works usually highlight the flood’s impact in
determining the victor of a given encounter, while environmental historians have been slow to
evaluate military issues. In many other works, the tactical floods are glossed over or portrayed
as a diversion, a side story to the main argument of the work. Scholars briefly introduce the
inundations, discuss their destructiveness, and then note the length of the interval until a sense of
normalcy (pre-war conditions) returned. Addressing this gap in the scholarship means that
scholars must examine the floods from both a military and environmental perspective. The same
waters which saved Leiden became a burden for the people living in Holland well after the
Spanish forces withdrew, and in order to do the subject justice, it needs to be studied holistically.
Second, viewing the history of Holland through a blue lens substantiates and supports
arguments within the wider historiography while also challenging the foundation of those same
claims. In other words, this research supports several widely held views on Holland’s history,
yet it also suggests alternative explanations for their validity. For instance, scholars have
provided a number of religious, economic, and political arguments to explain why there was such
a gulf in priorities between the Habsburg monarchy and its subjects in the Low Countries. This
research similarly highlights their diverging viewpoints, but provides an ecological origin in the
form of the All Saints Day Flood. Another example can be seen in the interpretation of civic
power in Holland. There is nearly universal agreement among scholars that the cities and the
regent class were the real power brokers in Holland politics. The findings of this dissertation
support that point as well, but focus here is put on the politicians such as Oldenbarnevelt who
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ceded civic control over the countryside in order to repair the poldermodel. The push to instill
discipline in the military, a foundation of the military revolution debate, can also be traced to a
reaction against chaos produced by the widespread tactical floods. In some ways this
dissertation simply affirms some well-established arguments within the historiography of the
Low Countries. Yet, in other ways, this research challenges those same views, offering different
explanations for their validity.
Third, this approach demonstrates the centrality of the complex negotiations between
Hollanders and their watery environment throughout history. That is not the same as reducing
Dutch history to a stereotypical account of Hans Brinker or the boy who stuck his finger in a
dike. Rather, as this dissertation shows, the people of Holland carried out intensive debates in
the Middle Ages and during the Revolt. These talks were not only between Hollanders and their
landscape, but among themselves over the best ways to carry out these discussions.
The negotiations rarely, if ever, left all parties satisfied. During the Middle Ages the
Hollanders developed the poldermodel, an inclusive form of decision making, yet by the
sixteenth century there were serious issues with the flood protection in the province, as
evidenced by the creation of the great inner sea of the Haarlemmermeer. After the All Saints
Day Flood struck in 1570, the Hollanders opened up negotiations with their Habsburg rulers for
tax exemptions to fix the broken dikes and sluices. When these talks broke down and the rebels
took control of Holland, they enlisted the support their watery environment to escape Spanish reconquest. In the process, several cities became disgruntled and the consensus-forming spirit of
the poldermodel briefly disappeared, to be restored when politicians gave cities greater control
over their surroundings. Afterwards, the cities of Holland agreed to export the strategic floods
and limit their destructiveness in the event of future uses.
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Framing these interactions in terms of a relationship offers the best opportunity for
generating traffic at the intersection of environmental history boulevard and military history
avenue. It encourages military historians to look at the landscape not as a blank chessboard
awaiting its pieces, but as a dynamic character, with agency of its own. As soldiers dug trenches
and engineers planned fortifications they were making demands on their environment. Nature’s
answer could often play an important role in a military encounter and have profound and
unanticipated effects. The rebels used strategic floods during the sieges of Leiden and Antwerp,
yet only the former was saved because of natural forces. Two encounters, two different results
with a victory and a defeat, yet many in Holland could be relatively satisfied with both results.
The relief of Leiden meant the Revolt continued, while the loss of Antwerp, although
disappointing, did nothing to disrupt the newly restored poldermodel in Holland.
Similarly, utilizing a framework of relationships invites environmental historians to study
the impact of warfare on grounds with which they are more comfortable. The initial works
which set the agenda for the discipline highlighted the importance social and ecological
relationships. As this dissertation demonstrates, the effects of warfare are felt well beyond the
battlefield, influencing financial, social, and political developments. Focusing on relationships
allows environmental historians to examine these events, and see how they change over time.
These scholars do not need to avoid addressing the consequences of warfare as if it is obstacle to
their larger points. Instead, as this research shows, combining military history with
environmental history provides a more holistic understanding of events in a way that both
supports and challenges the existing historiography.
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